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ABSTRACT
How can we use immersive and interactive technologies to portray stories?
How can we take advantage of the fact that within immersive virtual en-
vironments people tend to respond realistically to virtual situations and
events to develop narrative content? Stories in such a media would allow
the participant to contribute to the story and interact with the virtual
characters while the narrative plot would not change, or change only up
to how it was decided a priori. Participants in such a narrative would be
able to freely interact within the virtual environments and yet still be
aware of the main trust of the stories presented. How can we preserve the
‘respond as if it is real’ phenomenon induced by these technologies, but
also develop an unfolding plot in this environment? In other words, can
we develop a story, conserving the structure, its psychological and cul-
tural richness and the emotional and cognitive involvement it supposes,
in an interactive and immersive audiovisual space?
In recent years Virtual Reality therapy has shown that an Immersive Vir-
tual Environment (IVE) with a predetermined plot can be experienced as
an interactive narrative. For example, in the context of Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder treatment, the reactions of the participants and the thera-
peutic impact suggest that an IVE is a qualitatively diﬀerent experience
than classical audiovisual content. However, the methods to develop such
kind of content are not systematic, and the consistency of the experience
is only granted by a therapist or operator controlling in real time the
unfolding narrative. Can a story with a strong classical plot be rendered
in an automated and interactive immersive virtual environment?
The thesis developed through this document is that it is possible. Spe-
cifically the thesis is that this can be achieved through two principles
of interaction that we call ‘ATP’ and ‘Substitution’. ATP stands for
‘Advance The Plot’, and it is an underlying goal of the system to always
find the best action possible in any given context that will advance the
state of the story being expressed. The second principle, Substitution,
states that the human participant in an immersive interactive story can
assume the role of any character or, what is equivalent, that if he does
not do what the system expects him to do, a virtual character will do
it instead. To implement such principles, a story cognitive model named
Trama is proposed. The purpose of such a story model is to give arti-
ficial agents a guide to decide what to do in an interactive situation in
such a way that the human participant has the impression of interacting
within one or more narrative plots.
To validate such method, three experiments address the main assump-
tions of the approach.The first one is concerned with whether people inter-
act with virtual characters in a similar way they do with real people, ana-
lysing this in a particular aspect of interpersonal communication, namely
interpersonal distances. The second assesses whether people identify with
their virtual bodies, which is one of the basic assumptions underlying the
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principles of interaction proposed. The third experiment shows that the
story model allows to implement stories in such a way that people can
interact within an immersive virtual environment while conserving the
impression there is a narrative plot, and that they have assumed a par-
ticular role in it. In addition to the experiments, we explore whether the
formalism developed within the Trama model captures some aspects of
the important role that stories have in cognitive development.
RESUM
Podem emprar la realitat virtual immersiva per contar històries? Com po-
dem aprofitar el fet que dins dels entorns virtuals immersius les persones
tendeixen a respondre de manera realista a les situacions i esdeveniments
virtuals per desenvolupar històries? Els participants en aquest tipus de
narrativa podrien interactuar lliurement amb els entorns virtuals i no
obstant això experimentarien les històries presentades com a plausibles i
consistents. Una història en aquest medi audiovisual permetria als parti-
cipants interactuar amb els personatges virtuals i contribuir activament
als esdeveniments escenificats en l’entorn virtual. Malgrat això, la trama
establerta a priori no canviaria, o canviaria només dins els marges es-
tablerts per l’autor. Com podem preservar el fet que hom tendeix a "re-
spondre com si fos real" induït per aquestes tecnologies mentre desenvolu-
pem una trama en aquests entorns? En altres paraules, podem desenvolu-
par una història conservant-ne l’estructura, la riquesa cultural i psicolò-
gica i la implicació emocional i cognitiva que suposa, en una realitat
virtual immersiva i interactiva?
Recentment la teràpia de realitat virtual ha mostrat que un entorn vir-
tual amb un guió preestablert pot ser percebut com una narració inter-
activa. Per exemple, en el context del tractament de Trastorns per Estrès
Postraumàtic, les reaccions i impactes terapèutics suggereixen que pro-
voca una sensació de realitat que en fa una experiència qualitativament
diferent als continguts audiovisuals clàssics. No obstant això, la consistèn-
cia de l’experiència tan sols pot ser garantida si un un terapeuta o op-
erador controla en temps real el flux dels esdeveniments constituint el
guió narratiu. Podem representar un guió clàssic en un entorn virtual
automatitzat?
La tesi principal d’aquest treball és que és possible. En concret, la tesi
és que això es pot aconseguir a través de dos principis d’interacció que
anomenem ‘ATP’ i ‘Substitució’. ATP significa ‘avançar en la trama’
(Advance The Plot), i és un objectiu inherent en el sistema per trobar, en
qualsevol context, la millor acció possible que farà avançar la història con-
tada. El segon principi, Substitució, formalitza el fet que el participant
humà en una trama interactiva pot assumir el paper de qualsevol person-
atge o, el que és equivalent, que si no fa el que el sistema espera que faci,
un personatge virtual ho farà en el seu lloc. Per posar en pràctica aquests
principis, he introduit un model cognitiu d’història anomenat Trama. La
funció d’aquest model és donar als agents artificials una guia per decidir
què fer en una situació interactiva, de manera que el participant humà
té la impressió d’interactuar dins d’un o més guions narratius.
Introdueixo 3 experiments per abordar els principals supòsits d’aquest
mètode. El primer avalua si les persones interactuen amb personatges
virtuals de manera similar que fan amb persones reals en un aspecte
particular de la comunicació interpersonal: les distàncies interpersonals.
El segon estudia fins a quin punt hom s’identifica amb el seu cos virtual,
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un dels supòsits bàsics subjacents als principis d’interacció proposats. El
tercer experiment mostra que el model Trama permet implementar les
històries de tal manera que les persones poden interactuar en un entorn
virtual immersiu tot conservant la impressió que participen en un guió
narratiu subjacent on hi assumeixen un rol concret. També exploro si el
formalisme desenvolupat reflecteix o prediu algunes de les moltes funcions
que les històries tenen en el desenvolupament cognitiu.
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INTRODUCTION
1.1 motivation
The technology to render Immersive Virtual Environments (IVE) has
existed as a practical tool for the last 20 years. As it is suggested by its
name, Virtual Reality research has exploited this technology mainly to
simulate reality and create realistic responses (Brooks Jr, 1999). This has
also motivated its adoption as a methodological tool within behavioural
and cognitive sciences.
However, IVE can also be seen as a medium in its own right (Slater,
2009). Much in the same way radio, cinema or television started repro-
ducing theatre to then develop their own conventions, IVE could also
be exploited as a narrative medium (Pausch et al. , 1996). Nowadays
there exist methods and tools to develop a complete simulation of, for
example, the Star Wars universe. Such simulations can be rendered in
a Head Mounted Display in order for a person to experience it from a
first-person perspective. The main events of feature films could even be
rendered within such environment.
What are the particularities of IVE that make them diﬀerent from video-
games or movies? There are essentially two (Slater, 2009). IVE provoke
the impression of being in some place despite the objective knowledge
that this is not the case. This is called a place illusion. In addition, if
there are graphical representations of people, IVE can also make people
feel as if they were in a social environment with other people despite
the objective knowledge these are not real. This crucially depends on the
plausibility of their interactive behaviours. When these two aspects are
granted in an IVE, participants tend to respond as if they where exposed
to a real situation. 1
This has been exploited in IVE scenarios demanding interaction with vir-
tual characters. It seems intuitively clear that such environments could
be used for interactive storytelling: there are virtual characters, parti-
cipants react to and interact with virtual characters in many ways, and
they still have the same understanding of a certain psychology of the
characters they are confronting and can report an underlying plot. It
has been shown that people show realistic responses to IVE that depict
an emergency that requires intervention from the user (Herbelin et al. ,
2005), a violent incident in a bar (Rovira et al. , 2009) (see figure 1.1) or
1 For the purpose of clarity: throughout this document we will use immersive as a
technological characteristic: it is provided by Head Mounted Displays (HMD) or
three-dimensional projections coupled to sensors that render environments with a
perspective consistent with the subjects’ position. Depending on how the Immers-
ive technology is used it may or may not provoke the feelings of place illusion and
plausibility, or make participants respond as if it was a real situation.
2 introduction
an intimate conversation with flirtation connotations (Pan et al. , 2012).
However, to ensure this plausibility these kind of immersive virtual en-
vironments are not completely automated: there typically is a human
operator behind the system to choose at each moment the appropriate
response the virtual characters should perform, using a Wizard-of-Oz ap-
proach. If we want to completely automatize the interactivity within the
IVE using current techniques, the extent to which the person can interact
within such environments has to be severely restricted. Otherwise, the
plausibility of the scenario can no longer be maintained (see, for example,
Zerroug et al. (2008)).
1.2 research objectives
The question we seek to address in this work is the following: is it possible
to develop a story, conserving the structure, psychological and cultural
richness and the emotional and cognitive involvement it requires, in the
context of this type of interactivity and immersion? Throughout this
document we will try to argue that it is. The main thesis we will develop
is:
1. It is possible to develop interactive stories within immersive envir-
onments, and we propose a practical method to do so
2. Using this method the participant will be able to participate in the
story and interact with the virtual characters while the story con-
serves its psychological most interesting features: coherence, plaus-
ibility, etc.
3. Any story developed with such a method can be processed with a
set of software agents
The method developed is based on a series of assumptions that we have
tried to test experimentally. In particular:
1. Contrary to traditional media, a person immersed in this kind of
content will react to virtual characters in a similar way than in a
real social interaction
2. A person immersed in this kind of content identifies automatically
and implicitly with its virtual body
3. When immersed in a particular story people manage uncertainty
and take decisions consistently with the context depicted by the
story plot
Throughout this document we will also argue that the method intro-
duced can help to clarify on an experimental basis why stories are so
important in memory, learning, planning, decision-making, and a wide
array of other cognitive activities. However, this last point will not be
supported by experimental results, but rather by pre-existing results and
by experimental predictions that could be validated in the laboratory.
The scope of this work does not cover the automated generation of stor-
ies, neither it does build on massive implementation of interaction from
which a story would emerge. It rather tries to adapt the typical pro-
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Figure 1.1: In an immersive virtual bar an argument between supporters of dif-
ferent football teams forces a participant to take the side of one
of the two virtual characters. The experiment is designed to assess
whether the participant will intervene or not, and has been presen-
ted as a study on how people address a moral dilemmas. Rovira
et al. (2009), reproduced with the permission of the authors.
cess of scriptwriting, staging and editing that we can find in audiovisual
industry to an interactive environment. A participant in such an environ-
ment would be able to interact within the domain of the story, and modify
the unfolding story at the extent its creator would have decided a priori.
As we will try to show, this requires for careful scripting and staging
of the events that form it, in the same way a story is told within audi-
ovisual industry. Therefore, the approach is ideally suited to deal with
a small number of characters in a carefully scripted sequence of events
forming a story. However, the way such stories are processed is intrins-
ically distributed so using this method it would be possible to portray
stories with sequences of events arbitrarily large, several simultaneous
plots up to an unlimited number and in general to render arbitrarily
complex interactive environments.
1.3 document overview
After this introduction, chapter 2 reviews the state of the art in tech-
nologies relevant to tell stories within IVEs. It contains three main parts.
The first addresses at what extent interactive technologies have developed
or exploited stories in their content. It overviews existing applications in
virtual reality therapy, in video-games and in interactive drama. The
second focusses on artificial situated agents, the main system by which
virtual characters in video-games achieve decision-making in real time.
The third part briefly overviews some of the existing tools to develop
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such kind of content and does some considerations about the production
methods.
Chapter 3 is concerned with framing a story definition taking ideas
from several lines of research dealing with stories –Fields such as cultural
anthropology, cognitive psychology, or applied linguistics. The aim is to
introduce a definition that is consistent with how these fields develop the
notion, but that it still allows treatment by computing machinery. The
first experiment (chapter 4) studies a particular feature of non-verbal
language, namely interpersonal distances, in an immersive and dynamic
environment. The relevance of non-verbal language for communication in
immersive virtual environments seems to be a natural consequence of the
immersive nature of the displays considered, but it has wide implications
on the way one might interact with the virtual characters.
In chapter 5 we develop two principles of interaction: the Zelig Interac-
tion Metaphor as a general interaction paradigm and Providence as a
general principle to guide the plot of a story. It explains why these general
principles derive in two simple rules of implementation named Substitu-
tion and Advance The Plot (ATP). The second experiment (chapter
6) is concerned with at what extent a participant identifies himself with
a virtual body, which is an implicit assumption of the Zelig Interaction
Metaphor.
Chapter 7 completes the theoretical elements needed to be able to tell a
story exploiting the immersive and interactive capabilities of virtual real-
ity. It develops a formal story model allowing concrete implementation
of these principles. The basic intuition behind the formalism introduced
is that to represent a story plot we can use the formalism of lattice the-
ory.2 The practical purpose of the Trama model is to be used as a guide
for a software agent. An artificial situated agent can use such model to
decide what action to trigger in an interactive situation, relatively to
a certain scripted and acted story, appearing to understand what he is
doing -although not doing so-. The story model introduced is a cognitive
model in the sense that, while trying to be psychologically plausible, it is
precisely defined in terms of information theory, it can be implemented
by programming and it is empirically testable with the usual methodo-
logy of cognitive sciences. The third experiment (chapter 8) validates
the practical use of the Trama story model on a limited scale using a
simple scenario.
Chapter 9, the discussion, has three parts. First, it reviews the results
and addressing at what extent the method developed solves the problem
at stake and what would be needed to facilitate the creation of such kind
of content. A second part addresses whether the story model introduced
does capture some of the aspects of stories as they are “in the world”,
and whether this can be used to do some predictions within cognitive
sciences. Does the model imply a story is a way of ordering information?
Is it a good one? Does the model account for the relation of stories with
the cognitive development of humans? What would this imply that can
2 The story model is named Trama because in Catalan both plot and lattice are trans-
lated as trama. In english, it also sounds quite near to Drama, which is not unrelated
with what it is about.
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be measured with the techniques of cognitive neuroscience? The third
part attempts to outline some of the ethical questions that seem to go
together with the possible widespread development of this new way of
telling stories. After this, the Conclusion chapter summarises the work
done and possible directions for future work.
Finally, three appendixes are added after the conclusions. Appendix A
gives a detailed outline of the implementation of the Trama model in
artificial agents equipped with an Extended Behaviour Network (EBN)
to make decisions. Appendix B develops in further mathematical detail
the definition of causal relation introduced in chapter 7 and discussed
in chapter 9 in order to address the notion of causal inference at the
light of theTramamodel. Appendix C is a summary of the mathematical
definitions and notation developed throughout the diﬀerent chapters.

2
TECHNOLOGIES FOR INTERACTIVE STORIES
I like smog, traﬃc, kinky people, car trouble,
noisy neighbors, crowded bars, and spend most
of my time in my car going to the movies –
Tom Waits1
2.1 introduction
The fast development of rendering and interactive technology has facilit-
ated the creation of diﬀerent kinds of media that claim to be narratives
at the same level that movies or novels are. In immersive virtual reality,
where participants are immersed in a fully surrounding environment, and
sometimes there are characters that interact with the participant, there
has been limited work.
The first article reporting the use of immersive technologies for storytelling
involves the adaptation of an animation movie to an immersive environ-
ment (Pausch et al. , 1996). It basically consisted of the contents gen-
erated for the Aladdin feature film adapted to be displayed with im-
mersive technologies, plus a method to navigate through the immersive
space created. However, since then there has been small or no improve-
ment in the study of how the plausibility of a virtual environment could
be maintained while enriching how it interact with the audience or the
participants.Application scenarios where such compromise needs to be
addressed is generally achieved using a Wizard-of-Oz approach, where
the decisions are taken by an operator.
The main development of stories within automated interactive virtual
environments has been, despite not being immersive, within the video-
game industry. However, the development of interactive entertainment
industry has resulted in a set of quite strictly specified genres of video-
games. Interactive Drama has been sought as an alternative that would
overcome the narrative limitations of video-games. However, there are
few fully implemented interactive dramas. A diﬀerent kind of progress
has been in the interaction techniques. There are nowadays solutions
oﬀ-the-shelf available to interact in many diﬀerent ways that were not
available before.
After this introduction, section 2.2 introduces IVE used in virtual real-
ity therapy which have an underlying narrative scenario. The reader will
notice that in order to ensure the plausibility of the diﬀerent events depic-
ted in these application scenarios there is generally an operator choses at
run time what the characters should do. The rest of the sections address
interaction with automated virtual environments.
1 as found in www.tomwaits.com
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Section 2.3 describes diﬀerent techniques of interaction with virtual en-
vironments. Section 2.4 focusses on the main video-game genres, and
discusses the main limitations of the existing approaches. Section 2.5
does the same with the most developed approaches to interactive drama,
addressing questions such as: at what extent does interaction prevent nar-
ration? Section 2.6 surveys on the existing methods to program artificial
situated agents that are able to perform decisions in real-time, which is
a critical part for a plausible interaction with virtual characters. Section
2.7 introduces some considerations about the production of video-games
that illustrate some of the problems of the current approaches on inter-
active content with narrative content. This last part is not exhaustive,
but intends to give to the reader a notion of the kind of challenges one
must consider when addressing the generation of virtual characters with
plausible behaviours.
For purpose of clarity, we will use the term story following Stein (1982),
where a story is formed of events that must be causally related and the
behaviours occurring must be goal-based. For elements with only some
of these properties we will use the more general term narrative.
2.2 narrative virtual environments in virtual real-
ity therapy
Immersive Virtual Environments have been used for several kinds of ther-
apy. One of the most succesful application scenarios has been to treat
war veterans suﬀering posttraumatic stress disorder (Rizzo et al. , 2011).
The procedure adapts therapies initially designed to be used with mental
imagery and replace the imagined scenario with a much more concrete
exposure: the patient is immersed in a three dimensional audiovisual
representation containing some of the main elements provoking a trau-
matic response. Such procedures have also been used to treat diﬀerent
kinds of anxiety disorders, including several kinds of phobias. In many of
these cases, virtual reality exposure has shown to be at least as eﬀective
as other therapies, including exposure to the real stimuli provoking the
pathological reaction (Gerardi et al. , 2010).
It has also been shown that virtual reality exposure could be used on
other anxiety disorders related to body image. For example, Gutiérrez-
Maldonado et al. (2010) showed that patients suﬀering eating disorders
after pretending to eat in an immersive virtual environment with virtual
food and virtual social feedback could show distortions in body-image.
There is now enough evidence to state that virtual reality exposure has
therapeutic benefit in diﬀerent anxiety disorders. However, to grant the
exposure to the virtual scenario is kept within the apropriate therapeutic
window and that the events in the virtual environment appear as plaus-
ible to the patient, there is generally a therapist choosing in real time
which events should occur at each moment.
This is appropriate for relatively small virtual environments and ther-
apies on a limited number of patients, but it limits the complexity of
the scenario depicted in the IVE and the scale at which such therapy
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can be applied. It seems therefore necessary to address at what extent
automated interaction with IVEs can be achieved.
2.3 interaction with virtual environments
Real-time interactions in a virtual environment are standard in video-
game technology, and in recent years innovative ways have appeared in
commercial products. For example, the wiimote is a controller of the Wii
console that allows to detect hand gestures such as pointing or pretending
to play tennis (see figure 2.1).
Recently, Microsoft has released a device named Kinect which enables
gesture recognition, facial recognition and speech recognition. It is con-
stituted of hardware and software that merges a camera a depth sensor,
a matrix microphone and a specific software development kit that allows
to detect speech, facial expression, gestures and position (see figure 2.2).
This turn in entertainment industry has brought to the general public
the possibility of interacting with a virtual environment in much richer
ways.
There are also other toolkits to detect these features. Today many tools
with acceptable success ratio exist for speech recognition in English. Some
allow defining a grammar for phone-like interactions, such as the CSLU
toolkit 2, others operate on a word-spotting approach such as HTK3 or
Sphinx 4. As well, large thesauri such as Wordnet 5 allow looking for
synonyms of clue words. Exhaustive phonetic description of words is also
available in dictionaries such as BEEP 6 , which is very important for
English because of the diﬀerence between phonetic pronunciation and
written text. Apart from word recognition, speech includes non-verbal
aspects speech such as intonation curves, usually marked with “?" or “!".
Specific tools such as PRAAT 7 exist for the recognition of such patterns.
There also exist commercial packages that can be used to perform this
same task.
Finally, gestures such as pointing to an object instead of naming it -
as is done generally in everyday conversations- are sometimes processed
with data gloves or another tracking technology that does hand tracking.
For immersive environments, very precise tracking tools exist. Diﬀerent
companies such as Intersense and Optitrack oﬀer diﬀerent qualities and
prices of tracking technologies that can capture such raw information.
However, these tools do not extract more abstract features characteristic
of natural interaction. For example, there is no oﬀ-the-shelf software that
can take this data as input and tell if a human participant is loosely point-
ing towards a particular direction or object as we do in everyday conver-
sations. Despite some work demonstrating that this kind of more abstract
data description, such as aﬀective states, can be extracted automatically
2 http://cslu.cse.ogi.edu/toolkit/
3 http://htk.eng.cam.ac.uk/
4 http://cmusphinx.sourceforge.net/html/cmusphinx.php
5 http://wordnet.princeton.edu/
6 http://svr-www.eng.cam.ac.uk/comp.speech/Section1/Lexical/beep.html
7 http://www.praat.org
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Figure 2.1: The wiimote is a controller of the Wii console that allows to detect
hand gestures such as pointing or pretending to play tennis.
Figure 2.2: The Kinect systems is constituted of a hardware that merges a cam-
era a depth sensor and a matrix microphone and a specific software
development kit that allows to detect speech, facial expression, ges-
tures and position.
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from raw motion data (Bernhardt & Robinson, 2007); in general detect-
ing such features is currently done with software developed specifically
for each particular need and technical setup. The same applies for captur-
ing facial expressions. Although there is some work showing it is possible
to recognize some non-verbal language features such as facial expression
and to relate it to abstract categories such as emotions (El Kaliouby &
Robinson, 2004), there is at present no oﬀ-the-shelf tool to do so.
There are also other ways of interaction that have been explored separ-
ately from entertainment industry. There has successfully designed inter-
active immersive virtual space that interacts by processing the physiolo-
gical responses of the participant, or diﬀerent correlates of biological
activity via movement or physiological recordings. Perhaps the best ex-
ample of this is the installation Osmose by C. Davies 8, where a par-
tially representational, partially abstract visual aesthetic is used to con-
vey some presence-engaging relation with an abstract audiovisual space.
This is useful to feel involved in or concerned with a virtual space, as very
easily participants perceive some relation between their activity and the
context, but it doesn’t seem to allow developing a narrative in a strong
sense.
2.4 narratives in video-games
2.4.1 Introduction
There has been some eﬀort to combine a narrative plot with the typ-
ical interaction of a video-game. Despite this not being rendered within
immersive technologies, it is undeniable that video-games provide the
best and most often achieved interaction with a virtual environment,
and have developed at present into very complex virtual and interact-
ive worlds. There has been a long-ongoing discussion regarding whether
video-games are not in themselves a new form of narrative, such as was
cinema when it was invented.
For example, Pearce (2002) identifies in a video-game common elements
with a story, such as the presence of goals, obstacles, resources, and in-
formation. This information can be know to all players or only to some of
them, and be obtained progressively. The author argues that the stories
are often the general metaphor giving the context for the game interac-
tion, but that video-games are not the same than stories. Juul (2001)
argues that despite gamers can tell stories about their game and games
feature narrative introductions and back-stories, there are at least 2 ba-
sic diﬀerences: time in games and in (non-interactive) stories is managed
diﬀerently, and the involvement of a spectator or reader is qualitatively
diﬀerent from the one of a player.
The latter distinction seems consistent with the use of the term story
for a medium with the specific content that can be found in traditional
tales, feature films and novels, and the use the more general notion of a
narrative for any kind of content that can have some of the properties
8 http://www.immersence.com
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of a story, but is not strictly such. For example, a seminar presentation
of some research project can have some backstory to facilitate its under-
standing, but it is not in a strict sense a story because there are technical
details that are not relevant for the motivation of the characters involved,
there are no emotional reactions related with the outcome of the hero,
etc.
2.4.2 Narrative aspects of diﬀerent video-game genres
A classification of the very wide array of video-games necessarily intro-
duces some arbitrariness. Lewis et al. (2007) suggests that gamers group
games first by content -the setting or the aesthetic- and second by the
mechanic of the interaction, and these two properties appear as largely in-
dependent factors. Moreover, the technological factor -what is the graph-
ical quality, speed of the processor, etc.- is quite irrelevant in how they
classify video-games. Finally, it seems that the principal concern of de-
velopers matches this gamers’ mental space of games, even if developers
take more into consideration technological factors. So, there are at least
two reasonable dimensions from which to start: aesthethics and mechan-
ics of interaction. As in principle it is possible to tell a story in any kind
of setting or aesthethic environment, we introduce a classification that
focuses on the mechanics of the interaction.
Fight
The fight genre involves controlling a virtual character who fights with
other characters. The challenge of the game consists in, pressing com-
binations of buttons, to make the character perform the movements
to beat the other character(s). The three main sub-genres are the beat
’em up, the tournament and the ego-shooter. The first is a side-scroller
where the player encounters numerous smaller enemies before reaching
a boss at the end of each level. Final Fight or Double Dragon are clas-
sical examples. The tournament style consists in one-to-one competitions
evolving through rounds until the participant wins the tournament. The
fighting is usually more intricate than in the beat’em up subgenre. A very
popular example of this kind of video-game is Street Fighter II.
Another major subgenre are the ego-shooter games, which involve a first-
person perspective including a view of virtual hand handling diﬀerent
kinds of arms, generally guns or other projectile throwing devices (see
figure 2.3). They are thus rendered in a fully three-dimensional space.
The mechanics of interaction always involve a simulation of some fight
between two characters or two teams, one of which can be controlled by
a computer or not.
Despite the fact that some of the main action titles have attained very
high levels of popularity, in terms of narrative they seem to provide
a persistent lack of diversity: characters have to respond very fast to
player control. As a result of this, characters have a rather flat personality
and the whole story consist of figthing until you win or your character
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Figure 2.3: The typical visual perspective in a first person perspective fight
videogame, as can be found in Freedom, an open version of the
video-game Doom
dies. Recently, however, games such as Bioshock imply more intricate
narratives, in the sense that the development of the game can imply a
diﬀerent ending, or that the world in which the game occurs and the
actions involved in the game provide a more powerful metaphor closer to
a “message” such as can be usually found in fables and often movies.
In general, there are also titles that propose variations from the previous
scenarios, or mixes with other genres. For example, in a role-playing game
there can be some elements of a fighting video-game.
Role-Playing
In this genre the task of the player, as with their paper and pencil coun-
terparts, generally consists of developing the skills and resources of a
particular character or set of characters to achieve a certain amount of
goals or missions. Due to historical reasons, the dominant aesthethics is
in some imaginary medieval age but it is not a mandatory rule. There
are diﬀerent kinds of role playing games, some in which the characters
have to go through a quite closed pre-defined path ( the Final Fantasy
series, for example), others in which there are lot of secondary plots and
characters not directly involved in the main narrative path. These last
are named sandbox games, such as can be found in the Grand Theft Auto
series. This last example also shows how this kind of games can some-
times be mixed with the simulation genre –e.g. driving a car while also
assuming a role– or the action one.
An additional variation to this kind of game is the development of Massive
Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games, commonly known asMMORPGs.
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Examples such as World of Warcraft or Lord of the Rings Online provide
a huge virtual space in which massive multiplayer interaction is often
combined with several goals that the participant must achieve. This is
achieved by means of a lot of levelling up: by gaining experience the
character gains strength, speed, etc. which allows him to then adress the
goals or missions.
Examples of a relatively recent evolution of the genre would be Mass Ef-
fect and Infamous. In them the participant has some elections to choose
among moral paths. In Infamous this is done with a karma system, and
the outcome of the game will change according to what path the parti-
cipant choosed. In Mass Eﬀect the actions outline a more professional
military personality or a more renegade one. The answers of the other
characters change depending on these aspects.
In all the cases, what the participant is generally involved is in devel-
oping his character, which implies getting higher scores in some kind of
statistical model of a personality. Then, these higher scores will change
the likeliness of obtaining a result or another when facing a situation of
uncertainty such as a combat or another challenge. This kind of involve-
ment with the improvement of his character, which sometimes involves
long periods of time, can lead to a certain degree of identification with
its character.
Adventure
Another very old kind of video-game, existing even before computers had
graphical content, is the adventure genre. The first one, which coined the
name of the genre, was Colossal Cave Adventure,also known as Adven-
ture. Adventure games are characterized by a gameplay not requiring
reflex challenges or action, but rather advance by solving situations by
interacting with the characters or the environment. Contrary to the role-
playing game, the situations to solve seem more like a puzzle than a
competing situation.
A major seller in such genre was Mist, which worked on a point and click
basis, but also Monkey Island, which in addition implied choosing among
a finite amount of options in a dialog. Diﬀerent worlds and aesthetics such
as Loom were also popular. This kind of paced interactivity enables the
development of a coherence within the narrative of the gameworld, which
can depict scary ambients, humorous situations, and so on.
The genre of adventure games enables a richer independence of the vir-
tual character from the actions of the player, so in these games it is
possible to depict some personality traits of the character. In general
such traits do not change based on the actions of the participant, but
there are exceptions. As Pearce (2002) indicates, an early exception can
be found in the Blade Runner video-game. The video-game, exactly like
the movie, consists in hunting replicants -synthetic humans devised as
purpose-specific slaves- through a science-fiction world. The movie itself
was edited several times, and in some of the publicly released versions it
ended up with its main character discovering he was himself a replicant.
In fact, the notion of a “Director’s cut” started with that movie. In the
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video-game version, integrating the diﬀerent endings the movie had, the
virtual character “becomes” a replicant or a human depending on the
actions of the player.
Also, some elements of role-playing games can be used: the character can
develop in the sense it can obtain more weapons, powers, or skills. An
example of a game combining evolution of the character and aspects of
role-playing and adventure games is Infamous.
Strategy
Strategy games started as computer versions of board games such as Dip-
lomacy or Risk. They imply making strategic decisions, the skills required
are thinking and planning, and the goals generally involve exploration,
extermination of the ennemy, etc. Typically, the perspective is a God-like
one, or the one of a general with an overview of their troops. Each player
typically makes his decisions on a turn-based fashion, with no temporal
limit. Once he’s decided what to do, the consequences are seen or simply
told to the player. A typical video-games of this kind is the Civilization
series.
An important variation of such general schema are realtime strategy
games, in which the turn based approach is substituted by a continuous
stream of events. An example of such genre would be the Age of Empires
series. In such examples, the strategic decisions have to be made in real
time, and the tasks over the population controlled have to be assigned
continuously, as is the stream of events triggered by the machine or other
players. In terms of narrative, it is possible to delineate a plot: if World
War I can be told by considering countries to be particular characters
and their interactions the actions that ended up reshaping the end of the
colonial Europe, so can the set of battles that lead to world domination in
such games. Moreover, not all the characters are identical: there are dif-
ferent kinds of characters that assume diﬀerent roles in order to achieve
the common goal. Despite this, the principle of a strategic game itself
asks for an open end, this is what makes it interesting. Moreover, the
way the temporal managment is done, as Pearce (2002) already noted,
presents substantial diﬀerences with a story.
Puzzles, mazes and platforms
Puzzle games are best represented by Tetris, created by Alexey Pajitnov,
which has been considered the greatest video-game of all time. The task
of the player is to place falling pieces of diﬀerent shapes to form rows. As
many other video-games in the genre, and unlike traditional puzzles, such
games have some temporal aspect to add pressure to the solution of the
task. On the other side they share with traditional puzzles the tendency
to be abstract representations not involving any character whatsoever.
This suggests this genre should not even be considered, but there are
exceptions to this rule. For example, the recent Echocrome, as created
by Jun Fugjiki involves changing the perspective of a 3D structure in
order a small figure can go through a series of points.
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The novelty of such game is that the geometry of the structure changes
with the perspective: a hole hided by a column in front of it will not
exist anymore, and the character will cross it instead of falling down.
This is an exception to the puzzle genre in the sense that it does involve
a representation of a character, and that 3D representations are required
to work. Moreover, its musical soundtrack seems closer to the one that
could be expected from a movie or a character-based video-game such as
Infamous than from a typical video-game. Therefore, puzzle games can
certainly have some narrative aspects.
Maze and platform games involve navigating or jumping around an en-
vironment avoiding obstacles or potential harming characters. They are
well represented by games such as Pac-Man, Super Mario Bros. and
Sonic the Hedegehog. Crawford (1984) and many others consider maze
and platform games as a subgenre of action games, which would include
also fight games. Space Invaders is the first game in this very large genre,
which probably makes this genre the oldest genre in video-games. How-
ever, such a large category is too large to be useful here. If we present
them together with puzzles it is because the mechanics of the interaction
seems nearer to some of the so-called puzzle games: Pac-Man seems more
similar to Tetris than to the kind of skill you would need to play Street
Fighter. Moreover, and unlike fighting games, the visual complexity of
the scene depicted does not seem to contribute to the involvement in the
game.
Simulation
This genre consists of games that simulate some activity. Major sub-
genres are sports and music games, in which the participant is asked to
drive a car or a plane, simulate playing tennis, or play a guitar. Spe-
cific goals can be given –for sports, they are generally the same that
their real world equivalents– or the simulation can be open ended, such
as occurs sometimes in flight simulators, in which the game consists of
piloting a plane,with no specific purpose. These kind of games often ad-
opt specific props to interact with the virtual environment like steering
wheels, guitars, etc. They are possibly the kind of games that have first
exploited the new kinds of interactivity introduced by motion interfaces
such as the wiimote: when this device appeared there were reports on the
news of televisions being smashed when gamers, while playing a tennis
video-game, lost grasp of their wiimote in the intent of hitting a stronger
serve.
Simulation games also have subgenres that link them close to other
genres. For example, the very popular SimCity, as initially developed
by Will Wright, is generally considered to be a simulation game. How-
ever, the task of the player is similar to strategy games: he has to decide
what to do in a city from a god-based perspective. In this case, he plays
the role of the city hall, making decisions on domains such as taxes, roads
and energy plants. The main diﬀerence from typical al strategy games is
that there is no warfare involved, the game is open-ended, and the player
can decide if he prefers to see the flourishing and progress of his city, or
to drive it towards decadence and destruction. An extremely succesful
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spinoﬀ from SimCity is The Sims. This video-game surpassed Myst in
sales, becoming the most sold video-game in history. It has a logic similar
to SimCity, but now on a personal scale: the task of the players is to tell
the characters to interact with the TV, with other Sims, or with objects
surrounding them. With this they evolve and can attempt to obtain their
life goals. In this sense, it is obviously a simulation game, in which what
is simulated is the life of some citizens. But the main task of the player,
just as in role-playing games, consists of evolving the characters: it is an
example of a video-game from both genres.
Sandbox games
Finally, sandbox games, or sandbox modes in particular video-games al-
low open interaction with the environment with no explicit goal, and
often combine elements of the adventure, action or role-playing genres.
For example, the last releases of the Grand Theft Auto series, can be
thought to be a car simulation game, but there are also goals to achieve,
fights in which one can get involved, a whole open world with which you
can interact, including characters that are just there for interaction but
are unrelated to any particular path. In such cases, it is sometimes con-
sidered that the narrative emerges from the creative interaction between
the player and the virtual environment. But then, they are at the same
title that dance, an oral presentation or music are: video-games can have
a temporal dimension, expressive content or involve characters with a per-
sonality, goals and motivations, but there is no causal relations between
the actions of the characters, the temporal flow does not follow a par-
ticular path intended to provoke the dramatic or comic eﬀects that are
found in stories.
2.4.3 Discussion
The video-game industry has looked intensively at how to handle inter-
activity with a simulated environment. But it seems video-games cannot
be considered stories as found in fables, novels, theatre, or feature films.
There are several reasons for this:
Stories are just used as interaction metaphors
As Pearce (2002) notes, often in video-games stories seem to be reduced,
basically, to facilitate the understanding of what the player should do. In
video-games, when there is a story told there is no interaction possible:
the story plot is often an introduction to lead to the interactive part
which is the corpus of the video-game itself, or pieces of narration are
inserted between pieces of interaction. It gives a context to the player
from which he can start to govern his character. Sometimes, it is even
seen as an annoyance (see, for example, Metal Gear Solid 4 ).
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Games involve chance, stories destiny
Chance and destiny are opposite faces of a coin. This is generally regarded
as an unsolvable diﬀerence in video-game industry, one for which only
compromise solutions can be developed.
Take, for example, a very popular movie such as Saving Private Ryan.
It involves soldiers in a war scenario. It clearly tells a story, there is a
carefully timed sequence of events put in place, and characters have a
well depicted psychology. The likeliness of having a similar sequence of
events in a strategy game involving the same kind of war scenario is
extremely small, and it would only happen in one of many of the times
the game is played.
In general, in video-games the part that outlines the plot is separated
from the part in which interaction is possible or, if it occurs simultan-
eously -for example, like is the case in real-time strategy games- there
is little interaction among the two. Despite recently it seems that some
titles relate the actions of the character with moral consequences in their
outcome, the character does not have a destiny, in the sense it not always
reaches it. It is the task of the player to ensure this arrives. This will be
discussed in more detail in the context of Interactive Drama, where the
approaches proposed specifically adresses this problem.
Characters are flat
Despite Pac-Man, Mario and Sonic having had an undeniable and per-
sistent cultural impact, the characters involved in it are not more than
signs representing the player, or as (Newman, 2004, page 130) quotes
from (Jenkins & Fuller, 1995, page 61):
[in video-games,] characters play a minimal role, displaying
traits that are largely capacities for action ... The character
is little more than a cursor which mediates the players’ rela-
tionship to the story world.
To this it can be argued that these examples are very primitive video-
games. What about role-playing games? The player has one or many
characters to control, they grow and evolve and sometimes they have
particular goals to achieve. Even, in some cases the moral aspects of the
characters’ actions have consequences in the outcome of the game. But
the changing attributes do not translate in actions: the personality of a
video-game character does not determine what they do, contrary to what
happens in stories through all mediums. Rather, it determines what it
can do, leaving the decision to the player.
And adventure games? There are two kinds of adventure games. Classic
adventure games do not give direct control of the character to the player.
Rather the player has to discover the way in which, from interacting with
the elements in the situation in which he is, he can make his character
advance. If he does not do it, the system just doesn’t respond. Thus the
character makes only the actions that are consistent with its personality,
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at the price of having infinite patience to wait for the player to come up
with the right answer.
The other kind of adventure game combines such tasks with other activ-
ities such as jumping and running. Here, an interesting contrast can be
made between the fiction characters of Indiana Jones and Lara Croft.
Both are archeologists adventurers.The first was created as a character
in a movie series and then was ported to an adventure game. Lara Croft
was created as the main character in a video-game series, and then por-
ted to movies. They both have the same kind of background story, both
are impersonated by very talented and famous actors, and it is easy to
agree that, despite both characters being very famous, the personality of
Indiana Jones is clearly better depicted that of Lara Croft’s.
In fact, it seems fair to say that the identification of the audience with
the characters in a story is done because of their personality traits and
how this translates to their actions, while in video-games the identifica-
tion with the characters occurs precisely for the opposite reason: because
of the control the player exerts over the actions of the character. The ex-
ample of blade runner previously introduced suggests a way forward: the
actions change the internal nature of the character, its psychology, and
hence his destiny in the outcome of the game. But this has never been
developed systematically within a videogame genre.
It is simply a diﬀerent medium
Think of a game and a story with a similar general narrative, one that
would involve a character motivated by an insatiable ambition trying to
avoid haunting ghosts that try to harm him. In this general description
one can identify a very successful video-game such as Pac-Man and a
very successful story such as Hamlet, but it is hard to find anything else
in common apart from this very general narrative.
This is not the same as saying that actions in games are not dramatic, as
Crawford (2004) suggests. In a movie, killing someone can imply a tragic
moment. Think of the movie the Godfather : the potential death of the
Godfather, even if the character is a bad person, worries the spectator. In
other cases, such as in Pulp Fiction, a death can provoke a funny eﬀect.
But in general it is intended to provoke some emotional reaction. Now,
consider a death in a standard egoshooter game: a death has no emotional
significance of any kind. But this is not a general rule: in adventure games
deaths can have comic or tragic eﬀects, and in action movies deaths do
not have dramatic or comic consequences. In the simulation genre, the
interaction is based precisely in simulating a particular activity, such as
some sport or creative activity such as playing an instrument or singing.
Therefore, it seems clear that a simulation video-game is a narrative at
the same extent that riding a bike is: you can make a story of such an
activity but it does not constitute one as such.
At a more abstract level, all video-games involve some kind of simulation.
Frasca (2003) proposes to contrast games and traditional stories such as
drama arguing that the main defining characteristic about the first is
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simulation, while for the second it is representation. This would make
them essentially diﬀerent media.
2.5 interactive drama
2.5.1 Introduction
Interactive Drama (ID) appeared as a reaction to the turn video-game
industry had taken. Chris Crawford explains it quite clearly(Crawford,
2004, page 349):
I dreamed of computer games about duty and honor, self-
sacrifice and patriotism. I dreamed of satirical games and
political games; games about the passionate love between a
boy and girl, and the serene and mature love of a husband
and a wife of decades; games about becoming a man, and a
man realizing that he is no longer young. I dreamed of games
about a man facing truth on a dusty main street at high noon,
and a boy and his dog, and a prostitute with a heart of gold.
The obvious lack of such content in video-games motivated his shift to
Interactive Drama. Apart from theoretical approaches that describe how
an interactive drama should look like (Murray, 1997) or on what prin-
ciples it could be based (Glassner, 2004), all the existing approaches that
try to implement an Interactive Drama have in common that they try
to do so by abstracting aspects of a drama in order to formalize them
in some system of artificial intelligence. Then such systems are either
used as a generative method for stories, either to guide the events in an
interactive space preserving a formalized dramatic aspect.
2.5.2 Generative approaches
All the generative aproaches to interactive drama consist of formalizing
some of the salient features of stories and then introducing a generative
procedure that respects these formal constraints while reacting to the
actions of the participant. For example, Cavazza et al. (2002) proposed
the automatic generation of stories from the interaction of virtual char-
acters. Such virtual characters respond to hierarchically defined tasks,
declared a goal to achieve, composed of several subgoals. The formalism
used to declare these are Hierarchical Task Networks (HTN). In such
content, the participant can interact with narratives by changing objects
involved in the tasks. For example, if character A needs object B to do
task C and the participant takes object B then the character has to find
an alternative way of doing task C. Through the interaction of the diﬀer-
ent characters, a particular story is created. Then, the main concern of
the design process is to conserve a certain genre, while allowing diﬀerent
stories to occur. In this kind of aproach it is often said that story emerges
from the interaction of the characters (Chang & Soo, 2008).
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Other approaches, instead, rely on the formalization of formal constraints,
often extracted from the narratology literature (Cavazza & Pizzi, 2006).
In such case, the constraints are rather a guidance to organise the se-
quence of events generated by a storytelling engine. The task of the en-
gine is essentially to optimize a problem: compare what weight is given
to the predefined sequence of events, and what weight is conceded to
take into account the users’ interactions. To do so, for example, Cai et al.
(2006) use an optimization method to reestimate the goals of the char-
acters from the actions of the participants, in order the overall result of
interactions results in a more consistent plot. This is done by represent-
ing high level knowledge with diﬀerent weights and establishing ad hoc
causal relationships. Many other aproaches exist, however. For example,
Nelson et al. (2006) uses reinforcement learning to do the same kind of
optimization on a diﬀerent drama manager.
Other work has enriched the knowledge domain of virtual characters.
These generally derive work from litterary or psychological theories to
then define internal variables that formalize knowledge on the psycholo-
gical domain. Pizzi et al. (2007) has integrated states corresponding to
feelings in the virtual characters, intending to add further believability
to the decision domain. In a completely diﬀerent system, Si et al. (2010)
has modelled cognitive apraisal inside a multi-agent architecture (Si et al.
, 2005). Murray (2005) has tried to embed interaction of the participant
inside the story “fitting" narrative formal constraints to his actions.
2.5.3 Dramatic guidance of interactivity
Already Weyhrauch (1997) proposed interactive drama to be based on
an aesthetic evaluation function that can judge the quality of a User’s
experience; and an adversary search mechanism that can eﬀectively guide
the User’s experience by using the evaluation function. In such system the
interaction was guided through a so-called aesthethic function, which
expressed the aesthethic preferences of the author of the drama in a
formal language.
The most accomplished development in this aproach is a fully imple-
mented interactive named Façade (Mateas & Stern, 2003). The overall
narrative is that the participant is an old friend of a couple whose mar-
riage is dramatically falling apart. As the participant interacts with the
characters and the environment, the plot gently unfolds. Mateas & Stern
(2005) describes their starting point: they want to allow freedom of inter-
action to the participant, something which generally translates in to the
feeling of agency in a virtual environment in which there are dramatic
events occurring in real time. This asks for some Narrative Artificial In-
telligence to process, as the authors say, character-rich, causally-sparse
yet coherent plots. The strategy adopted is acknowledged to be a solution
to the inherent tension betwen game and story. But how does it work?
The user input is given with a text box, in which he can write at any
moment of the drama. The input is processed in a specifically developed
language (Mateas & Stern, 2004b), which is a rule-based system that
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maps specific content to a pragmatic meaning. The writtings of the par-
ticipant are considered to be discourse acts, and what the rule-based
parsing system intends is to find the pragmatical meaning of such acts.
For example, if the participant gives as input “Hello, Grace” or “How are
you doing, Grace?”, the maping will produce:
1 _iGreet AND _iCharacter ( Grace )
This kind of representation intends to map the language used by the par-
ticipant to the pragmatic meaning associated with it. It can also process
gestures, such as approaching one character or another. The implicit as-
sumption in such a language is that the dramatic events will guide the
actions of the participant towards the direction expected, and the lan-
guage he will use will be within the rules defined previously. The following
step is deciding what consequences do these inputs have in the events
going on. To avoid the combinatorial explosion of branching structures,
they use two techniques.
First, they break down the narrative events into diﬀerent fronts that
run simultaneously, and are constituted of events that in general are
causally independent, despite some points in which the progression is
not. The first part of the drama intends to determine on which side
of the two characters the participant lies, an aﬃnity game. This will
be determined along the interactions between the participant and the
virtual characters. In addition, some of the words of the participant can
be processed as incendiary topics that will make virtual characters react
agressively, independently of the previous aﬃnity game.
Second, they organize the story in what they call narrative sequences.
At a coarse level, their implementation is organized sequentially in beats,
and it is at this level where the causal dependence among major events is
handled. The transition to one beat or another is decided with a variety
of variables previously annotated by the author: preconditions, weights,
priorities, and so on. Then, at runtime the drama manager matches the
tension arc -which is also specified by the author- with these variables, to
follow with the beats to match the general tension desired by the author.
The fine detail of the behaviour is accomplished with Joint Language
Behaviours (JLBs), which are dramatic interactions among the 2 virtual
characters. The beats are constituted of 10 to 100 JLBs. These manage
goals specific to the beat and transform them into concrete behaviours,
with modifiers that change these behaviours taking into account the users
input. Thie managment of such goals and JLBs is done by a custom nar-
rative sequencer. In addition there are also JLBs specific to each beat
that intend to guide the participant back to the specific goals of the
beat, and general ones, which involve actions not specifically involved
in the narrative plot, such as comments about the furniture, drinks, or
satellite topics to the main plot of the story. A JLB, taking as input
the outcome of the parsing system intended to extract the pragmatical
meaning, is written like this (Mateas & Stern, 2004a):
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1 s e qu en t i a l behaviour OpenDoor ( ) {
p r e cond i t i on {
3 (KnockWME doorID : : door )
(PosWME spr i t e ID == door pos : : doorPos )
5 (PosWME spr i t e ID == me pos : : myPos)
( Ut i l . computeDistance ( doorPos , myPos) > 100)
7 }
s p e c i f i c i t y 2 ;
9 // Too fa r to walk , y e l l f o r knocker to come in
subgoal YellAndWaitForGuestToEnter ( doorID ) ;
11 }
A beat is then defined as a certain amount of these rules to achieve
some dramatic eﬀect desired in the particular beat. By processing these
rules, the actions of the characters are decided within each beat, and also
the transitions among beats are triggered. This way of breaking down the
narrative acts avoids the combinatorial explosion that would be expected
in a classical branching tree. Then, finally, there is a rendering engine
which plays the animations the JLBs map to.
The result, according to the authors, is that going through the whole
Interactive Drama lasts aproximately 20 minutes. This generally involves
going through 15 beats. The total content of Façade is organized in 27
beats which involve around 2500 JLBs. The feeling of Agency they wanted
to provoke in the participant seems to occur on the short term, but not so
much in the long term: despite the participant having the impression he
could aﬀect the short term course of events, this feeling was not conserved
on the long term. They insist this would have not occurred if they had
more beats implemented, which was not possible because of a lack of
more authoring time. The process of designing and authoring all the
JDBs, apart from the design of the platform, implied more or less 3
person/year. As they say, this is more than a standard research project,
but far less than what a standard video-game production involves. The
conclusion they draw is that one of the ways forward for the workload
burden is to integrate procedures with a higher generative component to
author JLBs.
Other authors use diﬀerent terminology for similar elements. For example,
in the system developed in Crawford (2004) beats are named Events, and
JLBs are Formulas. Despite the systems have some diﬀerences, thiey
both need additional scripting to relate all these elements.
2.5.4 Discussion
There are not many examples for discussing the properties of Interactive
Drama. The possibilities of Interactive Drama are more the domain of
a research field rather than a mature clearly defined media. However,
from the existing examples, it is possible to depict some strengths and
limitations of the approach.
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Decisions need to face uncertainty
Crawford (2004) already noted that in a movie such as Star Wars: A
New Hope, the main character, Luke makes essentially 6 choices, some
of which are Rescue Princess Leia, Run away from Darth Vader or trust
the force to blow up the death star. However, an interactive version of
such a story would make the election trivial: no one would choose NOT
to rescue princess Leia, for example. This is because decisions in stor-
ies are generally well motivated –because of the psychological make-up
of the characters, their desires and goals. Therefore, these kind of de-
cisions would not work for interactive stories. He states: A story-world is
composed of closely balanced decisions that can reasonably go either way.
In this picture, the task of the story-builder is to create and harmonize
such decisions in order to obtain an unfolding stories. There needs to
be uncertainty in the decisions adopted. Typically, much like in informa-
tion theory, this uncertainty is defined by branching strucutres. However,
creating consequences for each of these options seems to imply a combin-
atorial explosion of branches, or to present many decisions that are not
actually real ones because they end up with the same result.
Let’s look how this is solved in Façade, the best example available of an
Interactive Drama. In this story the participant is assigned the role of
an old friend visiting a couple whose marriage is dissolving. The strategy
adopted is to reduce the interactions of the participant to rather cas-
ual chatting, and the dramatic consequences of such actions are left to
the interactions among the two virtual characters. The incentive for the
participant to actually do the actions the system expects him to is to
discover what the situation is about, who are these characters that treat
him as an old acquaintance. In social terms, what is expected from the
side of the participant is to respect basic social rules and to ask ques-
tions relevant to the situation that the authors have depicted. In this
sense, as the story is realistic, so is the interaction, and therefore the
decisions of the participant have to be realistic. But the actions of the
participant cannot provoke major dramatic changes in the decisions of
the virtual characters and the consequences of their interaction will re-
main essentially unchanged. The main changes will be the election of
certain beats over others to satisfy the dramatic curve. The fact that the
plot advances loosely and has diﬀerent simultaneous fronts only helps
to create this eﬀect: apparent uncertainty in the interaction but a priori
defined outcome.
In generative approaches, this problem is not addressed: decisions will
really make stories change. However, having consequences for actions
comes at the price of losing any possibility of a carefully planned se-
quence of actions, or major emotional consequences associated with stor-
ies. Therefore, it seems to be the same case as with adventure-action
games previously discussed: characters are flat, and the story has no
emotional consequences for the participant.
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The participant has to be the protagonist
The previous point derives from an essential problem of interactive drama
which is defined as an interactive experience in which the participant is
the protagonist of an unfolding story. Considering the participant as the
protagonist of the story implies that he can disrupt the story at any
moment by a lot of means: by doing any action the system does not
expect him to do. In Façade, despite the participant does not seem to be
the protagonist of the story being told, the story advances mainly from
his actions, and therefore he can also break the story if, for example, he
does not respect basic social rules or doesn’t ask questions relevant to
the situation depicted by the other characters.
The questions asked when addressing interactivity in the context of writ-
ten stories are still valid: can narrative coherence be saved when inter-
activity comes into play? There doesn’t seem to be any obvious strategy
to address this (Ryan, 2000, chapter 8), and Façade, which is the only
solution fully implemented to date, solves this problem only by means
of a loose plot advancing in diﬀerent fronts. It also assumes the parti-
cipany will fully collaborate. This is acknowledged by the authors and
assumed as an initial decision: only a loosely advancing plot allows a
space with a lot of interaction. But this would not work for a classical
strongly directed plot.
The assumption that the participant has to be the protagonist supposes
that the participant knows what he is supposed to do in every plot-
relevant situation. In a standard play or movie this is previously scrip-
ted, but in this case it is hard to understand how someone can be the
protagonist of a story if, for example, he is quite passive.This brings to
the general conflict already mentioned for video-games:
Stories are directed by Fate, interactivity by Free Will
This is acknowledged as a fundamental problem that cannot be overcome
in a general way. In the Façade system, if the participant does not respect
these social rules, the system quite rapidly does not recognize them as
some of the options designed by the author. Because the plot advances
with the actions of the participant, if this occurs the impression of being
part of a story rapidly falls apart.
In generative approaches, there is not really a Fate because the story can
change. This suggests it is a similar case to video-games. This motivates
the addition of a Drama Manager, which is another autonomous agent
that imposes a certain amount of constraint to the possible outcomes.
The result of this combination seems clear: open interactivity at the small
level, and fate at the large one.
This kind of approach seems a description in more abstract terms to what
occurs in Façade, and we do not know of any other example of a Drama
Manager publicly available to be tested, so in principle the same criticism
would apply to it: the success in conserving a story within an interactive
experience critically depends on the collaboration of the participant. But,
as Newman notes (Newman, 2004, page 96):
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interactivity is not simply a matter of individual players being
active. In this way, and perhaps echoing the sentiment at the
heart of a ludic approach to video-games, playing a video-
game may be no more meaningful a phrase than watching TV
which, as Ang (1996) notes, is no more than a shorthand label
for a variety of multidimensional behaviours and experiences
implicated in the practice of television consumption.
This evokes what Crawford (2004) puts forward repeatedly: the success
of an Interactive Drama critically depends on what the human parti-
cipant can do. In this view, the problem in Façade would be that the
space of actions allowed to the participant is too large, and therefore his
collaboration and therefore restriction of the domain in which he places
his actions is really needed to have a proper impression of an unfolding
interactive story if at some point of the experience the participant is not
engaged enough to figure out what role he should adopt. This can be seen
as the inverse of the situation in a classical video-games: in a classical
video-game the interaction is so restricted –only pressing buttons and a
finite amount of actions– that the participant cannot take part in a story.
Here the participant can say whatever he wants, so he has to self-restrict
himself in order the story is not broken.
Crawford goes further (Crawford, 2004, page 51) and identifies the prob-
lem with a scholastic dilemma characteristic of medieval theology: de-
terminism against Free Will. If God is omnipotent and omniscient, and
therefore can determine the world at his will, how can it be that humans
can decide freely what to do? If they decide freely, then God is not omni-
potent. The solution proposed to this dilemma seems to determine what
will an Interactive Drama look like.
Abstraction will make stories interactive
Crawford’s solution is to consider a metaplot. He explains that a story
God cares about the process, not data; he embraces physics and ration-
alizes faith. The example he puts is simple: God does not specify the
trajectory of all particles in the universe, but rather imposes the laws
of physics. The solution he proposes is abstraction: in the same way the
basic meaning of a story is abstracted from the concrete details of the
plot, a game designer should abstract some of the principles of his ap-
proach to let the concrete details take into account the Free Will of the
participant.
So the solution is abstraction. Assuming good abstraction skills, the
limit of this Free Will are the laws of physics the designer has assumed
or defined for his world, and the rationalization of faith or personality
models that he has developed for his virtual characters. This is a crit-
ical point, because once abstraction is assumed then the approach of
designing autonomous agents with personality models plus an additional
agent or drama manager to manage the metaplot is the most reasonable
strategy to address this conflict.
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2.6 situated agents
2.6.1 Introduction
In this section we overview some of the existing techniques to program
situated agents. The review is not exhaustive. We only provide a general
background and detail further the particular architecture used to imple-
ment the story model.
One of the main goals of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is building artificial
agents that can perceive, decide and behave in a way that looks intelligent
to us. In such aim, the decision method is a critical step for which it is
important to have a good representation of the external environment
and/or the internal state of the agent.
There have been 2 main streams in AI: symbolic and sub-symbolic ap-
proaches. Early artificial intelligence (AI) focused on building artificial
agents with skills for solving formal problems, most often based on op-
erating logical rules over symbolic knowledge. The problems at stake in-
volved algebraic constructions and the solutions found were formal and
analytic. This is often an approached used, for example, for chess play-
ing agents: the challenge is to generate a good representation that allows
stating a large amount of solutions and evaluate their convenience. A
parallel stream of work involved the so-called sub-symbolic processing.
Techniques such as control theory, neural networks, and Bayesian sys-
tems were used to represent knowledge in a much more distributed way:
there was no variable representing a concrete proposition, but rather a
system that learnt from examples to give a correct answer. Nowadays,
all such techniques are widely used for industrial applications. They can
also be compared in a common statistical framework based on success
ratios.
In the 70s, expert system representation used fuzzy values within formal
constructions to represent symbolic knowledge more subtly. In particular,
possibility theory was proposed as an alternative to probability theory to
represent uncertainty in a more nuanced way. Instead of representing an
uncertain knowledge with a probability (example: the table is green with
probability 0.8), they represented with possibility and necessity values
(example: the table is green with possibility 1.0, and given it is not pos-
sibly yellow nor pink nor blue it is green with necessity 0.8). The aim of
such kind of fuzzy representations would lead to decision processes more
consistent with human reasoning and decision. Nowadays, fuzzy logic is
still used to combine the output of several expert systems which would
give information partially redundant. This problem is still not solved
satisfactorily and techniques to do so are eventually patented. All the
previous techniques work on problems that are “well defined”, this is,
when the context of application is reasonably constant. For example, to
train a neural network it is necessary to have a corpus of data obtained
in the same context that the final application will have. If the context
changes, the training is no longer valid, and the decision system will not
perform as well as expected. Even more, logic based systems need to
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know all the possible events or perceptions that can occur in order to as-
sign them a symbol and in addition the logical rules relating the symbols
have to capture at some extent the relations among the elements they
represent. Otherwise, the decision system will not give a good answer.
For example, controlling a robot in a car factory with these techniques
needs the robot to be set and trained in a static framework. Such robot
can use sub-symbolic processes to detect the exact location where to use
a screwer, but if instead of a car piece it receives a human it is likely the
system screws the human instead of the car. Such systems are very good
at following a pre-established static plan in which to behave but they
cannot react to an environment changing in real time.
A more common day example: inkjet printers use such sub-symbolic tech-
niques to adjust the precise alignment of paper sheets from the input
obtained from sensors. The decision technique is simply used to decide
whether it should move the paper to the left or to the right. The plan
of printing a sheet is a fixed sequence established a priori. Therefore, if
the paper is not of the kind planned, for example it is too thick, the
sub-symbolic techniques will help aligning the paper, but the fixed plan
will make the printer malfunction.
Later on, around 1990, a new approach to AI appeared: situated agents.
The reason is simple: many real-life problems do not give such a static
context, and therefore decision problems moved to complex environments:
environments changing in real time in a nonlinear fashion. Situated agents
are those exposed to a rapidly changing environment which asks for de-
cisions that take into account real time updated perceptions. These en-
vironments can be physical as a room is, or virtual as a website. How
can such agents be designed? The influence of cognitive sciences, where
the idea of embodied cognition was increasingly embraced, suggested
that such problems could be addressed better with architectures that
where distributed -just as the brain is- with many specialized modules
contributing cooperatively to make decisions. The adoption of this ar-
chitecture in AI created Behaviour-Based Artificial Agents. Classical AI
understands knowledge as symbolic, with several layers of representa-
tion -perception, belief, plan, decision, etc.- which are often linked hier-
archically. In Behaviour-Based Artificial Agents, each of many modules
contributes to the whole decision of performing one or several actions.
2.6.2 Behaviour Networks
Historically, artificial situated agents were proposed precisely as an al-
ternative to classic mechanisms of action selection based on planning,
particularly in dynamic environments that could not be predicted be-
forehand (Brooks, 1990). Several architectures and improvements have
been proposed for the design of these agents. For example, Maes (1989)
introduced a novel action selection mechanism based on a recurrent net-
work of competence modules, which encapsulated domain-based know-
ledge stated in the form of simple rules. Later on, she introduced goals
in situated agents to give them a direction or purpose ahead of purely
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reactive behaviours (Maes, 1990). In this view, an activation spreading
mechanism that would select which actions were most relevant to achieve
a certain amount of goals according to certain perceptions of the state
of the world. This allowed to combine the knowledge based on simple
empirically testable rules with techniques of statistical learning (Maes,
1991).
Building on such developments, Goetz (1998) showed that such action
selection mechanism could be seen as a particular kind of recurrent beha-
viour network. A behaviour network is a distributed decision mechanism
over non-linear and time varying domains. It has properties similar to a
recurrent neural network, with the practical advantage that knowledge
is encapsulated in labeled modules whose function can be interpreted. In
this view, we may consider an action is considered as an attractor within
a space of motivations. The strength of the attractor is defined by the ex-
pected eﬀects of the action in relation to the fulfillment of the predefined
goals. When the perceptions about the state of the world are updated,
it changes the strength of the diﬀerent attractors. If we are nearby an
attractor, the mechanism of activation spreading will ensure we converge
towards it.
In this approach, agents have multiple situation-dependent goals, and the
actions performed are selected with the expectation of goal achievement,
and also with relevance measures relating actions with goals. It’s basic
elements are competence modules. These modules trigger the behaviours,
do the reasoning, establish the beliefs and the representations in such
a way that the “module society" guarantees the agent’s functions on a
cooperative basis. These modules can be organized in groups according
to at what extent they are incompatible in their co-execution. They can
also form “macro-modules", which are formed by a large set of modules
co-activated, forming cyclic or acyclic graphs of activation spreading.
Behaviour Networks share some similarities with artificial recurrent neural
networks, but have the advantage of allowing for the declarative instan-
tiation of the competence modules, the goals and their relations, instead
of “wiring" arbitrarily the diﬀerent modules of a neural network. It is
a form of having knowledge without representation, in the sense there
is no place where knowledge is formally declared: when programming a
behaviour network it is never said “this world is like this and like that",
but rather the agent is told “do this in this situation". How to determine
a particular situation is done by other competence modules in a similar
way: “if this and this is detected then believe this".
Another advantage is that the way how the diﬀerent elements of the situ-
ation should be weighted can be learnt using adaptive learning techniques.
In fact, the architecture was originally designed by Pattie Maes to mix
representational, belief, planning and action triggering levels indistinctly
in competence modules, and having learning as a central element. Meth-
ods of statistical learning can widely be used but contrary to Bayesian
or neural networks its declarative nature grants that it is still easy to
understand what each module does after the learning process.
However, the modular nature prevents them from satisfying goals which
require plans, i. e., sequences of events causally related. This has probably
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been one of the main reasons why these approaches have been adopted
for applications such as video-games, but not for industrial manufacture:
since their adaptation to the dynamic environment the outcome of their
behaviour is not predictable. In the previous car factory example, ad-
opting the situated view would allow giving away the linear production
pipeline. A behaviour based agent would detect the opportunity to put a
screw in a place when perceived, but there would be no way of granting
that several robots with diﬀerent skills would end up building a car in
the right structure as the end result. For a football match, there would be
no way to coordinate the behaviour of the agents to grant that a certain
result occurs.
2.6.3 Extended Behaviour Networks
Taking on these results, Dorer (1999) introduced a particular kind of
behaviour networks that made decisions over continuous and dynamic
environments. He showed it could be used for a robot playing football
with real time decision-making, as exemplified in the Robocup competi-
tion. He also showed these networks behaved better than Maes’s decision
mechanism (see also Nebel & Babovich-Lierler (2004)).
Dorer (2004) extended these results by introducing the use of resources
needed to perform an action. With resources, the activation spreading
becomes a concurrent mechanism that can select several actions simul-
taneously and always converge towards a decision: Extended Behaviour
Networks (EBN) were born.
Contrary to classical AI, Behaviour-Based AI approaches perform well
in complex domains. It has largely been demonstrated that EBN per-
form well in a complex and real-time environment such as the RoboCup
competition, where robots have to play a football match. In such envir-
onments, each of the robots forming a team is an autonomous entity
deciding and performing actions on its own. This architecute presents
the additional advantage that the diﬀerent modules can be concurrent,
this is, processed separately, that the decisional method always converges
and parallel action selection works well.
Since their introduction, da Silva Corrêa Pinto & Alvares (2005) used
EBN to characterize personality stereotypes that would aﬀect decisions
of virtual characters in video-games. It has also been shown useful to
model psychological aspects of decision-making. Johansson & Dell’ Acqua
(2009) extended its architecture to show how it could integrate emotional
traits in decision-making. Dorer (2010) showed the decision mechanism
could be adjusted to fit with realistic psychological biases in the context
of risk estimation. These results suggest virtual characters equipped with
an EBN could show certain psychological realism when interacting with
a human participant. However, to use EBN for interactive storytelling
we should have some way of handling a plan as a coordinated goal, much
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in the way the actors involved in a play follow a script established be-
forehand.9
It is also worth mentioning that EBN is also compatible with pattern
recognition mechanisms. As can be found in (Goetz, 1998, chapter 8),
Action selection is also pattern recognition: the task is to categorize the
situation at hand by the response appropriate to it. As he argues, the
basic way of storing a pattern is not central, nor declarative: the pattern
is stored as an attractor in the recurrent space of activation spreading.
As is shown in Goetz (1998), if the response of a competence module
is a Sigmoid function, the systems’ behaviour is stable, this is, there is
always an action chosen given enough activation.
2.6.4 Syntax
The two central elements of an EBN are Goals and Competence Modules.
Goals are declared with a relevance condition, a goal condition and an
importance. To show how the rules that define the decisional architecture
are declared, we use samples of the configuration file used in Dorer (2004).
Goals are declared as:
1
GOAL: //A new goa l
3 IF ballIsNearOwnGoal //The re l e vance cond i t i on
THEN noOtherGoal 0 . 9 //The goa l cond i t i on and
i t s importance
5
GOAL: //Another goa l wi th i d e n t i c a l
syntax
7 IF inOtherHal f
THEN NOT inO f f s i d e 0 .6
Modules are a bit more complicated to declare. A single module looks
like this:
2 MODULE: //A new module
IF haveSeenBal l //A precond i t i on
4 AND NOT ba l lK i ckab l e //Other p r e cond i t i on s
AND NOT teammateIsNearerBal l // . . .
6 AND haveEnoughStamina
THEN runToBall //The ac t i on to perform
8 EFFECT haveBal l 0 . 5 //An expec ted e f f e c t and i t s
expec ted p r o b a b i l i t y
AND ba l lK i ckab l e 0 . 4 //Other e f f e c t s
10 AND lowStamina 0 .3
USING l e g 1 //A resource and the amount
expec ted to be needed
The result of such declaration is a rule file with a list of goals and com-
petence modules with combinations of conditions, resources, actions and
numbers with diﬀerent meanings. To declare such rules, each condition
has to be maped to a function that returns a fuzzy truth value when
9 Note that “to plan” is sometimes used concerning any kind of motivated behaviour.
However, here we are using “plan” with the specific meaning of a sequence of events
carefully established before doing any behaviour (see also Agre & Chapman (1990)).
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called. Each resource has to have a function returning a value of the
estimated amount of units available (which will be contrasted with the
expected amount to be used). As a result all the actions have to be
maped to functions returning a fuzzy value, which will in turn modulate
the intensity of performance of the action (despite it can be simply a 0
or 1 value if no modulation is wanted). To complete the description of an
EBN we now introduce the formal definition of the diﬀerent elements
and the decisional algorithm.
Formal Definition
A behaviour network is a set of Goals, Competence Modules and Para-
meters such as {G,M,P}. The extended version, in addition to the Com-
petence Modules and the Goals also has Resources, which can be material
such as a part of the body, or an arm, or immaterial, such as a previous
perception driving to some acquired knowledge, as for example the know-
ledge of football players that know the ball is in some place although not
seeing it. Therefore, an EBN is a set {G,M,U,P}, where, following
Dorer’s notation:
A Goal is a tuple (GCon, i,Rcon) such as:
• GCon is the goal condition, and it is a conjunction of propositions
(it has ^,¬)
• i 2 [0..1] is the static importance of the goal
• RCon is the relevance condition, the situation dependent dynamic
importance of the goal, made of a conjunction and disjunction of
propositions (it has ^,_,¬)
A Competence Module is a tuple such as (Pre, b, Post,Res, a) with:
• Pre is the precondition, with e , tP(Pre, s) the executability, this
is, fuzzy truth value of the precondition in situation s.
• b is the behaviour performed once the module is selected for exe-
cution.
• Post is a set of tuples (E f f , ex), where E f f is a proposition describ-
ing an expected eﬀect, and ex = P(E f f/Pre) is the probability of
achieving the eﬀect given a certain precondition (and therefore ex-
ecution of b).
• Res is a set of resources res 2 R. tU(k, res, s) is the situation-
dependent amount of resource units expected to be used in be-
haviour b.
• a 2 < is the activation of the competence module, and it represents
an expected utility of a behaviour according to certain goals.
The Parameters are defined as:
• g 2 [0..1] is the activation of competence modules
• d 2 [0..1] is the inhibition of competence modules
• b 2 [0..1] is the inertia, this is, the influence of activation across
diﬀerent cycles
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• q 2 [0..aˆ] is the activation threshold a module has to exceed to be
selected for execution. Dq 2 [0..q] is the threshold decay for one
step.
In EBN there is another parameter introduced, which is:
• qres 2 [0..q], which is the threshold to use a certain resource.
The activation of a certain competence module k is related with its own
inertia:
atk = ba
t 1
k +Â
i
atkgi (2.1)
The external contribution to this value atkgi is the biggest of these terms:
max(g f (igi , r
t
gi)exj, d f (igi , rtgi)exj, atkgi
3, atkgi
4
) (2.2)
In the previous equation the first two terms take into account the eﬀect or
conflict with the j successor goals, and the other two account for inertia
terms related with this eﬀect. The expected eﬀect can be of the module
itself or of a successor module.
In EBN, the decisional procedure, for each module, leads the machine
to:
1. Calculate the activation a and the executability e of the module
2. Calculate the execution-value h(a, e) , which can be eventually a
non-monotonic function, but also simply the product.
3. Besides these two actions, for each resource res used by module k
starting with the previous unavailable resource:
a) check if the execution value exceeds the activation threshold
of the resource res, this is h(a, e)   qres
b) Check if the amount of resource units still available are enough,
this is, if: tU  tR(res, s). If so, bind the resources, i.e., in-
crease the number of used units by the expected number of
units the behaviour will use.
4. If both tests succeeded,
a) Execute the corresponding behaviour
b) Reset the activation threshold of all the resources used, i. e.,
reduce the amount of bound resource and start again
5. Otherwise, reduce q by Dq and start again.
2.6.5 Limitations of Behaviour Networks
In summary, an EBN is a distributed decisional process defined by the
declaration of Goals, Competence Modules with conditions and eﬀects,
as well as Resources that are perceived. Resources will be used to perform
actions associated with Expected Eﬀects. An EBN allows for the integ-
ration of a large set of skills and goals and it is easy to scale. Moreover,
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the modules are labelled, and therefore the function of each module in
the whole is still understandable. It has suitable mathematical properties
such as scalability, stability and convergence.
On the other side, there is no way to control the outcome of diﬀerent
situated agents interacting. This would ask to represent a plan in such a
way that it is performed in coordination by several situated agents in a
complex environment. This is because in the state of the art there is no
method to represent sequences of causally related events to be performed
by situated agents. If such kind of plans existed, several agents taking
decisions on their own could reach to build sophisticated structures. In
the car factory example, such kind of agents could start with all the
pieces of the car placed randomly, but they would be able to coordinate
their work to end up with the car built. This is because they would
have a plan of what building a car is embedded within their distributed
decision architecture, perceive what the other agents do and contribute
to the global plan on a constructive basis.
2.7 considerations about the production methods
Video-games are almost always made by a team of people, and often a
very large team. The amount of technological and creative means integ-
rated in the production pipeline of a standard video-game is often un-
derstated for the naive person. Production timelines are typically longer
than any other entertainment product, and the budgets and personnel
involved are equivalent, if not higher, than big budget Hollywood film
releases. This makes the development of video-games a process strictly
organized and distributed. Obviously, there is always someone overview-
ing the whole process, but in the same way a movie director cannot work
without a team having diﬀerent skills, a game designer must have the
support of diﬀerent kinds of experts in order to be able to produce a
standard video-game.
This process has generated a whole set of tools to produce and render
interactive content. These engines assist the creation of a new video-
game by abstracting some of the standard tools that are needed to run a
video-game in a game engine. Typically, a game engine integrates tools
to support advanced graphic rendering, physics simulation and decisional
intelligence. The game designer may or may not use such packages, or
use specific physics, rendering or artificial intelligence libraries. There are
many game engines. Some are opensource, such as OGRE 10. Others can
be used only under license, such as CryEngine 11. Recently, in addition,
game engines provide the tools to compile one game for multiple plat-
forms. This enables, for example, recycling the eﬀort spent to develop a
game for a PC and compiling it directly to a Playstation. An example of
such capability is found in Unity 12.
Specific tools to develop Interactive Stories have also been developed. The
approach proposed by Chris Crawford is instantiated in an engine called
10 www.ogre3D.org
11 http://mycryengine.com/
12 http://unity3d.com/
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Storytron 13. It facilitates the creation of such content by providing a set
of menus to create the elements his system needs to run an Interactive
Story. Moreover, it has a simplified scripting language to facilitate the
scripting of the Events and the features that cannot be reduced to menu
options.
Other tools aiming to facilitate interactive content with some kind of nar-
rative component have been developed. Inscape (Balet, 2007) integrates
diﬀerent authoring tools -a stage modeler, drawing graphs to state the
transitions among scenes, etc. This facilitates the integration of all the
diﬀerent elements of interactive multimedia by a person without technical
programming skills. Another oﬀshoot of this project has been StoryTec
(Gobel et al. , 2008), which also allows to define structures forming stories
and scenes which constitute the content. Both these tools have a Story
Editor, a Stage editor and other tools to develop an interactive story
through menus and non technical means.
At a graphical level, there is a plethora of techniques to render graphic-
ally a geometric model. However, natural illumination has global prop-
erties that make impossible to render a scene preserving both realistic
and real-time constraints. Due to this, computer graphics technologies
have developed a separation between the geometric description of the
scene, the textures in it and the illumination, which allows, with some
hypothesis like static illumination, and large time for pre-processing, to
render quite realistic scenes with real-time constraints.
However, at the present day, existing production processes have already
been used in commercial video-games such as Rockstar’s L.A. Noire
to achieve cinematographic quality in a 3D audiovisual environment
rendered in real time. In this particular case, the process involves 2 parts:
first, the bodily movements of the actor are captured and, on a second
step, the dynamical changes of the face are scanned. The overall is then
integrated in a 3D mesh controlled by a skeleton, and additional lightning
techniques are applied to the resulting virtual characters.
For the present purpose, these complicated production processes under-
line a diﬀerent problem of Interactive Drama based on the Weyrauchs’
strategy. In the movie industry the person or team who writes the script
is usually not the same person that takes care of the visual appearance of
the characters. For writing interactive drama scripts, we’d like to use the
most intuitive language possible, and not have to bother or think about
typical aspects of formal languages such as precise syntax or marking ex-
plicitly if we mean to have objects considered as references or as pointers.
The creative skills of storytellers are nowadays well adapted to produce
written text, audiovisual content, and acted and oral interaction, but not
to produce rule-based agents. Therefore, the process of creation should
adapt these pipelines, and leave to the technicians the task of “wrapping
up”.
However, in the current approaches existing to Interactive Drama it is
necessary to build an evaluation function to embed an aesthetic inside a
computable function. This problem can therefore only be addressed by
13 http://www.storytron.com
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people who are able to develop a coherent aesthetic, and at the same time
are able to implement it in a computer. In Façade, even if the content
is organized in a more straightforward way to implement, this process
also needs to have both creative and computer science skills combined,
which seems a very rare profile. The approach of Mateas and Stern, as
exemplified in Façade, shows that content intuitively understood as a
story is not incompatible with simulated environments, but the burden
of combining technical and creative skills is still present.
2.8 conclusions
The rapid development of interaction and rendering technologies suggests
that a new medium combining a strong narrative such as in movies with
intensive interactivity such as found in video-games could be rendered
in immersive virtual environments. However, the question of whether
interaction with a simulation is compatible with telling a story eﬀectively
remains open.
The uses of virtual environments for storytelling fall mainly in three cat-
egories. The first and obvious one is exemplified by animation movies, at
the price of having no interaction. The second one includes video-games.
The video-game industry has adopted diﬀerent strategies to introduce
narrative aspects in video-games. If a narrative is understood as a cul-
tural content that has a temporal dimension, expressive content or char-
acters involved, video-games certainly are narratives, at the same title
that dance, an oral presentation or music are narratives of diﬀerent kinds.
Video-games can have characters with a personality, goals and motiva-
tions in an interactive environment, but there is no fate, no temporal
constraints or emotional consequences associated to their actions. Des-
pite the fact they are certainly narratives, they do not depict a story
if we understand as such a carefully pre-established sequence of events,
and it is quite diﬃcult to consider that it has the same kind of internal
coherence than a novel, or a feature film, can have. The third one is
Interactive Drama, which is potentially a new medium, in which interac-
tion and story have a strong cause-and-eﬀect relationship. However, this
this field is still in its infancy and it seems to present not only technical
challenges, but also conceptual ones. The diﬀerent approaches currently
being developed assume an inherent tension between Fate and Free Will,
and attempt to find a compromise solution between these, but no general
solution has been developed so far.
In addition, it would be desirable that the technical and the creative parts
involved in this automation process can be separated. In particular, the
statement and implementation of the events forming the story should
allow that people talented for stories can easily apply their skills to such
media.
3
WHAT IS A STORY?
Tell me, O Muse, of that ingenious hero who
travelled far and wide after he had sacked the
famous town of Troy –Homer (Butler, 2008)
3.1 introduction
In this chapter we introduce some notions about stories and natural in-
teraction as described in fields such as cultural anthropology, cognitive
psychology, or applied linguistics. The aim is not to put forward how to
solve the technical problem outlined in chapter 1, but rather to frame
the approach introduced later on within the broad scope of litterature ad-
dressing what are stories and what properties they have. This chapter can
be useful to conceive the potential impact of the widespread adoption of
story telling technologies, but it is certainly not necessary to understand
the mathematics or the programming parts. The reader more interested
in these aspects can safely skip it and eventually come back if needed.
Storytelling is the oldest way of conveying information by humans, and
all performing arts that derive from such narrative rely on implicit cul-
tural conventions and expectations created by the cultural background
of the audience, as well as technical capabilities. For the present purpose,
the example of the cinema is paradigmatic, and it is possible to trace
through history how it gradually separated from theatre and how it gen-
erated codes in relation to the technical constraints of the time: from
silent cinema to sound cinema, the idea of documentary, live recorded
sound, how post-production techniques influenced audiovisual language,
and so on. The evolution of theatre and live music has also strongly been
influenced by technical evolution, among many other influences.
The socio-cultural particularities of our recent history and the progressive
growth of unidirectional mass media during the 20th century contributed
to the extinction in Europe of interactive storytelling as a spontaneous
cultural expression. However, in rich oral traditions this kind of interact-
ive performing art is -or was until recent dates- still alive. For example, in
his masterpiece on the interpretation of cultures, Geertz (1973) describes:
From our point of view, what is important to underline is
that the drama (...) doesn’t constitute for the natives a simple
show to observe, it is rather a rite in which it is necessary to
act.
It also seems very significant that when Geertz defines the main figures
of that performance, he does it in these terms:
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The countryman gets to know both figures as genuine realities
in the direct meeting with them in the context of the perform-
ance. Both figures are not representations of something, they
are presences.
Of course, the fact that the participant considers completely irrelevant
the question of being involved in a real or fictitious context, and perceives
the main figures of the plot not as pretend characters but as real presences
is an extreme example of an experience of presence which seems hard to
achieve, since it demands very specific conditions and a precise socio-
cultural context. This is in a similar way what is desirable to happen in
a virtual reality: that people abstract the objective knowledge that the
environment is not real, and react in a certain way as if it was.
Note that, although the previous quote is relatively recent (1973), it is
from a time where immersive technologies were still largely in the domain
of science-fiction, or restricted to a tiny fraction of the population, for
example in the form of flight simulators. However, in the present case,
what is desirable is to introduce mediation in this kind of interactive per-
formance. In contrast with the kind of cultural expressions depicted, this
means that some characters are present and assumed by the participants,
and the other figures are automated virtual characters.
To understand the motivation behind the particular story model intro-
duced in chapter 7, as well as the cultural and cognitive underpinnings
that could come together with such technological development, it is ne-
cessary to introduce some additional notions, starting with a story defin-
ition.
In general the picture of stories as a cognitive construct largely fits with
the “philosophy of action" line in cognitive sciences. In this, cognitive
abilities exist because they are useful, decision-making is based on expec-
ted utility of some kind, communication principles are related to com-
municative economy, categorization on principles of cognitive economy,
learning is example based, language and semantic acquisition are usage-
based, and “better” in general means that it can be related with a more
successful behaviour in terms of adaptation to a particular environment.
3.2 a story definition
What is a story? The scientific literature on stories covers various fields.
The literature about cognition and stories is immense (see pages 128-208
in Boyd (2009) for a good updated review).
Each time we face the challenge of telling a story, we have to address this
question. When we try to understand how we develop planning abilities,
learn languages, acquire counter-factual reasoning and similar cognitive
abilities in which stories are involved (Boyd, 2009), we are faced with this
same question. Stories are a basic mental mechanism for representing
and organizing information, and this mechanism has a central role in
cognitive development, and an important role in shaping cultures. More
concretely, according to Stein (1982) and Stein & Policastro (1984), a
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story is formed of events, and the events forming a story must have the
following properties:
• The events must be causally related.
• The behaviours occurring must be goal-based.
• If some behaviour is not goal-based, it must be explicitly shown
that the behaviour was caused by some other unexpected event
that, from the characters’ perspective, could not be expected and
made planning impossible.
This definition has the advantage of being empirically testable. For ex-
ample, Stein & Policastro (1984) have shown that the more a sequence
of events satisfies these properties, the more teachers and students cat-
egorize it as a story.
3.3 stories in theatre
Despite the lack of technology-based simulation in drama, telling stories
within an IVE has some similarities with theatre. Of course, theatre is
in three dimensions, it involves a whole controlled space, sometimes it
creates surrounding actions out from the stage that make it more “im-
mersive", and generally it is limited to audiovisual stimuli. In addition,
it generally has an understandable plot, which helps to develop the psy-
chology of the characters and depicts a coherent world –diﬀerent from
the real one, but with internal coherence. Even more, something like the
presence of an actor, which could be understood as “how well s/he fakes"
being the character, is a diﬀerent but complementary idea of the presence
of a participant within an immersive virtual environment.
In this view, a theatre play is a precise succession of communicative ac-
tions. Communicative actions are what people -and sometimes things-
do when they want to communicate something. A communicative action
is an action that communicates certain communicative intention by say-
ing a concrete text or doing particular gestures in a precise situation.
These communicative actions can be verbal or non-verbal: a character
can clearly mean something without saying any word. The important
point is that the action performed conveys some meaning. Because of
this semantic aspect, each of these actions generate certain expectations
in the spectator –implicit expectations like “what will she do?", or “what
will he answer?" etc.– that are satisfied or not within the communicative
actions coming after.
In theatre, a process of rehearsals of the actors with the guidance of
the director constitutes the main part of the staging process, in which
are incorporated the various other parts: stage design, lightning, and
so on. Because in virtual environments characters are virtual, we need
to understand what makes an actor a good one, to then know what
will make a good virtual actor. What does an actor need to do to act
properly? We can look for answers in the classic thoughts around the
actor’s speciality: acting. For a long time acting remained a practical craft
without theoretical implications. It is generally considered that in Europe
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Diderot (1902) wrote the opening theoretical text on the condition of the
actor. In this text, and contrary to the dominant opinion of his time, the
author claimed that the actor is some kind of “super puppet” which does
not need to feel what his actions reflect, but rather calculate the eﬀect
that his actions will produce in the audience.
On the other side of dramaturgy theory, Stanislavski states (Stanislavski
& Hapgood, 1968): The external characterization explains and illustrates,
and therefore transmits to the spectators the internal conception of its role.
This implies the actor would need to have an internal representation of
its role to be able to act consistently. Considering that a play is made
of sequences of events, he adds: In the centre of each sequence there is
a goal. This quote already tells the clue of what an actor needs to look
for: motivations in the form of goals associated with the sequences he
has to act, and expressive skills to reflect these goals. Grotowski, who
attempted to reduce theatre to its minimum elements, states (Grotowski
& Barba, 1969): We compose a role as a system of signs which show
what masks the common vision: the dialectics of human behaviour. A
sign, not a common gesture, is the essential element of expression for us.
In this conception, theatre consists of staging a set of signs, which are
very concrete human behaviours that provoke narrative, theatrical and
dramatic eﬀects. To translate this to actors, the creator of an acted story
must: Educate an actor (...) doesn’t mean to teach him something; we
try to eliminate the resistance that his organism oﬀers to the psychical
processes. The result is a liberation that is produced in the step from
internal impulse to an external reaction, in such a way that the impulse
transforms in an external reaction.
Therefore, the main tool to express successfully what a play can commu-
nicate is controlling this set of characteristic signs. This can be thought
as doing the right set of communicative actions at the right time. Are
actors needed for this? Again, Grotowski: Can theatre exist without act-
ors? I do not know any example of this, perhaps the puppet shows. But
even like this the actor can be seen behind the scenes, even if in this case
its a diﬀerent kind of theatre.
In conclusion, drama theory suggests that the same kind of theatre seems
possible using puppets or, for the present case, virtual characters. How-
ever, what remains crucial in order for the dramatic eﬀect of plays to
work well is to take special care toward the expressiveness of the char-
acters’ behaviour and the election of the communicative actions forming
this behaviour. These actions can be the result of internal goals and feel-
ings, or be meticulously calculated as part of a sophisticated strategy.
However, there is no consensus on this point and some authors argue one
or another option is not always necessary or even useful.
3.4 the elements of an acted story
We now introduce a more detailed definition of the basic element of an
acted story. A communicative action is an event with:
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• an agent performing it. This is generally understood to be a per-
son, but here we also consider agents such as virtual characters or
robots.
• a communicative intention. We will consider this is well represented
by one or more goals motivating the communicative action. For
example, if someone said “I am hungry", his goal could be triggering
the typical social protocol involved in going for lunch.
• a set of verbal and non-verbal features characterizing the action.
This is the spoken text, but also the enunciation curves, facial
expressions, gestures, interpersonal distances, a pointing gesture
and so on. An automated detector of these features would involve
word recognition, for which automated software detection exists,
and non-verbal language analysis, for which no general tools for
automated detection exist. Ideally, what one would want to have is
an automated system that detects both verbal and non-verbal lan-
guage. However, it should be noted that an exhaustive taxonomy of
features cannot be given. The way characters are dressed, the tools
they are using and the activities that they are performing can alter
the interpretation of these communicative features, or add other
ones (see Poyatos (2002)).It should therefore be expected that the
intentions we associate with a particular features will change ac-
cording to the particular stiuation and context where they occur.
Assuming these elements, an acted story can be characterized by propos-
itions describing events. This means that, in the same way it is done in
movie scriptwriting, the events occurring can be declared with proposi-
tions, such as in a random scene from a well known movie:
THE DON turns to the stiﬄy formal LUCA, and he moves
forward to kiss his hand. He takes the envelope from his
jacket, holds it out, but does not release it until he makes
a formal speech.
LUCA
(with diﬃculty)
Don Corleone...I am honoured, and
grateful...that you invited me to
your home...on the wedding day of
your...daughter.
May their first child...be a
masculine child. I pledge my never
ending loyalty.
(he oﬀers the envelope)
For your daughter’s bridal purse.
DON CORLEONE
Thank you, Luca, my most valued
friend.
THE DON takes it, and then LUCA’s hand, which he squeezes so
tightly we might imagine it to be painful.
Assuming all events have a starting time and a finite duration, and can
occur simultaneously or successively, the previous maps into a simple
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formalism in which each event is stated with a proposition. Thus, any
(non-interactive) story is a set of communicative actions that can be
stated in a form such as:
p1.p2.p3...
This assumption is the backbone of the story model introduced in chapter
7.
3.5 on the meaning of stories
3.5.1 Meaning as categorization
One of the challenges that immediately appear when attempting to relate
stories and computers is that stories appear to have meaning, something
remarkably diﬃcult to model mathematically. A way to see this is that
someone seeing an acted story would characterize the verbal and non-
verbal features of the communicative actions performed by the actors to
then associate them with certain beliefs or intentions.
Obviously, this is something any human does spontaneously in his native
cultural context, but it is also something that generates endless confu-
sions when the cultural background of the participants is diﬀerent. The
notion of Natural Category (Rosch, 1973) is useful here: when humans
share a cultural background they would understand events performed by
actors in the same way because they would associate the same categories
to the events. When these categories diﬀer, then the meaning associated
to them diﬀers.
3.5.2 Prototype theory
Although initially proposed in cognitive psychology, the notion of Natural
Categories as proposed in Prototype Theory (Rosch & Mervis, 1975)
has been widely adopted in cognitive sciences, ranging from cognitive
psychology to applied linguistics. Essentially, natural categories are the
basic element that allows us to categorize the world and organize mentally
cognitive knowledge. They are generally identified with fuzzy sets (Zadeh,
1996). Fuzzy sets are sets in which the degree of belonging to it, as
denoted “2" is fuzzified, which is sometimes written as 2a, with a 2 [0..1].
This implies there are better and worse examples of each category, which
it is often named as the level of prototypicallity. Obvious examples of this
can be found in colours: in face of a spectrum of diﬀerent red samples we
will attribute a “typical red" example or a “not so good red" example to
diﬀerent samples.
For the case of colours, Rosch & Mervis (1975) and Rosch (1978) showed
that even in a culture with no color terms people can learn these categor-
ies from examples. Also, she showed that easier examples, basic colours
such as blue or yellow are easier to learn than mixed colours, such as
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brown or magenta. This would be due to how these categories are em-
bodied within our body. In this case, for example, one could relate it to
the fact that we have specific sensors in the retina for those basic colours,
but not for the mixed ones. In other terms: categorization is an embodied
cognitive process determined by the "wiring" of our cognitive system.
Prototype Theory builds on the notion of Natural Category to explain
meaning. In a communicative situation, this implies the features of an
event are categorized with a large set of interrelated Natural Categories
(Rosch, 1978). The process of categorization of the events results in an
interpretation of them, which supposes the association of goals to the
actions occurring, and meanings to their features. How an event is inter-
preted, its meaning, is determined by how its features are categorized in
a particular context.
In cognitive linguistics, the notion of conceptual metaphor as used by
Lakoﬀ & Johnson (1980) relies on it. In this view, conceptual metaphors
are mappings between domains that give a richer meaning to how we
communicate and think. Usual metaphors such as “Life is a Journey”, or
categories of diﬀerent cultural systems, such as the category of “Women,
Fire, and Dangerous things”, to cite only the most famous examples, rely
on the notion of Natural Category. In plain terms, this general frame-
work assumes perception and understanding involve associating natural
categories with events, and the appropriate use of conceptual metaphors
facilitates a deeper understanding of such events.
Overall, it is not possible to formalize the meaning of the events involved
in a story, but it is the meanings of the events that guides our story
understanding. As machines do not have these categorization capabilities,
they do not have interpretative skills.
Instead of trying to formalize in a mathematical model these interpretat-
ive skills for particular practical cases, we will simply replace these skills
with whatever method that provides an appropriate fuzzy value from a
signal input. This means we will focus on estimating at what extent a
particular action occured, and let its interpretation to the audience or
participants.
3.5.3 Intentions
A diﬀerent aspect of interpreting events when performed by actors is
that we associate intentions to them. The ability to associate intentions
with human behaviour is especially important for communication, and it
is developed by sustained social interaction from the very first stages of
baby learning (Halliday, 1985; Tomasello, 2003).
If we see someone in a certain situation or conversation, especially if we
know him well or he is in a familiar socio-cultural context, we can spon-
taneously say what he will probably do or say, or at least a small set of
diﬀerent options, according to the situation, taking into account previous
experienced contexts. This is a general cognitive ability of humans called
intention attribution or mind-reading, which some impaired people such
as autists seam to lack (Baron-Cohen et al. , 2000).
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More precisely, the intentionality of a certain (spoken) text is related
with the communicational intention (of the speaker), and it is composed
of an extensional contribution, and an intensional contribution. The ex-
tensional contribution is the objective information about the world, for
which a truth value related to its semantics can be isolated. For example,
consider the expression:
This paper is white.
The extensional information of this expression can be true or false in a
certain situation, corresponding to the notion of proposition of first order
logic, like used intensively in classic artificial intelligence. It could also
be associated with a fuzzy truth value, depending on a progressive truth
level established with some estimation method.
The intensional aspect is determined by how and when the text is con-
veyed. In the previous example, if said in the appropriate way and in the
appropriate context, the same text can convey things like ‘I’m surprised
because in his exam he did not write a word’, or Fantastic, finally I found
a blank paper and I can draw what I was wanting to’ or so, you finally
didn’t fill in the papers of our divorce, did you?’. The process by which
we go from what is said to what is meant is determined not only by the
meaning of the words and in what context the communicative action is
performed, but also by implicit assumptions in everyday interaction. In
the next section we try to introduce what are these assumptions and
show how this results in a theory quite diﬀerent from usual information
theory.
3.6 a different theory of communication
3.6.1 Introduction
The publication of A mathematical theory of communication (Shannon,
1948) spread the view of communication as the transmission of a mes-
sage encoded by an emitter and decoded by a receptor. It was an elegant
abstraction of how to send and receive electrical signals encoding informa-
tion, but hardly ever a theory developed for engineering purposes has had
such influence in fundamental research fields such as physics, linguistics,
biology and cognitive sciences. However, people studying natural commu-
nication started to raise some objections to such view of communication
and they eventually proposed the inferential communication model to
give some account of aspects of everyday conversations not described by
classical information theory.
In classical information theory communication is a stationary stochastic
process. A stochastic process is, by definition, a sequence of events whose
occurrence is determined by probabilities. Stochastic means that each
communication event x has a probability of occurrence p(x) associated.
Stationary means and that this probability does not change through time
(p(x, t) ⌘ p(x)).
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Figure 3.1: An example of a graph of transitions among states depicting a sta-
tionary process: given one state it is always possible to be in another
state given enough transitions. This implies that, despite the prob-
ability of being in one state or in another can be diﬀerent, this
probability will not change through time.
For example, if A and B want to communicate in written English using
a device based on classical information theory, one could consider the
English alphabet with additional characters such as spaces and points
and build a graph of the transitions that are possible among characters.
For example, the transition from “g” to “r” is possible like in “green”, the
“g” to “h” is possible like in “light”, but the contrary is not: there is no
word in English in which an “h” is followed by an “g”. Generalizing this by
parsing systematically a large set of English literature will give a set of
transitions among letters, which we consider to be states of a particular
communication device. At a certain point in the communication, if the “g”
state is assumed, there will be a series of possible options with diﬀerent
probabilities. The task of the receiver is to decide which is the most likely
sign received within the possible ones.
Now, despite the transition from “h” to “g” is not possible, it would always
be possible to go from “h” to “g” assuming some intermediary transitions
through other characters. As already pointed out in Shannon (1948), it
can be shown that this kind of circularity results in a stationary process.
In other words, in order stationarity is satisfied the graph of transitions
needs to have circularity such as depicted in figure 3.1. Under these
conditions, the probabilities of the events do not change through time.
Quite the same goes for the actions involved in a video-game. For ex-
ample, in a football match a player can run, shoot, etc., but generally one
action can always occur after another one if enough transitions between
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them are allowed. But in the case of the events forming a story, or in
natural communication in general, this does not hold: if we consider com-
municative actions as the basic events, these events normally occur once,
at best few times.
3.6.2 The inferential communication model
Contrary to the code model (Shannon, 1948), in which a communicator
encodes a message to be decoded by an audience, the inferential model
of communication considers that communicative actions, both verbal and
non-verbal, should be understood as the expression and recognition of
intentions: the communicator provides evidence of his intention to convey
a certain meaning, and the audience infers the meaning on the basis of
the evidence provided. This evidence can be something said together with
some gestures and voice inflexions, but it can also be non-verbal, such as
pointing, smiling, approaching, or any other action that the audience is
susceptible of associating a meaning to it. The association of the evidence
with a meaning is strongly influenced by the social and material context.
If classical information theory was largely inspired by the image of 2
agents coding and decoding signs through a telegraph wire, the inferen-
tial model of communication can be exemplified by the communication
of 2 fully embodied agents sharing a 3 dimensional environment portray-
ing in real time bidirectional behaviour and speech with the purpose of
exchanging information and intentions related with this information. It
should be noted that this model has never been formalised or tested in
quantitative and rigorous terms such as information theory has. On the
other side, it can give simple explanations to quite complicated phenom-
ena. For example, in this view the reason why we are constantly playing
with diﬀerent layers of meaning when we communicate is simply for com-
municative economy.
Such view of communication can be summarized in non-mathematical
terms introducing the Principle of Cooperation (Grice, 1975) and the 2
principles of Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 2004) in the wider
context of Language games (Wittgenstein, 1953).
3.6.3 The Cooperative principle
Grice’s Cooperative Principle was the first principle of communication
proposed, and it would involve any everyday linguistic interaction –even
non-verbal. The clearest explanation might be introduced by it’s pro-
ponent (Grice, 1975)):
Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of
disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did.
They are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperat-
ive eﬀorts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some
extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mu-
tually accepted direction. This purpose or direction may be
3.6 a different theory of communication 47
fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal of a question
for discussion), or it may evolve during the exchange [...]. We
might then formulate a rough general principle which parti-
cipants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely:
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at
the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or dir-
ection of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One
might label this the Cooperative Principle.
A classical example adapted from Grice (1975) will frame better the
problem. Consider this scenario:
A is standing by an obviously immobilized car.
B approaches him.
A says: I am out of petrol.
B says: There is a garage around the corner.
In the previous example, the last reply of B would be a consequence
of the previous exchanges. However, we can observe how this is incom-
patible with a probabilistic definition of causality: being out of petrol
is independent of having a garage around the corner. In probabilistic
terms, they cannot be related. In communication theory this kind of
causal relations are named implicatures, and they are of major import-
ance to characterize the process by which we go from what is said to
what is meant. In chapter 7 we will introduce a definition of implication
()) general enough to include these implicatures, despite we will care-
fully avoid trying to formalize processes such as meaning inference or
categorization.
3.6.4 Relevance Theory
Maybe the most popular version of the inferential model of communica-
tion is Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 2004).
The theory develops two basic principles.
The first principle of relevance theory or cognitive principle, states that
human cognition tends to be geared towards the maximization of the cog-
nitive eﬀect, which is a certain relevance measure. This implies that,
given a certain context, performing an action will be done in such a way
that it maximizes the cognitive knowledge it gives for a certain amount
of information shown. For example, we will react more to our baby cry-
ing than to any other baby crying. It is motivated in terms of cognitive
adaptation to the environment.
The second principle of relevance theory or communication principle adds
an extra layer. It states that every ostensive stimulus conveys a presump-
tion of its own optimal relevance. This is best shown with an example.
If tow people, A and B, are chatting in A’s living room, B can put his
empty glass in A’s line of sight to suggest that he might want more water,
but this is only exploiting A’s cognitive tendency to maximize relevance.
B still has to show you that he put the glass there “on purpose", that it
was his intention, and therefore that it is worth processing this stimuli in
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A’s cognitive system, which is something not trivial in a world of stimuli
competing for scarce cognitive attention.
The previous implies that a communicative event is not one in which
a maximum amount of information is given, but rather one in which a
maximally relevant information is given. It is somewhat a principle oper-
ating at a second level: it implies any event triggered will aim at giving
the minimal information but with the maximal relevance. At reception,
it also implies that determining the goal(s) conveyed by a certain action
should assume optimal relevance. But to be able to quantify such relev-
ance, agents need not only to determine causal relations, but also have
the skills to determine the underlying goals of a certain behaviour.
This suggests goal determination requires, first, to take a formal defin-
ition of causality that includes implicatures. In other terms, without a
formal definition of implicature the formalization of the inferential model
of communication is not possible.
3.7 stories as language games
All the principles outlined before are influenced by the vision of every-
day communication as a language game. Wittgenstein (1953) outlined
a large number of examples on how the meaning of words and actions
are determined by how we use them, in what context and with what
intention. Therefore, we can define the class of Language Games as all
situations in which several people (or things like virtual actors) can per-
form communicative actions. In this picture, stories are just a particular
kind of game satisfying specific properties within this large class and, as
we’ll see in further detail in the following chapters, acted stories can be
conceived as a cooperative game whose joint purpose is building shared
representations through the performance of causally related actions.
This is in marked contrast with games -and video-games in particular-
, which often involve a competitive situation: each agent has its own
goals, and the achievement of these goals by an agent goes against the
achievement of the goals by the other agents. A story with diﬀerent
characters seems to have a diﬀerent logic: each character has its own
personality and goals, but in some way they collaborate to achieve the
plot. This will to collaborate is a shared goal and it characterizes the
kind of language game addressed.
In the influential view of Wittgenstein (1953), there is no other way to
define the meaning of a word or an action than to address how it is
used. Therefore, to control the meaning associated with an event within
a story we will control how each communicative action is used, focussing
on determining its cause and in which context it will occur.
3.7.1 How to define a cause?
As said before, the events forming a story must be causally related. In
addition, some of these causal relations can be implicatures. The problem
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is that there does not seem to be a trivial way to define formally a cause
as such. Such a definition should be given within a dynamic and non-
linear environment. In addition, the events in a story can be caused by
the beliefs of agents perceiving and acting in such environments. If we
look into complex systems theory as applied in statistical physics or in
economics, there is no easy way to define causality. Auyang (1999), in
page 314, writes:
The best way to establish a temporal direction is to base it on
a general concept, so that we need not go into the substantive
details of various processes. The most likely candidate for
such a general concept is causality. If we can find a notion
of causation that is independent of the concept of time, then
we can establish a general temporal direction by identifying
it with the direction of causation. The task is not easy [...].
Philosophers do not succeed in finding a time-independent
notion of causation.
In the same section similar criticisms are stressed regarding the attempts
to define causation from statistical or probabilistic frameworks. There-
fore, to define formally a story we will need some way to define Cause.
A useful definition of causation should not only work for complex envir-
onments, but also take into account that agents have mental categories
and goals that may not only aﬀect the process of cause determination,
but be in themselves the cause of performing an action.
3.7.2 What is a Context?
To give a natural account of causal relations among events, we want to
distinguish between causes and contexts (Cheng & Novick, 1991). Con-
texts make events possible: in the case of a gas explosion in an apart-
ment the context would have to be a closed apartment, a gas escape,
etc. Causes, on the contrary, introduce a necessity in events: in this
example, it could be a match lighten by someone with a specific goal.
In the physical sciences, this distinction is quite generally assumed: any
physical problem is either a boundary problem -in which you want to de-
termine what is possible given certain conditions- or a dynamic problem
-in which you study the dynamical behaviour of a system given a cause,
namely, an event occurring at a given time provoking other subsequent
events.
However, in the case of communicative actions related with interpersonal
communication, a context includes a greater number of factors: part of
the physical situation, but also the cultural background assumed to be
shared, the gender, social relation of the speakers and in general anything
that contributes implicitly to determine what is meant by a certain com-
municative action (The role of contexts in natural communication can be
traced back to 1923 in the work of Malinowsky, but the reader can find
an introduction in chapter 2, section 1 in Kramsch (1993), or the entry
context et situation in Houdé et al. (1998)). A typical example of this is
irony. If someone says I am very happy, his assertion can be interpreted
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as meaning to express his happiness, or exactly the inverse, his extreme
sadness. This will depend not only on how this is said, but also according
to what we know about the person from what he did in the past. Some
elements of the present situation can also have an influence in what is
interpreted from what is said.
In conclusion, in an interactive story one must control very carefully the
context in which communicative actions are performed. Otherwhise, it
will be diﬃcult to ensure the meaning intended is appropriately conveyed.
3.8 conclusions
In the framework outlined in this chapter, an acted story is a particular
kind of Language Game in which participants named characters perform
communicative actions. In order to be perceived as a communication with
meaning, such games must satisfy general rules such as the cooperative
principle and the 2 principles or relevance. Such meaning is particularly
sensitive to the context in which the communicative action is performed.
Moreover, in order this communication to be perceived as a story, the
communicative actions performed must relate through causal relations,
and the diﬀerent characters must appear to have goals motivating their
behaviour. These motivations must be apparent according to the categor-
ization skills and the general cultural background of the audience.
In chapter 7 we will use some aspects of this theoretical background
to introduce a story cognitive model named Trama. However, we first
address in next chapter at what extent such picture is consistent with
how people respond to virtual characters in an IVE.
Later on, in appendix B we will revisit the notions introduced in this
chapter in order the reader can judge whether the model introduced
matches at some extent the principles of natural communication here
introduced.
4
PROXEMICS WITH MULTIPLE DYNAMIC V IRTUAL
CHARACTERS
4.1 introduction
In the previous chapter we have conceptualised interaction with virtual
characters in an IVE as an exchange of communicative actions between
real participants and artificial agents embodied in virtual characters. If
this picture is appropriate, it should be expected that the features of
communicative actions in everyday natural interaction are also present
when interacting with virtual characters in an IVE. This includes not
only the verbal features of communicative actions, but also their non-
verbal features such as proxemics, which study interpersonal distances.
This is a feature that, contrary to more traditional displays, interpersonal
distances, only enters into play between the participant and the virtual
characters when the display is immersive.
An experiment was carried out to examine the impact on electrodermal
activity of people when approached by groups of 1 or 4 virtual characters
to varying distances. Earlier work in this field has investigated proxemics
in head-mounted display delivered virtual reality when participants walk
towards a single virtual character or when a virtual character walks to-
wards them (Bailenson et al. , 2003, 2001). The response measures were
based on the actual movements of the participants (how close did they go
to the virtual characters, how much did they move when the characters
walked through them?). In (Wilcox et al. , 2006) static stereo images
of people and objects were used with response measures consisting of
subjective reporting and skin conductance. In the experiment presen-
ted here we investigate mainly the skin conductance changes induced by
varying the minimal distances that one or more virtual characters (either
humanoid or cylindrical) approach to a participant who had been instruc-
ted to stand still. The virtual environment was delivered by a wide field
of view head-tracked head-mounted display.
An ideal immersive virtual reality system supports perception through
natural sensorimotor contingencies (Noé, 2004), that is, those action-
perception behaviours that humans employ in everyday life by using
our bodies in order to perceive: we can bend down, stretch, reach out,
move closer to or around an object or a whole environment, implicitly
knowing the rules that relate perception to action. Current day head-
tracked, wide field-of-view head-mounted displays or Cave-like systems
(Cruz-Neira et al. , 1993) support such sensorimotor contingencies to
varying degrees. It has been noted in the literature that such systems
can give rise to a feeling of being in the place depicted by the virtual
environment displays, for example (Draper et al. , 1998; Sanchez-Vives
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& Slater, 2005; Sheridan, 1992, 1996; Slater, 2009). If people have this
illusion and if what is depicted there is plausible then there is a tendency
for people to respond realistically, across a range of parameters, to the
virtual events and situations - even though they know for sure that they
are experiencing an illusion. This has been demonstrated many times
across a range of studies, for example Bideau et al. (2003); Pertaub
et al. (2002); Slater et al. (2006).
Here we have focused on human participant responses to virtual char-
acters, in particular the extent to which people would conform to the
implicit rules of distance between people as studied in the field of prox-
emics. This term, originally introduced by Hall (1963, 1969), describes
four regions of interpersonal distance: public, social, personal and intim-
ate, albeit modulated by cultural, gender and social status diﬀerences. It
is postulated that the diﬀerent distances of approach convey diﬀerent so-
cial meanings and interpersonal relationships, forming a set of culturally
bound implicit rules of distance. Therefore, when these rules are broken,
a person might feel shocked and may attribute an erroneous intention
to the person who has approached. It should be possible therefore to
identify this shock with the measurement of behavioural, physiological
and subjective reactions. Our main question is the extent to which prox-
emics behaviour might be observed in virtual reality, giving credence to
the view that people tend to respond realistically to virtual events and
situations. From the existing literature it seems that this is likely to be
the case - see for example Bailenson et al. (2003, 2001) Blascovich et al.
(2002); Blascovich (2002) Friedman et al. (2007); Guye-Vuillème et al.
(1999); Wilcox et al. (2006).
Our experiment, discussed in detail in the following sections, has either
1 or 4 virtual characters repeatedly approaching a participant to varying
distances (social, personal, and intimate). The characters approaching
may be of two diﬀerent types, either female virtual characters or cylin-
ders of adult human size. Our response variables include physiological
measures and subjective questionnaire reports. Our intention was to ex-
plore how these factors - proximity of approach, number of characters,
number of approaches, and type of character - together influenced skin
conductance response. We have presented a dynamic multi-character situ-
ation, with multiple repetitions - the latter serving also as a validation
check on the skin conductance measures.
4.2 proxemics
A relationship between proxemics and physiological responses was first
reported by G. McBride (1965). This work showed that varying the dis-
tances between two people influences skin conductance responses, and
that one person having open or closed eyes, provokes significantly dif-
ferent responses in the skin conductance of the other. There is evidence
that this also occurs in immersive virtual environments. Bailenson et al.
(2001) showed that people spontaneously managed interpersonal diﬀer-
ences diﬀerently when facing a graphical representation of a person com-
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Figure 4.1: The virtual body of a participant as would be seen when he looked
down at himself
pared to a cylinder, and that there were also significant eﬀects related to
the gaze direction of the character and other behavioural influences.
It has also been shown that objects or people provoke diﬀerent physiolo-
gical responses consistent with proxemics theory when appearing at a
fixed distance to the person looking at stereo images (Wilcox et al. ,
2006). This was achieved with photorealistic representations of people
displayed stereoscopically using a large screen (2.35X1.73m2) and it was
shown to be consistent with the subjective reports of personal comfort.
In (Wilcox et al. , 2006), as well as in Bailenson et al. (2001), a detailed
overview of proxemics in non-mediated situations can be found. Using a
diﬀerent approach to the phenomenon, Beltran et al. (2006) showed that
the spatial behaviour of a crowd can be explained reasonably well with
a bottom-up approach starting from proxemics rules. This demonstrated
that the global behaviour in a crowded space can be simulated using a
local minimum discomfort level criterion, which is the diﬀerence between
the desired ideal distance and the actual distance in a dyadic interaction.
In the field of robotics Brooks & Arkin (2007) developed a behavioural
model for a robot that took into account several aﬀective aspects in rela-
tion to a nearby person in order to decide how the personal space was to
be managed. In summary, previous work does suggest that basic rules of
social interaction such as interpersonal distances in a virtual environment
are maintained in the interaction with virtual characters.
The goal of our experiment was to assess whether people respond to vir-
tual characters in similar ways to what would be predicted by proxemics,
but in a dynamic situation where several virtual characters move but
the human participant is stationary. Would the simultaneous approach
of several virtual characters heighten the response compared to a single
character? Would participants exhibit greater arousal in response to the
approach of a human character compared to a non-human cylindrical
one? There were, therefore, three main factors investigated: the distance
of the approach, the type of the characters, and the number of characters
who simultaneously approach. An important fourth factor, introduced as
a validity check, was the number of times that virtual characters visited
the participant. The results were assessed by using skin conductance
measurements as well as by subjective questionnaires and reports. The
experiment was approved by the ethical committee of the IDIBAPS at
the Hospital Clinic of University of Barcelona.
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Figure 4.2: The characters and the cylinders involved in the experiment. At the
left can be seen the virtual body that would be inhabited by the
participant.
4.3 materials and methods
4.3.1 Participants
Twelve participants were recruited by advertisement around the campus.
Their age ranged between 22 and 39 years, and they were deliberately
restricted to be males in order to remove one source of variation. The
participants were paid 5 euros for their participation in the study.
4.3.2 Materials
A Fakespace Labs Wide5 head-mounted display was used which has field
of view of 150X88 with an estimated 1600X1200 resolution displayed
at 60Hz 1 , and also Sennheiser HD215 stereo headphones. The head-
tracking system was an Intersense IS900, and the physiological recordings
used a Mind Media Nexus 4 device, recording skin conductance at 128Hz.
The virtual environment was modeled by using 3D Studio Max to load
motion captured data and export it appropriately to animate the virtual
characters or “avatars”. The geometric, clothes and skin texture models
of the virtual characters were acquired from the company AXYZ design
2. The Virtual Reality software system used was XVR (Tecchia et al. ,
2010) and HALCA (Gillies & Spanlang, 2010) an extension of the Cal3D
library for the character animation used to blend, loop and script the
motions of the characters. The synchronization of all the devices and
signals was achieved with a custom implementation that uses the VRPN
protocol Taylor II et al. (2001).
1 http://www.fakespacelabs.com/files/Download/Wide5%20Data%20Sheet.pdf
2 http://www.axyz-design.com/
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Figure 4.3: Subjective view of 2 characters at (a) 0.4, (b) 0.8 and (c) 1.6 meters
respectively. The orientation of the camera is exactly the same to
facilitate the comparison. However, during the experiment when 4
characters approached a larger amount of the group was visible due
to the large field of view of the HMD. Also, usually participants
moved their head to see frontally the diﬀerent characters around
them. The characters appear as they were standing in the fixed
distance. Then they would walk back to their initial position and a
new combination of factors would be selected (amount of characters,
distance and type -cylinder or humanoid-) for a new approach.
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4.3.3 Procedure
When a participant arrived for the experiment they were first given an
information sheet describing its purpose and procedure. After reading
this, and after the procedure had also been explained to them verbally,
they were asked if they wished to continue and were then given a consent
form to sign. Next the electrodes of the physiological recording device and
the HMD were fitted. Participants wore headphones in order to further
isolate them from the laboratory and through which they would be able
to hear wind noise and footsteps when the characters or the cylinders
approached.
There was a baseline period of two minutes in order to give participants
time to adjust to wearing and seeing through the HMD, and to become
familiar with the scene, and also to record baseline physiological meas-
ures. During the baseline participants could see the characters standing
far away, and were asked to describe what they were seeing in order to
focus their attention on the surrounding elements. The characters were
one of two types, female or cylinder, and during the baseline, the female
ones made subtle movements to display life-like signs, but did not move
otherwise. After the completion of the baseline the dynamic scenario star-
ted and participants were asked to stand in place and maintain silence.
However, they were advised that they could leave the experiment at any
time without giving reasons. The participants were head-tracked, and
could move their head freely. After the end of the session they completed
the post-experiment questionnaire, and a short interview was recorded.
4.3.4 Scenario
On entering the virtual reality via the HMD, participants would see that
they had a virtual body, especially when they directly looked down at
themselves (Figure 4.1). Since the HMD has a wide field of view par-
ticipants could see their virtual body in peripheral vision much as in
physical reality. The environment depicted an open field in which several
humanoid characters and cylinders were standing at diﬀerent distances
from the participant, forming roughly a semi-circle of 4m radius, as can
be seen in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. Then after the 2 minutes of baseline id-
ling either 1 or a group of 4 characters (either all females or all cylinders)
walked (or moved in the case of cylinders) towards the participant and
(all) stopped at one of three possible distances. The cylinders followed the
same paths as the humanoid characters that they replaced. They stood
for 7 seconds at that distance and then go back to their initial position.
We call each such approach a ‘visit’.
4.3.5 Experimental Design
There were 4 factors with 12 subjects in a repeated-measures design. The
factors were:
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1. Number of characters: 1 or 4 characters approaching simultan-
eously.
2. Distance: Since this factor is the most important one, 3 distances
were selected: 1.6, 0.8 or 0.4 meters, which correspond approxim-
ately to the diﬀerent proxemics categories (public, social or intim-
ate).
3. Type: Each character could be either a cylinder or human female
character.
4. Run number: The number of visits so far (between 1 and 12). This
was used to track the habituation eﬀect due to repeated visits.
Participants were assigned to combinations of the first three factors us-
ing a D-Optimal design (Dror & Steinberg, 2006), and each participant
always experienced 12 visits in total.
4.3.6 Response Variables
The main response variables were obtained from electrodermal activity
(EDA). This measures changes in arousal through changes in skin con-
ductance caused by sweat levels, reflecting changes in the sympathetic
nervous system (Boucsein, 1992). An important derived measure of in-
terest is the number of Skin Conductance Responses (SCR) which re-
flect transient sympathetic arousal, either spontaneous or in response to
events, specifically the orienting response, that is responses to changes
in the environment and events or surprises. Skin conductance responses
(SCR) were defined to be local maxima that had amplitude of at least 0.1
S and in a period not exceeding 5s from the start of the SCR to its max-
imal point. Such SCRs were identified in an oﬄine program written in
MATLAB. The number of SCRs was recorded for 10, 15 and 20 seconds
after the arrival of the virtual characters at their destination in front of
the participant. The number of SCRs in the baseline period was recorded
to allow for diﬀerences between participants in the subsequent analysis.
A second measure derived from EDA was the maximum skin conductance
level reached within 5s after the characters had stopped walking and had
arrived at their destination. As a baseline value we subtracted from this
the participant’s SCL at the moment that the characters were triggered
by the computer program to start walking. Normally, one would take the
maximum minus the level at the start of the event that might cause the
rise (i.e., the moment of arrival of the characters at their destination in
front of the participant). However, the situation here is more complex,
since the start of the ‘event’ is fuzzy -participants may become aroused
at the moment they realize that the avatars are going to stop very close
to themselves, in which case the SCL will already be rising by the time
that they reach the destination. We call this measure the change in skin
conductance level DSCL.
For an arousing event (for example, when the avatars approached to an
intimate distance) we should find a greater number of SCRs compared
to a non-arousing event, but, due to adaptation, we expect that with
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repetitions of the event the number of SCRs should decline. Also DSCL
should be greater for arousing than non-arousing events, and decline with
repetitions.
Table 4.1: Post experiment questionnaire (translated from Spanish). Each ques-
tion was answered on a 0 to 10 scale where 0 meant ‘not at all’ and
10 meant ‘very much so’.
Overall experience of being in the virtual place
1 The virtual world became the place where I felt I was
located
2 During the experiment I forgot about the real lab where
this was happening
3 During the experiment I felt that those events were really
happening
Responses to the approach of the characters
4 When people started approaching towards me, I hoped
that they would stop before arriving very near to me
5 When people stopped at a certain distance from me, it
aﬀected me less that when they stopped very nearby
6 It aﬀected me more when there were more people ap-
proaching me
7 When the people approached close to me, it had an eﬀect
on me
Sense that the characters were real people
8 During the experiment, I had the impression of being with
real people
9 Sometimes I forgot those people were not real
10 Sometimes I had the sensation of feeling the body heat or
smell of the people
4.3.7 Questionnaire and Interview
Immediately following their experience in the virtual reality scene the
participants were given a questionnaire to complete, as shown in Table
4.1. These were grouped into three types of question: the overall exper-
ience of being in the virtual place (Q1,2,3), responses to the approach
of the characters (Q4,5,6,7), and the sense that the characters were real
people (Q8, 9, 10). A short informal interview was also conducted after-
wards, and statements of the participants recorded.
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Figure 4.4: Mean and standard error of the skin conductance (adjusted for the
baseline) by stopping distance from the participant. (A) skin con-
ductance responses (B) change in skin conductance level.
4.3.8 Statistical Analysis
Regression analysis was used to examine the relationship between the
response variables and the four main factors described in Section 4.3.4.
The first dependent variable considered is the number of SCRs per time
period (10s, 15s, 20s). This is a discrete count variable, and under the
null hypothesis that there is no eﬀect of any of the independent variables,
it should follow a Poisson distribution (the number of events occurring
per unit time at random moments). The standard model here is there-
fore log-linear with a Poisson error structure which is a particular case
of the class of Generalized Linear Models (McCullagh & Nelder, 1989).
Normal regression analysis was used with the second dependent variable,
DSCL, which, however, has the requirement that the residuals of the
model fit follow a normal distribution, and this was found not to be the
case. The usual approach in these circumstances is to find a monotone
transformation of the response variable that resolves this problem. This
was achieved with  e( DSCL). In any case this transformation leads to
qualitatively almost the same results as for the non transformed variable,
as shown in the next section.
For all of the regressions we standardized the scores of the independent
variables to have mean 0 and variance 1. This does not result in any
change in relationships nor in significance levels, but the utility is that
when all of the independent variables are on the same scale the parameter
estimates can be considered as eﬀect sizes.
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Table 4.2: Log Linear Regression for response variable: Number of SCRs per 20s
after the arrival of the virtual characters to their stopping point in
front of the participant. The design matrix is standardized to mean 0
and variance 1 so that the parameter estimates are also comparative
eﬀect sizes. Overall deviance of the fit is 102 on 138 d.f., n = 144.
Term Para-
meter
Estim-
ate
P
Constant -0.066 0.417
Run number -0.142 0.011
Distance -0.213 0.001
Number of characters -0.021 0.708
Type (Cylinders = 0, Virtual Females = 1) -0.110 0.052
Baseline Number of SCRs 0.956 0.000
4.4 results
4.4.1 Overview
Figure 4.4 shows plots of mean skin conductance by the final stopping
distance from the participant. Figure 4.4A shows the skin conductance
response and figure 4.4B the change in skin conductance level DSCL.
The influence of the baseline values have been eliminated by regression.
The graphs show that the highest skin conductance is associated with
the smallest distance of approach. However, this analysis cannot take
into account all of the independent variables that we manipulated and
their possible additive eﬀects, and for this we turn to multiple regression
analyses in the next sections.
4.4.2 The number of SCRs
The variance of the number of SCRs per 15s was more than double
that of 10s, and the variance for 20s was almost triple that for 10s. We
present results for 20s avoiding the problem of insuﬃcient variation in
the response variable - but actually the results for all these three possible
response variables are very similar. We also included as an explanatory
variable the number of SCRs during the baseline period, to account for
a priori diﬀerences between people.
Table 4.2 shows the result of the fit. The run number, that is the number
of visits of the avatars so far, is negatively associated with the number of
SCRs. This conforms to expectation since repetition of the stimulus leads
to adaptation and therefore less arousal. Second, the closer the avatars
were to the participant, the greater the arousal. This is consistent with
what would be expected from proxemics theory. The number of charac-
4.4 results 61
Table 4.3: Linear Regression for response variable: ySCL = -exp(- SCL), where
SCL is the maximum skin conductance reading in 5s following the
arrival of the characters in front of the participant minus the skin
conductance level at the moment that their walk started. The design
matrix is standardized to mean 0 and variance 1 so that the para-
meter estimates are also comparative eﬀect sizes. For this model R2
= 0.27, overall P = 0.000, d.f. = 138, n = 144.
Term Para-
meter
Estim-
ate
P
Constant -0.858 0.000
Run number -0.034 0.062
Distance -0.064 0.001
Number of characters 0.036 0.048
Gender (Cylinders, Virtual Females) -0.024 0.178
Baseline Number of SCRs 0.093 0.000
ters simultaneously approaching has no eﬀect. The baseline number of
SCRs is clearly significant. The only curious result relates to the ‘type’.
When the number of SCRs per 10s is used this is not significant at all,
and for 15s the P value is 0.04. Hence either the type is not significant
or the humanoid characters are associated with less arousal than the cyl-
inders - either way this is not what would be expected from proxemics
theory. Amongst the relevant variables it is clear that distance has the
greatest eﬀect (its parameter estimate is 1.5 times that of run number).
4.4.3 Change in Skin Conductance Level DSCL
A regression of DSCL on the factors above leads to the same results for
run number and distance, but in this case also the number of characters
is positively associated with the response. The type is not significant at
all. However, as stated earlier, the residuals of this fit do not follow a
normal distribution. The transformation ySCL =  e( DSCL) did result
in normal residuals (P = 0.16 with a Jarque-Bera test (Jarque & Bera,
1980)), and the results are shown in table 4.3.
The results are qualitatively the same as for table 4.2, but here there is
some evidence to suggest that also the number of characters that simul-
taneously approach the participant is positively related to the change in
skin conductance. The type is clearly not significant in this case.
4.4.4 Questionnaire and Interview
The questionnaire provides descriptive data with results given in figure
4.5. On the whole participants had the illusion of being in the virtual
62 proxemics with multiple dynamic virtual characters
Figure 4.5: Standard boxplots for the responses to the questionnaire. The me-
dians are shown as the central horizontal bars, and the boxes are
the interquartile ranges (IQR). The error bars (whiskers) represent
either the extreme data points or extend to 1.5 X IQR. There is
one value outside the whisker for Q10 shown by (+).
place (Q1,2), but not a strong illusion that the events were really hap-
pening (Q3). On the other hand their subjective impressions of how they
responded when the characters approached them were quite consistent
with the skin conductance results (Q4-7), even though consciously the
characters were not considered as being real people (Q8-10).
4.5 discussion
Two diﬀerent measures derived from the electrodermal activity recordings
show that on average the smaller the distance of the characters from the
participant, the greater the arousal. A supporting result of the validity of
the skin conductance recordings was the finding that repetition reduced
the level of arousal. There is also some evidence that the greater the
number of characters who approached the greater the level of arousal.
This is also backed up by the questionnaire results. These results are
consistent with what would be expected from proxemics theory.
However, the unexpected result was that - with respect to EDA - par-
ticipants tended to respond to cylinders in the same way as to the vir-
tual people. As one participant wrote on the questionnaire: “To see the
columns coming close was more striking than the people, it gave me some
fear, insecurity. When I saw people coming close to me I wanted to step
back, but at the same time I knew it was not real, so I didn’t do so (ex-
cept maybe once). However, there was something very contradictory in
my mind”. He said in the interview: “In some way I knew the characters
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would stop, but I was not sure about the columns”. Other participants
also said that the approach of the cylinders scared them.
These results are not the same as those found in (Bailenson et al. , 2001)
and (Wilcox et al. , 2006). Bailenson et al. (2001) found that people
managed interpersonal distance diﬀerently if they had to approach a
cylinder or a virtual character, but in their first experiment the virtual
characters were static, and were approached by the participants. Wilcox
et al. (2006) found that the physiological response to an object was less
strong than to a face, but here both were also static. It is possible that dy-
namic, moving objects (in this case, cylinders) also evoke strong arousal
responses when they approach humans. The arousal - although quant-
itatively the same as between humans and between these cylinders - is
likely to represent qualitatively diﬀerent mental processing. For example,
a close approach by a virtual human may lead to discomfort because
social norms are broken, whereas a close approach by a moving cylinder
may lead to discomfort due to fear of collision. Moreover it should be
noted that the cylinders had approximately the same dimensions as the
people so it was not a question of size. Also, in physical reality, moving
towards an adult human-sized cylinder is a very diﬀerent experience than
such a cylinder moving towards you.
Another possible interpretation is that proxemics rules applied to cyl-
inders because of the nature of the movement. In the experiment, the
cylinders followed the same trajectory as the female characters they re-
placed. This gave them a more saccade-like path that could make them
intuitively be understood as social agents.
Studies of proxemics in virtual reality have usually focused on static en-
vironments in the sense that it is the participants move, not the virtual
characters. Our experiment shows that it is likely that environments with
dynamic virtual characters are more complex to understand. There has to
be a clear separation between the social aspects (this person is too close
to me) and the physical aspects (this potentially dangerous object is too
close me). It is clear that in these environments simple interpretations of
physiological responses such as skin conductance are not suﬃcient to de-
termine social cause. However, in our case the subjective response results
are consistent with the results found from the physiological measures.
Although the results have good statistical significance, further work is
needed to understand more clearly why the response to cylinders diﬀers
from the accounts given in literature, as well as analyzing the combined
eﬀect of other factors such as gaze, gender or even cultural context, which
are known to aﬀect the reaction provoked by interpersonal distances.

5
PRINC IPLES OF INTERACTION
I have an interesting case. I’m treating two
sets of siamese twins with split personalities.
I’m getting paid by 8 people –Woody Allen
playing Zelig pretending to be a psychiatrist.
(Allen, 2001)
5.1 introduction
Crafting a compelling and entertaining story is a challenge that involves
deliberate and painstaking eﬀort. The events in a story are typically fixed
and presented in a pre-determined order. If the story is acted, very precise
temporal relations must be preserved between the actions of the diﬀerent
characters and any external forces, e.g. to create tension or comedic eﬀect.
The forms in which stories are typically conveyed enforce the constraints
necessary to keep the story as the author envisioned, and consider small
or no contribution from the audience.
In this chapter we seek to address how a person or persons can become
part of a story that is playing out in an immersive virtual environment
(IVE). This is similar to having a role on a stage; only the stage is di-
gitally produced and can, therefore, be anything and react in any way.
Portraying an unfolding story within an IVE seems diﬃcult: in an IVE,
participants can pay attention to and interact with whatever they want
within the immersive simulation. Moreover, the decisions taken by virtual
characters must appear consistent with their personality and motivations,
but also take into account the participants actions, whenever relevant. Fi-
nally, the result of the interactions should satisfy a pre-established plot.
In this chapter, we introduce a new two-part approach that addresses the
dilemma between freedom of action and narrative. How should we guide
the decisions of virtual characters in order that the result of the inter-
action among them and with the participant satisfies a pre-established
story plot?
We introduce two novel interrelated principles that we believe can ad-
vance this goal. Guiding a story under the principle of Providence, it is
possible to depict one or even several strongly directed plots of arbitrary
complexity in an interactive virtual environment. In addition, interaction
based on the Zelig Interaction Metaphor allows for the depiction of plaus-
ible virtual characters interacting with the participant in an IVE. The
overall implementation based on these methods is tractable and leverage
methodologies already in place in movie and video-games industry.
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5.2 fate against free will
Previous work has often conceptualised this challenge as an inherent
tension between the player’s freedom to do whatever he decides and the
need to satisfy a pre-established plot. This tension between narrative
coherence and open interaction is sometimes identified with a scholastic
dilemma: Fate against Free Will. Either the storyteller is omnipotent and
sets the Fate of characters in order to generate a compelling story or the
participants freely decide which actions to take, thereby asserting Free
Will.
Examples of this conflict can be seen in the approaches taken by the
video-game industry, which has favoured either story or interaction. For
example, in fight games such as id Software’s Doom or Capcom’s Street
Fighter the participant’s character can do whatever he wants, but the
outcome of the game is completely open. On the contrary, classical ad-
venture games such as Lucasfilm Games’ Monkey Island or Loom have
a complex pre-established plot, but at each stage the participant only
has one option: he must find the way forward solving a situation in a
puzzle-like style. A popular approach to combine the two has been to
alternate both: intersperse “cut scenes” which advance the story in video
form throughout the interactive game. The Interactive Drama (ID) re-
search area has sought a new way to combine the narrative of stories
with the interactivity of games. Some titles in video-game industry have
also taken this direction. However, the solutions proposed present several
limitations and at present day none are completely satisfactory.
5.3 providence
We propose an alternative approach to guiding the events in a story
that permits a mixture of interaction (Free Will) and a strong story
line (Fate). The medieval solution to the Fate versus Free Will dilemma
relied on Providence. Providence is diﬀerent from Fate. Fate is at work
in a lot of Greek tragedies, where unwillingly the hero has broken some
rules and Fate will impose the price to pay. This is mirrored in Propp’s
narrative structure, which is the backbone of many of the existing ID
attempts (Glassner, 2004). Providence is closer to the small coincidence
that finally changes the course of the story.
In everyday life, people control what they do, but not all of the con-
sequences of their actions nor the eﬀect of such consequences on them.
For example, one can decide to make a phone call, but cannot control
who will answer, or in what mood the person will be. In the medieval
view, Providence is an abstract entity that guides our decisions within a
world of uncertainty; it is a link between our actions and the context that
grants the consequences of our actions fit within a “bigger plan” (McCann,
2006). In contemporary fiction, Providence appears in the form of coin-
cidences that precipitate the course of events, or a whole set of incidental
details that produce the dramatic eﬀect.
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In practical terms, Providence can be seen as a gambling game. To cre-
ate a story that occurs within apparent randomness, the game must be
biased: characters must conspire to grant that the story will unfold as
established a priori. For example, in a war video-game involving teams,
in principle it is possible to program the virtual characters of the players’
team in order that, within the unfolding video-game, they perform the
actions involved in the Saving Private Ryan plot with the right timings.
In such a view, opponents would moderate their attacks dynamically so
that no crucial character gets killed too early. If some crucial character
were killed because of the participant’s accidental intervention, another
character would assume his role. If the participant did not cooperate at
all with the group’s goals and killed everyone in his team, a replacement
team could appear and assume the main roles of the story. It is almost
like in theatre: if in a company everyone knows how to perform all the
roles and some actor cannot be at the show, another actor will assume
his and the show will go on.
Under this principle, the characters will end up performing the story
actions in the pre-established order and latencies, but this result will
appear to a naïve user as a set of apparent coincidences.
5.4 the zelig interaction metaphor
In ID, as in video-games, it is assumed the participant is the protagonist
of the story. However, this has several drawbacks. For example, in Façade,
the story rapidly falls apart when the participant does nothing, gets dis-
tracted or acts crazily. She must assume the role the system expects
of her or the story cannot unfold. If the participant is the protagonist,
in principle diﬀerent consequences must be designed for each decision
with which she is confronted. This leads to a combinatorial explosion of
branches, which cannot be implemented. Making a participant the prot-
agonist also supposes that she knows what to do in every plot-relevant
situation, and the plot cannot advance unless she performs that action.
It is also hard to understand how someone can be the protagonist of a
story if, for example, she shows the typical attitude of a story audience.
However, adopting the Zelig interaction metaphor the participant will
simply assume the role she wants and the system will take care of reas-
signing the roles needed for the story. If she takes the initiative and does
the relevant actions, she will have a more prominent role. However, if she
stops doing so, another character will assume her role.
The Zelig interaction metaphor is inspired by the main character in
Woody Allen’s movie Zelig (Allen, 2001). Zelig physically and behavi-
ourally adapts to the social situation at which he is confronted. When
medical doctors surround Zelig, he starts behaving and talking as a doc-
tor. When pretending to be a gangster, he progressively looks as one.
He is a human chameleon with an environment-dependency syndrome,
and he adapts his behaviour and even physical appearance to the social
situation at hand.
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Surprisingly, this kind of behaviour already happens spontaneously in
pathological subjects suﬀering a rare syndrome related with brain dam-
age in frontal areas, which provoke a personality disorder. In simple terms,
these patients have “lost” their own identity, so they adopt for themselves
the more dominant social role that they can find in their surrounding,
like “human chameleons" (Conchiglia et al. , 2007). This is obviously not
needed to interact within an IVE based on such interaction metaphor,
but we can use the scientific litterature existing to outline how a it would
be like to interact in an IVE based on the Zelig Interaction Metaphor:
A.D. was taken to the hospital bar, his admittance being
allowed through the personnel’s private entrance. A.D. set
about performing the simplest duties of a barman in the com-
pany of an operator. A few minutes after entering the bar a
request made by an actor to prepare a cocktail was enough
for A.D. to take up the role of a barman. He claimed that he
had been kept “on a two-week trial” hoping to be taken on as
barman, and that he was expert in making alcoholic drinks,
and had attended special courses for this purpose. In this ex-
perimental setting the patient kept up the role for the entire
duration of the time set aside for the session, demonstrat-
ing considerable skill as he gave general indications about
organizing the bar, yet always making plausible but never
any precise statements. He used bottles and drinking glasses,
but always in response to a stimulus or a request.
As this seems to happen spontaneously with pathological subjects, and
is something intensively developed by actors, especially in improvisation
situations, it seems reasonable to think that normal subjects can adopt
these behaviours. Adopting this principle as an interaction metaphor,
the participant will play by pretending, and his actions will determine
whether he becomes the protagonist, a secondary character or an an-
onymous witness.
At this point it is important to make a distinction between desktop-based
virtual environment and an IVE. Contrary to traditional interactive me-
dia, a person exposed to an immersive display sees an audio-visual inter-
active scene that fully envelops them and is updated according to their
head and body movements. Hence, participants in an IVE tend to ex-
perience a place illusion (Slater, 2009): the sensation of physically being
there, instead of seeing a moving image. This diﬀerence has profound
eﬀects on the experience and is likely to aﬀect how one reacts to and
interacts with a story.
Place Illusion can induce participants to spontaneously engage in a con-
versation and show body language and physiological reactions similar
to a real social scenario (Rovira et al. , 2009; Pan et al. , 2012). How-
ever, we do not spontaneously speak to desktop computers or televisions,
which suggests interaction in an IVE is closer to role-playing in theatre
than to playing video-games. This suggests that the more immersive a
virtual environment is, the stronger the tendency for people to adopt a
particular role within a virtual social environment, and interact with the
other virtual characters consistently with this role. Therefore, the more
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Figure 5.1: A qualitative diagram of diﬀerent kinds of simulated environments
comparing interactivity opposed to narrative coherence.
immersive the virtual scenario, the more likely participants will adopt
implicitly the Zelig interaction metaphor and, therefore, assume a partic-
ular role and interact with the virtual characters. Moreover, in the Zelig
movie, the character not only assumed the social role, but also adopted
the physical appearance of the pretended role, something that could also
be done if the display is immersive enough to render a virtual body for
the participant. Recent research on body representation has shown that
given Place Illusion and a virtual body that reacts as themselves, parti-
cipants can even experience a transfer of body ownership which radically
overrides their previous knowledge about their real body (Slater et al. ,
2010).
Overall, under the Zelig interaction metaphor the participant can feel
as though impersonating any role within the story. However, if the parti-
cipant is completely passive, another character will replace him. Contrary
to ID and video-games, adopting a passive attitude will have a minimal
impact on story coherence: the roles will be redistributed among the
available virtual characters, which will show plausible behaviours motiv-
ated by individual personalities and unfold a story as the result of their
interactions.
5.5 providence guidance with the zelig interaction
metaphor
Both Providence guidance and the Zelig interaction metaphor dissolve
the tension between Fate and Free Will and establish methods to improve
on existing ID creation methodology. However, the combination of these
two approaches creates a paradigm that can truly combine Free Will
with storytelling for immersive settings, diﬀerent participation levels, and
even multiple participants. Assuming the Zelig interaction metaphor and
Providence guidance, the actions of the participant are free, but the
consequences of these actions are determined by the reactions of the
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environment and other characters, which are ultimately controlled by
the storyteller.
For example, in an interactive story similar to Saving Private Ryan,
Providence could grant that Ryan gets saved no matter what the par-
ticipant does. Under the Zelig interaction metaphor, if the participant
adopted a completely passive attitude, not even following his team, then
his character could get killed and she would become a disembodied spec-
tator, like a ghost with no acting capabilities. Otherwise, if she cooper-
ated with the other members of the commando, she could contribute
to the achievement of the story, and avoid getting killed. However, in
both cases the story would still occur coherently. In a romantic comedy,
Providence would ensure the main roles always end up together. Via the
Zelig interaction metaphor the characters that correspond to such roles
could be altered by the participant’s actions.
One of the mainstays of ID work to date is forking storylines. There are
two main motivations for these, to give the impression that the parti-
cipant’s interaction has an eﬀect and to allow a story to be experienced
multiple times with diﬀerent storylines and outcomes. Combining Provid-
ence guidance and the Zelig interaction metaphor does not preclude the
development of such approaches and yet addresses both independently.
Through adopting diﬀerent roles and actions the participant will have
a diﬀerent experience every time and the single storyline will play out
slightly diﬀerently every time. Moreover, the storyteller can still foresee
alternative versions of the same story. For example, in a story like Saving
Private Ryan, the number of members of the rescue team that survive can
depend on the participant’s behaviour. This decision will be established
beforehand, but the branches will only be triggered by the participant’s
behaviour. As the participant is not necessarily the protagonist, such
layer of alternative possibilities is not necessary, but it is certainly still
possible.
Overall, compared with the narrative limitations of other interactive con-
tent (see figure 5.1) the combination of Providence guidance with the
Zelig interaction metaphor provides a viable solution to the Free Will
against Fate dilemma.
5.6 implementation
A classic issue with creating IDs is how to implement them. Both storyte-
lling industries, such as film, and interactive industries, such as video-
games, have developed established methods to enable their creation in
distributed ways. To define the detailed plot of an ID based on previous
methods both creative and technical skills have to be combined to build
evaluation functions, drama managers or rule-based agents. This requires
both story and implementation be performed by the same people. Since
there isn’t an easy way to create a systematic process with separated
tasks in these approaches, it is diﬃcult to adapt them to an industrial
scale.
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Apart from allowing task separation, ideally content production for in-
teractive stories should be similar to how a movie is done. When it was
invented, cinema initially took conventions from theatre to progressively
develop its own. Therefore, if IVEs were to become a new narrative
medium, they would benefit from adapting the practical knowledge de-
veloped in theatre or in movie industry to this new medium. For this,
it is essential to produce an unfolding story in an IVE in a way similar
to how a theatre play or a movie is produced. For example, through the
writing of a script, acting it (or creating the scripted animations), and fi-
nally editing it through cuts and transitions. Our proposed method takes
steps to allow content production in a more natural way.
One advantage of adopting Providence guidance is that an interactive
story becomes nearly as concrete as a normal drama; its scriptwriting
does not require more technical skills than writing a movie script. There-
fore, building complex stories is not harder (or easier) than writing a
movie script. For example, consider an excerpt from the last scene of
Saving Private Ryan (personal transcription):
MILLER, RYAN AND REIBEN
RYAN looks around with perplexity while all the
American troops run to clean and organise the re-
maining of the battlefield. He approaches MILLER
and REIBEN, nearby a motorbike. MILLER, badly
wounded on the ground, looks at Ryan. REIBEN tries
to take care of his wound, and then runs to find a
paramedic. MILLER raises a trembling hand. RYAN
approaches him. MILLER speaks in a weak but firm
voice: “earn this”. RYAN watches silently. MILLER
dies. REIBEN approaches Miller and notices he is
dead. REIBEN takes the letter that Miller kept in a
pocket to be given to his family in case he died and
looks at RYAN with perplexity. RYAN keeps staring
at Miller’s body.
In the next chapter we introduce a method that takes advantage of the
conventions of movie scripts to integrate the events depicted as a plan
to be performed by a group of situated agents. In a scene such as the
previous one, we consider the story plot as a set of propositions. Each
of the propositions refers to an event with certain duration. The roles
involved in each event of the plot are stated in capital letters. Generating
the animations corresponding to the scripted actions can be done with
standard industrial techniques, such as those used in video-games. Recent
titles such as Rockstars’s L.A. Noire have already demonstrated the use
of real actors to develop video-game characters as expressive as movie
characters.
To implement the Providence principle, each of the virtual characters
makes decisions using a decisional architecture named Extended Beha-
viour Networks (EBN). We chose this method because it is a distributed,
scalable and stable architecture that can perform decision on continuous
domains, integrate aﬀective states in decision-making and psychologically
plausible decisions under uncertainty (see section 2.6).
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An EBN performs an action if it is expected to contribute to the achieve-
ment of one or several goals stated beforehand. It takes into account
whether these goals are relevant according to the situation at hand, and
also considers if the resources needed to perform the action are available.
In this context, we can process the plot as a goal labelled ‘Advance The
Plot’ (ATP). In this view, each agent has a copy of the list of events
described in the plot and will attempt to contribute to it to the same
extent he will try to achieve other goals. The roles are processed as any
other resource: each of the virtual characters will monitor which roles
are available, and take one of them whenever he can adopt it in an ac-
tion relevant for the plot. In the previous example, if no character has
adopted the role ‘MILLER’, a virtual character can adopt it and start
doing actions corresponding to events such as ‘MILLER speaks in a
weak but firm voice: “earn this” ’. In this view, each virtual charac-
ter will simply wait until it has to perform one of the actions attributed
to his role. Meanwhile, the virtual character will collaborate passively.
For example, if it is a war scenario, it will stand nearby, careful not
to exterminate the other characters with relevant roles, and eventually
perform other actions relevant for goals not conflicting with the ATP
goal.
The implementation of the Zelig interaction metaphor is simply a Sub-
stitution rule. If no character assumes a particular role –or the character
assuming the role gets killed, or abandons the role- the role can be taken.
Therefore, the participant can pretend to be any role she wants. If she
does not do what the system expects, another character will assume her
role. In addition, if a character with a particular role gets killed, some
other character will fulfill that role. As will be explained in further detail
in the next chapter, the way the plot is processed can grant a particular
role to be adopted or a particular event to occur with particular tem-
poral latencies. Within such an interval, the participant can perform the
action or not. If she does, the system will assume she has adopted the
role corresponding to the action, and if she doesn’t, some other character
will assume the role and perform the action. In practical terms, determ-
ining the temporal interval in which a scripted action should occur is
not harder than introducing a transition using standard movie edition
software.
Overall, given the picture depicted in chapter 2 about the inferential
model of communication describes a reality, the ATP goal intends to im-
plement the cooperative principle (Grice, 1975) by processing the actions
of the script as a collaborative game where agents must satisfy (Luce &
Raiﬀa, 1989, chap 6, p.114):
1. a minimal degree of collaboration -such as for example to sit down
round a table if the collaborative game is a negotiation-,
2. Every agent has its own goals, and
3. They all share at least one common goal (in this case, the ATP
goal).
The kind of social game created by the Substitution rule will grant that
there is always a significant part of the characters that give responses that
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are relevant (Sperber & Wilson, 2004) to the situation at hand. However,
this will not be because of some magical system of artificial intelligence,
but rather because of a scriptwriter that has specified beforehand the
events involved in the story. If the scriptwriter has specified a scenario
that is plausible, the participant will feel as if the virtual characters in
front of him are really understanding in what they are involved, despite
they are mere automatons without much will of their own.
In conclusion, as long as there are more characters than roles in the story,
the Substitution and the ATP principles can grant a story will always
occur. For example, we can save Private Ryan within an interactive war
video-game no matter what the participant does. However, some aspects
of the story, such as how many characters survive, or even which is the
particular character that assumes the role of Ryan, can be determined
by the actions of the participant.
5.7 conclusions
We have introduced two interconnected paradigms that enable the cre-
ation of interactive stories in IVEs: Providence and the Zelig Interaction
Metaphor. These principles permit the merger of a strong story with
unrestricted user interaction. Assuming the Zelig interaction metaphor
and Providence based story guidance, one can portray arbitrarily com-
plex stories within an IVE using a method that intuitively matches the
process of producing movies.
The next chapter is concerned with assessing on an experimental basis
whether it is reasonable to assume such principles of interaction in an
IVE. Later on, chapter 7 will develop in detail how the concrete rules
underlying these principles, namely Advance The Plot (ATP) and Sub-
stitution, can be implemented in a robust and scalable decisional archi-
tecture such as, for example, Extended Behaviour Networks (EBN).

6
IDENT IF ICAT ION WITH A VIRTUAL BODY :
V IRTUAL BODY OWNERSH IP INFLUENCES
TEMPERATURE SENS IT IV ITY
6.1 introduction
In the previous chapter we have introduced two principles of interaction
on the assumption that, due to the sensorimotor correlations respected
in this kind of display, in an IVE people will identify with their virtual
bodies and experience the IVE as a shared space with other characters.
Chapter 4 has already shown interpersonal distances in an IVE provoke
electrodermal responses similar to a real social space. In the present
chapter we seek to address whether someone embodied in a virtual body
with the appropriate sensorimotor correlations can feel as owning this
body. This would give an experimental insight on how literally can the
principles of interaction previously outlined be assumed.
In the rubber hand illusion tactile stimulation seen on a rubber hand,
that is synchronous with tactile stimulation felt on the hidden real hand,
can lead to an illusion of ownership over the rubber hand. This illusion
has been shown to produce a temperature decrease in the hidden hand,
suggesting that such illusory ownership produces dis-ownership of the
real hand. Here we apply immersive virtual reality (VR) to experiment-
ally investigate this with respect to sensitivity to temperature change.
Forty participants experienced immersion in a VR with a virtual body
(VB) seen from a first person perspective. For half the participants the
VB was consistent in posture and movement with their own body, and
in the other half there was inconsistency. Temperature sensitivity on the
palm of the hand was measured before and after the virtual experience.
The results show that temperature sensitivity decreased in the consistent
compared to the inconsistent condition. Moreover, the change in sensit-
ivity was significantly correlated with the subjective illusion of virtual
arm ownership. We suggest that the results are consistent with a model
of body ownership where the brain allocates exteroceptive attentional re-
sources in accordance with the free energy (or ‘surprise’) interpretation
of brain functioning.
The question of how the brain represents the body is especially intriguing
since, and counter to common sense, it seems that the brain’s body rep-
resentation is highly plastic, with the possibility of rapid illusory incor-
poration of fake body parts into this representation, as demonstrated by
the rubber hand illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). This work sugges-
ted that the brain is able to incorporate into the body representation a
rubber hand that receives a series of contingent touches that are tempor-
ally and spatially synchronous with touches on the corresponding real
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(but hidden) hand. This rubber hand illusion generates the illusion of
ownership over the rubber hand, where the rubber hand feels as if it
were part of the body. An extension of these results suggested an inter-
pretation that the brain employs a Bayesian bottom up inference mech-
anism to determine what is and what is not part of the body (Armel
& Ramachandran, 2003). The rubber hand illusion paradigm has pro-
voked extensive research on underlying brain activity and mechanisms
associated with such body representation illusions (Blanke et al. , 2005;
Ehrsson et al. , 2007, 2005; Tsakiris, 2010). This has also led to theor-
etical advances at the interface between neuroscience and the notion of
the self from a philosophical viewpoint (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009).
Immersive virtual reality technology provides an excellent technology for
the study of body representation. For example, the rubber hand illusion
was reproduced in virtual reality. This was implemented using a virtual
projection of an arm in stereo 3D as if coming out of the shoulder of the
participant. The virtual arm was seen to receive taps on the virtual hand
that corresponded with physical taps on the illuded real hand Slater et al.
(2008, 2009). Generally, using immersive virtual reality it is possible to
visually substitute a person’s real body with a collocated virtual one. In
order to achieve this the participant wears a head-tracked, stereo, wide
field-of-view head-mounted display that shuts out all visual input from
the surrounding physical world. The participant will see the virtual world
in full stereo 3D while looking around, and in particular looking down
towards him- or herself will see a virtual body representation substitut-
ing his or her own. Moreover, if there is real-time motion capture, then
as the participant moves their real body then the virtual body would
move in synchrony. It is also possible to place a virtual mirror in the
scene, and so by looking at an appropriately positioned virtual mirror,
reflections of the virtual body will also be seen. Additional synchronous
multisensory stimulation with respect to the real and a virtual body has
also been employed. For example, the participant sees their virtual body
touched, while feeling the touch synchronously and in the same place on
his real body. Several papers have recently shown that it is possible using
variants of this type of technique to generate in people the illusory sense
of ownership of such a virtual body Ehrsson (2007); Petkova & Ehrsson
(2008); Lenggenhager et al. (2007); Slater et al. (2010, 2009) .
A question that arises from virtual limb and whole body illusions is
the extent to which these generate detectable physiological consequences.
The major correlates to such illusions that have been investigated to date
rely on a stress response to attacks on the body. For example Petkova &
Ehrsson (2008) reported a diﬀerential skin conductance response when
comparing between a synchronous visual-tactile condition concomitant
with a subjective rating of the illusion, and an asynchronous visual-tactile
condition. When the participants experienced a physical threat to the
virtual body their arousal level as measured by skin conductance was
significantly higher than in the non-ownership asynchronous condition.
In Slater et al. (2010) heart-rate deceleration was significantly higher
in a 1PP compared to a third person perspective (3PP) condition when
participants saw their virtual body being attacked.
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A major consequence of virtual limb ownership is that it may provoke
a certain dis-ownership of the real counterpart. For example, in Moseley
et al. (2008) it was shown that the experimental induction of illusory
ownership of a rubber arm (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) provokes a temper-
ature reduction of the corresponding real limb, but not of other parts of
the body. The converse also seems to be the case: reducing limb temper-
ature can modulate the intensity of the rubber hand illusion (Kammers
et al. , 2011).
This has been related with several pathological conditions such as com-
plex regional pain syndrome, or acute schizophrenia (Moseley et al. ,
2008), where an abnormal feeling of dis-ownership of the real limb of the
patient is associated with a drop in temperature. Motivated by similar
bodily alterations in diﬀerent conditions for which dopamine hyperactiv-
ity has been proposed as an underlying mechanism, Albrecht et al. (2011)
showed that the pharmacological induction of higher levels of dopamine
provoked an increase in the illusory ownership, and specifically concern-
ing the embodiment of the rubber hand, and the loss of ownership of
the person’s own hand, but did not provoke significant diﬀerences on the
perception of movement or the aﬀective component of the experience.
This can be thought as the withdrawal of resources away from the real
arm when there is the subjective illusion of ownership over a rubber arm.
According to this picture, one would expect that performance in visual-
tactile discrimination tasks involving the illuded arm would decrease.
Consistent with this Moseley et al. (2008) showed that performance in
visual-tactile temporal order judgements decreased with the induction of
virtual ownership.
The goal of this experiment was to investigate the relationship between
the body ownership illusion and temperature sensitivity threshold, that
is, the extent to which participants can discriminate small temperature
changes on the palm of their hand. Our hypothesis was that this would
be another indicator of dis-ownership of the real body, that sensitivity
would decrease in correlation with the body ownership illusion. Addition-
ally we investigated whether the changes in sensitivity were related to
the subjective illusion of body ownership, or whether they can simply
be explained by the actual experimental manipulations involving cross
modal conflict, independently of whether there was a subjective illusion
of ownership. In the experiment described in this paper the participants’
real bodies were substituted by a virtual body as seen through a HMD.
They could see the virtual body directly when looking down towards
themselves and also as reflected in a virtual mirror. The body was either
in a posture consistent with that of the real body and with the virtual
right arm movements temporally and spatially synchronous with real
right arm movements (consistent condition), or alternatively in an un-
usual posture, not consistent with the real one, and with movements
of the virtual right arm inconsistent with those of their real right arm
(non-consistent condition). The temperature threshold sensitivity of par-
ticipants was measured before they entered the virtual reality, and imme-
diately after they had experienced the virtual embodiment. We expected
that those in the consistent condition would have greater relative temper-
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ature sensitivity threshold after embodiment compared to those in the
non-consistent condition. We also expected that the rating of the sub-
jective illusion of virtual body ownership would positively correlate with
an increase in the temperature threshold. In other words virtual body
ownership should impair sensitivity, indicating a level of ‘dis-ownership’
of the real body.
6.2 methods
6.2.1 Equipment
The head-mounted display used was an NVIS SX111 with a resolution
of 1280⇥1024 and a Field of View (FOV) of 76oH⇥64oV per eye with
overall resolution 2560⇥1024 and an overall FOV of 111oH⇥64oV. The
display refresh rate is 60Hz. The virtual environment was programmed on
a PC with graphics card GeForce 480GTX. Head-tracking was achieved
with the 6-DOF Intersense IS-900 device. Additionally the right hand of
the participants was tracked using the Optitrack optical tracking system
1.
An optical marker was put on the back of the participant’s right hand,
which was used for position and orientation tracking. Temperature sens-
itivity threshold (TST) was obtained with a CASE (Computer Aided
Sensory Evaluator) IV Thermal stimulator (Figure 6.1a). This consists
of a thermoelectric unit which has a linear ramp of cooling and warm-
ing of 4 /second. The device was placed on the floor to the right of the
participants and they were required to position the palmar of their right
hand on the measuring device. During the recording periods, depending
on the condition, participants would see or not their virtual hand resting
on the virtual counterpart of the device (Figure 6.1b). The device first
adjusts to the temperature of the hand of the participants, and then 20
readings are taken at diﬀerent temperature values. At each reading the
participant was required to say whether he felt any temperature change
or not. The computer program associated with the device then computed
the threshold temperature in degrees celcius (Dyck et al. , 1993).
It should be noted that since TST measures the threshold at which there
is a just noticeable diﬀerence in temperature, higher values of TST imply
lower temperature sensitivity. Throughout this chapter we denote the
threshold by TST, temperature sensitivity itself by TS which is inversely
related to TST.
6.2.2 Experimental design
The experiment was initially designed as a within groups experiment
where each participant experienced two conditions - a Consistent Con-
dition (C) and a Non-Consistent Condition (N). In the C condition the
virtual body was in a normal seated posture with the left hand hanging
1 http://www.naturalpoint.com/optitrack/
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Figure 6.1: The Case IV temperature sensitivity recording device, and its vir-
tual counterpart. (a) Shows the position of the participant next to
the device (b) the view in the virtual mirror.
down the side and where the right hand and arm moved synchronously
in time and space with the real counterparts. Once the participant had
entered the VR he was placed into the same posture as the virtual body
and in particular the virtual right hand was carefully adjusted in order
that its position and orientation was consistent with the real hand. In or-
der that the participant would experience it to be in the same position as
his real hand, the position of the virtual hand and also the virtual coun-
terpart of the Case IV (see Figure 6.1) were adjusted. The only tracking
information available was the position and orientation of the hand, and
therefore the rotation of the shoulder and both the position and rotation
of the elbow was inferred with inverse kinematics.
In the N condition the body was also seated but remained throughout
the experiment in an unusual posture and the right arm movements were
not the same as the movements of the real right arm. The participant
would see the virtual arm move as soon as he moved his actual arm, but
the movements would diﬀer. Earlier pilot experiments had shown that it
was quite diﬃcult to find a condition where participants did not have the
illusion of ownership over the collocated virtual body experienced from
1PP. We examined many diﬀerent possibilities until we found that the
ownership illusion tended to diminish with both non-synchronous arm
movement and non-consistent body posture.
Forty male participants were recruited from around the university cam-
pus, and assigned arbitrarily to one of the two groups: Non-Consistent
condition followed by Consistent condition (NC) or the opposite order
(CN). Each group had the same number of participants. The two condi-
tions were presented in counter-balanced order. However, it turned out
that there was a very strong asymmetry between these two groups with
respect to their questionnaire responses and TST measures, so treating
this as a within-groups design was inappropriate. Hence for the purposes
of analysis we have considered only the first exposures of each group, mak-
ing this a between-groups design with 20 participants per group. We refer
to the groups as N and C - the group that received the non-consistent
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condition or consistent condition as their first exposure respectively, and
results from the second exposure were discounted.
6.2.3 Participants
The mean age of participants was 23 ± 5 years with no significant dif-
ference between the two groups. The experiment was approved by the
Ethics Committee of the University of Barcelona, and all participants
gave their written informed consent to participate in the study.
6.2.4 Procedures
When participants arrived at the virtual reality laboratory an outline of
the procedures and experiment was explained to them, and they were in-
vited to sign a consent form. The operator gave them a pullover to wear
of the same colour as the one shown on the avatar in the virtual reality
and then adhered the Optitrack marker on the dorsal area of their right
hand. They were invited to move the hand to verify the marker was well
fixed. Then, they were then invited to sit on a chair on which they re-
mained throughout the experimental procedures. The procedures for the
TST recording were explained to them. They were given a series of test
trials in order to become used to the task and understand the require-
ments. The number of test trials was between 3 and 8, and the intensity
changes were chosen by the operator. The training phase stopped once
the participant recognized the stimuli, and gave at least one aﬃrmative
and one negative answer perceiving some stimuli. Then, 20 readings were
then administered using an adaptive procedure (Dyck et al. , 1993). This
resulted in the first TST reading that we denote as tReal.
Then they donned the HMD (which also housed the Intersense head-
tracker) while their eyes were closed and it was adjusted so that it was
comfortable. When the participants opened their eyes they were in a
virtual room of size 7.6 ⇥ 3.9 meters, and 2.7 meters high with some
furniture (Figure 2). They were told to sit in a posture with their left
hand hanging down at their side, their feet flat on the floor. There were
told that they could move their right hand and head but no other part of
their body. To acclimatise to the virtual environment and to confirm they
could see correctly through the HMD, they were asked to look around
and describe the scene they saw (Figure 6.2). One of the elements in
this scene was a green box (representing the CASE IV) immediately to
their right. Then they were asked to look down at themselves, and they
would see a male virtual body substituting their own and seated on a
virtual replicate of the chair (Figure 6.2a). The virtual body could also
be seen as reflected in a virtual mirror. In addition, to avoid rejection
of the virtual body because of it having a face diﬀerent to that of the
participant, the mirror was placed in such a way that the participant
only saw the reflection from the neck down (Figure 6.2c).
The position of their body with respect to the chair and the box was
calibrated so that it appeared to be in the correct position from the point
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Figure 6.2: First person perspective of the body and the view in the virtual
mirror (a) a stereo pair of the scene when the participant looks
down towards himself (b) the participant moving an arm (c) a view
in the mirror of arm movements. (b) and (c) are not meant to be
corresponding images.
of view of each participant. After this adjustment phase, the participant
was asked to briefly close his eyes and the experiment was started, either
in the N or in the C condition. Participants were encouraged to move
their right arm, and they would see the arm and hand move both from
a first person perspective and also as reflected in the mirror. Figure 3
contrasts the C and N conditions. What cannot be shown is that in the
C condition the movement of the virtual right hand was synchronous
with the real hand, whereas in the N condition this was not the case, but
instead the arm moved triggered by movements of the real arm but the
movement was not the same as the movement of the real hand.
To ensure that participants in the N condition did not feel a spatial
congruency between their arm movements and the movements of the vir-
tual arm and hand, three distortions were introduced. First, the update
of the virtual hand position was delayed 1 second. Second, to ensure
that there was no congruency felt between the real and the virtual arm,
the rotation of the virtual hand was not delayed but the x and y axis
of rotations were swapped. This introduced movements that were still
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Table 6.1: Post experiment questionnaire (translated from Spanish). Each ques-
tion was answered on a 0 to 10 scale where 0 meant ‘not at all’ and
10 meant ‘very much so’.
1 (own) How much did you feel that the virtual body
was your body?
2 (move) How much did you feel that the movements that
the virtual body
made were your movements?
3 (another) How much did you feel that the virtual body
was another person?
4 (arm) How much did you feel the virtual arm belonged
to you?
physically possible but, combined with the delayed position, prevented
an identification with the real movements. Third, in order to reduce the
probability of limb ownership due to some collocation of the real hand
and the virtual one, when the physical hand approached within 40 cm of
the Case IV box a progressive displacement was introduced in order that
virtual hand deviated upwards and away from it. As a result, when the
real hand was exactly at the initial position, on the Cave IV, the virtual
arm was extended upwards by 1.5m above the virtual counterpart of the
Case IV.
Over a period of 2 minutes participants were encouraged to move their
hand in diﬀerent ways: towards the left, the right, look at their palm, the
back of their hand, and so on (Figure ). They were also asked to look
down at themselves and at the mirror. They were also encouraged to pay
attention to the details of their virtual hand such as the fingernails. In
addition to this, at various moments they were asked to point to some
of the objects of the scene they had previously described: for example,
to point at a painting on the wall in front. They were asked to do this
pointing task 3 times during the 2 minutes.
After this period they were asked to place their hand on the CASE IV.
In the C condition, the virtual hand followed. In the N condition, the
virtual hand remained in a position above the CASE IV. Then there
were another 20 sensitivity readings, resulting in the TST measure that
we denote as tVR.
After the completion of these readings participants were asked to close
their eyes and also the screens were blanked, and they were asked a num-
ber of questions (see below). Then the experimental trial was repeated
in the other condition where all procedures were the same.
6.2.5 The Questionnaire
There were 4 questions answered immediately following each of the two
exposures, and while the participant was still wearing the HMD, as shown
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in Table 6.1. The scale and the questions were read out to the participants
by the experimenter who noted down the answers.
6.2.6 The TST readings
Each participant completed the TST test before entering the virtual
reality (tReal), and then in the virtual reality after the period of 2 mins
(tVR). It should be noted again that greater values of tReal or tVR
indicate less sensitivity to temperature changes. We define Dt = tVR -
tReal. When Dt > 0 there is less sensitivity to temperature changes in
the virtual reality compared to physical reality.
6.3 results
6.3.1 Questionnaire Scores
Figure 6.4 shows the questionnaire scores. It is clear that the N and C
conditions had the required eﬀect, generally the scores are higher in the
C condition than the N for Q1, Q2 and Q4, and lower for Q3. Comparison
of the C scores with the corresponding N scores show that the diﬀerences
between them for Q1, Q3 and Q4 are highly significant: Q1 (own), P =
0.0002, Q2 (move), P < 0.00005, Q4 (arm), P < 0.00005. For Q3 (other)
the diﬀerence has significance P < 0.11. All significance levels are two-
sided, using the Wilcoxon rank-sum non-parametric test.
The primary purpose of the C and N conditions was to find body config-
urations that would provide a suﬃcient range of the degree of subjective
body ownership, and this succeeded.
6.3.2 Temperature Sensitivity Threshold
Here we compare Dt between the N and C groups. The mean and stand-
ard errors for the two groups are N: -0.06 ± 0.10 and C: 0.29 ± 0.07.
One way ANOVA shows that the means are significantly diﬀerent at
P = 0.007. However, the Shapiro-Wilks test for normality of the resid-
uals is marginal (P = 0.06), and it can be seen in Figure 6.5a that the
relationship between tVR and tReal shows possible heteroscedasticity
(variance of tVR increasing with tReal). Figure 6.5b shows that this is re-
solved by working on a log scale. Let Dlogt = log(tVR/tReal), which has
mean ± standard error N: 0.008 ± 0.102 and C: 0.401 ± 0.095. ANOVA
shows these to be significantly diﬀerent (P = 0.008). The Shapiro-Wilks
test for normality of the residuals has P > 0.8.
Figure 6.5b shows the scatter diagram for the plot of log(tVR) by log(tReal)
separately for the N and C groups. Analysis of covariance on Condition
results in a common slope (P < 0.00001) with the intercept for the C
group greater than that for the N group (P = 0.020). The residual errors
are compatible with normality (Shapiro-Wilks, P = 0.23).
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Figure 6.3: Contrasting the C and N conditions. The inset shows an example
of the N Condition, where the avatar is in a strange posture, and
the virtual and real hand movements and position do not match.
The right image shows a snapshot from the Consistent condition,
where the character is seated normally and the real and virtual hand
movement match. In the N condition the position of the real hand
did not correspond with the position of the virtual hand, whereas
it did in the C condition.
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Figure 6.4: Boxplots for the questionnaire scores for condition N and C. The
central horizontal lines are the medians and the upper and lower
edges of the boxes are the 25 and 75 percentiles. The whiskers ex-
tend to the minimum and maximum data points if these are not
outliers. Outliers are shown separately and are outside the bounds
of 1.5 times the interquartile range below or above the 25 and 75 per-
centiles respectively. In this case the length of the whisker extends
to 1.5 times the interquartile range.
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6.3.3 Relationship between TST and the body ownership illusion
The previous section shows that the change in TST is greater for the
C group than for the N group. However, we also need to consider the
relationship between the subjective illusion of body ownership and the
TST. Figure 6.6 shows scatter plots of Dlogt on each of the question-
naire responses Q1,. . . ,Q4 together with the corresponding correlation
coeﬃcients and significance levels. The results show that there is a pos-
itive and significant correlation between and Q4 (arm), suggesting that
the greater the level of perceived ownership of the virtual arm the more
impaired is the sensitivity to temperature changes. Although the correl-
ations with the other variables all point in the appropriate directions
(positive for Q1 and Q2, while negative for Q3) only Q4 is significant.
However, we have seen that the condition (N or C) is positively correlated
with Dlogt and also with the questionnaire responses. So it could be that
the correlation between Q4 and Dlogt is spurious. This is unlikely to be
the case though. The partial correlation coeﬃcient between Q4 and Dlogt
, controlling for condition, is 0.30 with a (two-sided) significance level of
0.065. On the other hand the partial correlation between condition and
Dlogt, controlling for Q4, is 0.15 with a significance level of 0.356. Hence
when controlling for condition the relationship between Q4 and Dlogt is
maintained.
There is also another issue to consider. In Tsakiris et al. (2011) it was
reported that susceptibility to the rubber hand illusion varies with in-
teroceptive sensitivity (see discussion in section 6.4). It is possible that
susceptibility to the body ownership illusion considered here may vary
with exteroceptive (thermal) sensitivity. This does seem to be the case
with respect to Q4. Figure 6.7 shows the scatter plot of log(tReal) on Q4
(arm), which shows a significant negative slope. There are no significant
correlations with the other questionnaire variables. This suggests that
the greater the exteroceptive (thermal) sensitivity the greater the sus-
ceptibility to the illusion of owning the virtual arm. Now since we have
found that log(tReal) is correlated with Q4 and log(tReal) is obviously
correlated with Dlogt=log(tVR) - log(tReal) , the correlation between
Q4 and Dlogt may be spurious for this reason. However, the partial cor-
relation between Q4 and Dlogt controlling this time for log(tReal) is 0.34
with P = 0.034, and thus the correlation is maintained.
6.4 discussion
This experiment has led to the following findings. First, the subjective
illusion of body ownership (Q1), agency (Q2) and specifically virtual arm
ownership (Q4) was significantly higher in the consistent condition than
in the non-consistent condition (Figure 6.4), and the median scores in the
consistent condition were high (around 7 out of 10). Hence it is possible
to produce a quite strong subjective illusion of ownership of a collocated
virtual body that is seen from a first person perspective position and
in a virtual mirror, and where the body is in the same posture and the
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Figure 6.6: Scatter diagrams of log(tVR/tReal) by the questionnaire variables.
(a) Q1 (own), r = 0.11, P = 0.49. (b) Q2 (move), r = 0.24, P = 0.13.
(c) Q3 (another), r =  0.20, P = 0.22. (d) Q4 (arm), r = 0.48,
P < 0.002. In each case r is the Pearson correlation coeﬃcient, and
P is the significance level against the null hypothesis of 0 correlation.
All tests satisfy normality requirements on the residual errors of the
corresponding regression equation using the Shapiro-Wilks test (all
P for residual errors following a normal distribution > 0.40).
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Figure 6.7: Scatter diagram of the scores for Q4 (arm) on the log prior sensitiv-
ity measurement. r =  0.40, P = 0.011 (two-sided). Shapiro-Wilks
test for normality of residual errors has P = 0.36.
virtual right hand is slaved to the movements of the real right hand.
When the body posture is not consistent with that of the real body and
the movements of the virtual right hand are asynchronous and diﬀerent
than those of the real hand then the subjective illusion is significantly
lower.
Various aspects of this result have been found before. In Sanchez-Vives
et al. (2010) it was shown that a virtual arm and hand can be em-
bodied through synchronous visual-motor correlation with the real hand,
although since the display was on a stereo powerwall, the person could
see their real body except for their hidden illuded hand. In Slater et al.
(2010) a whole body ownership illusion in virtual reality was demon-
strated that included the body seen from 1PP and a mirror reflection,
but it also included synchronous visual-tactile stimulation. In González-
Franco et al. (2010) a whole body ownership illusion was demonstrated
where the virtual body was only seen in a virtual mirror and with up-
per body synchronous visual-motor correlation. The work in Petkova &
Ehrsson (2008) incorporated a static manikin body seen from a 1PP but
required synchronous visual-tactile stimulation. Finally Petkova et al.
(2011) directly tackled the issue of 1PP versus 3PP and found that 1PP
was essential for the generation of a body ownership illusion.
It is important to note that during the pilot studies it was diﬃcult to find
a condition in which there was a reduced ownership illusion when there
was embodiment with a collocated body seen from 1PP. In the case study
reported in de la Peña et al. (2010) it was found that when someone
is put virtually in a posture that is not their actual one but where that
posture is feasible even if uncomfortable, then vision tends to dominate
and the participant has the illusion of being in that posture. In the cur-
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rent experiment we found that by having an implausible (but physically
realisable) body posture and the inconsistent virtual arm movements we
were able to attain a wide range of ownership questionnaire scores. Even
so note that the ranges of body illusion questionnaire scores for the Non-
Consistent Condition were relatively high (Figure 6.4) notwithstanding
that this body was not in the same posture and did not show same the
mobile arm movements as that of the real body. However, the body trunk
was collocated with the real body. In summary - a degree of subjective
ownership over a collocated virtual body seen from 1PP seems to be the
normal response, and not an exceptional one.
The second finding was that the experimental manipulation did result in
significantly greater change in TST in the Congruent than in the Non-
Congruent condition (Figure 6.5b). This supports the notion in Moseley
et al. (2008) that there may be dis-ownership associated with withdrawal
of resources from the real body in the context of virtual body ownership.
The third finding is that TST measured prior to entering virtual reality
was negatively associated with the measured subjective illusion of owner-
ship over the virtual arm (Figure 6.7). In other words greater sensitivity
to temperature changes prior to the virtual embodiment (lower TST) was
associated with a greater subjective illusion of arm ownership. In Tsakiris
et al. (2011) it was reported that susceptibility to the rubber hand illu-
sion increases with lower interoceptive sensibility (specifically own heart
beat detection). On the other hand in Mirams et al. (2011) it was found
that when participants were asked to pay attention to interoceptive pro-
cesses (heart beats) they were more likely to report the feeling of touch
in a somatic signal detection task, and less likely to report touch when
they had been asked to increase exteroceptive attention. In the current
experiment participants had been asked to pay attention to exteroceptive
signals prior to their virtual embodiment, and lower TST was associated
with higher subjective illusion specifically of the hand of the arm used for
the temperature sensitivity readings. Putting this together a conjecture
would be that lower interoceptive sensitivity and higher exteroceptive
sensitivity could be predictors of the likelihood of the virtual arm illu-
sion. Of course, it is the case that we did not attempt to manipulate
exteroceptive sensitivity as such, but only attention to this, but this con-
jecture is a reasonable claim from our own results together with these
two papers. The fourth finding is that there appears to be a positive
association between the illusion of virtual arm ownership (Q4) and the
change in TST from prior to after the stimulation. In other words, lower
temperature sensitivity in the VR correlates with higher ratings of vir-
tual arm ownership. It should be recalled that it was only the arm that
was moved during the experiment whereas participants had been instruc-
ted not to otherwise move their body except for the head. This result is
analogous to that of Moseley et al. (2008) where it was found that that
the amount of cooling of the illuded hand was positively correlated with
the strength of illusory ownership as assessed by questionnaire. It was
argued that this demonstrated a significant drop in skin temperature for
the real hand as a result of experiencing the rubber hand illusion. It was
further noted that this also provided evidence of brain (illusion induced)
changes in homeostatic control, and akin to what has been observed in
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patients as a result of ‘dis-ownership’ of limbs (for example, as a result of
stroke). In other words ownership of the rubber hand was accompanied
by dis-ownership of the real hand.
The results of the current experiment could be argued to lend supporting
evidence to that conjecture, but in a diﬀerent modality – sensitivity to
temperature changes rather than actual temperature. In Folegatti et al.
(2009) evidence was presented that the result found in Moseley et al.
(2008) of a decrease in temperature of the illuded arm may have been
solely due to cross-modal incongruence rather than the subjective illusion
of rubber hand ownership. The experiment reported in this paper tends
to support the positions of Moseley et al. (2008) rather than Folegatti
et al. (2009), since the partial correlations showed that even allowing
for a direct eﬀect of the experimental condition on the threshold change
there is still an eﬀect of the subjective illusion of arm ownership. A very
similar result to Moseley et al. (2008) was found, both the fact that the
experimental conditions did result in a change in TST, and especially the
seeming correlation between lesser sensitivity to temperature change as-
sociated being with higher levels of the arm ownership illusion. Moreover,
once the cross-modal incongruence is itself accounted for (using the par-
tial correlation) the apparent connection between the illusion level and
sensitivity does not vanish.
There is general consensus that body and limb ownership are supported
by a combination of bottom-up information (including visual, tactile,
motor and proprioceptive) together with a top-down mechanism in the
form of a cognitive representation in the brain dealing with decisions
and actions and creating the sensation of control and agency over the
body, which should be humanoid in form (for example Tsakiris (2010)).
In this model, the induction of virtual limb ownership would provoke a
reduction in the detection thresholds because the sensory input coming
from the virtual limb would not fit so well with the cognitive model of
the body representation, and therefore this would suggest the tactile or
temperature information to be less reliable.
If we assume that the body representation has been built by integrating
the sensory information over a long period of time, then this is consistent
with general principles of brain organisation based on the minimization of
the negative log-evidence or ‘surprise’ (Friston, 2009). We could say that
because the limb looks strange or seems to be even slightly misplaced
or moving slightly diﬀerently compared to the real limb, the brain does
not completely ‘trust’ the information provided, and therefore reduces
autonomic activity hence provoking a temperature drop (Moseley et al.
, 2008) and even greater immune activity (Barnsley et al. , 2011).
This framework could be used to explain why in the current experiment
some questionnaire responses are positively associated with sensitivity to
temperature changes but not to virtual body ownership as a whole. Since
in all conditions the trunk of the virtual body was collocated with that
of the real body and it did not move, there was no visual-proprioceptive
conflict with respect to the body trunk, which therefore does not provoke
any conflict in the brain. Putting it another way, since the representation
of the body trunk is collocated with the real body trunk, appears to
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look the same, and does not move - there is nothing to be ‘surprised’
about. However, the subjective feeling of ownership over a virtual limb
that moves necessarily provokes a greater mismatch between the virtual
representation and the real limb, which induces the brain to observe a
mismatch between what the underlying body representation predicts as
input and the sensory information it gets from the limb. This, in turn,
would diminish the ‘trust’ and trigger the changes described.
In other words, in the case of the body trunk that does not move, owner-
ship is reinforced precisely because it is coincident with the real body and
there is no sensory conflict. Hence this type of virtual body ownership
does not imply real body dis-ownership, since this part of the virtual
body is always static and coincident with the real one. Remember also
that the participants even wore the same pullover as they could see in
the virtual mirror being worn by their virtual reflection, or directly when
they looked down towards themselves. However, the virtual arm is not
in exactly the same place as the real one, does not look exactly like
the real one, and does not move exactly the same, but it is nevertheless
‘close enough’ to be incorporated into the body representation. Therefore,
there is probably at least a subliminal sensory conflict (in the C condi-
tion). The position of the hand is more sensitive than the body trunk,
so small departures from reality have a large impact. However, in the N
condition, the diﬀerences between real and virtual hand are so great, that
the virtual hand is not even incorporated into the body representation.
On a larger scale, this explanation also seems to be compatible with in-
creases in tactile discrimination provoked by displaying an augmented
image of the real limb, but not of an augmented object (Kennett et al.
, 2001). Moreover, we could predict that an ownership illusion is main-
tained while progressively degrading the visual appearance of the limb,
as in (Hohwy & Paton, 2010), ‘disownership’ of the real limb could be
increased and a stronger reduction of temperature sensitivity or even of
two-point tactile discrimination could be provoked, which may be useful
in therapy for people suﬀering tactile hypersensitivity or similar disorders.
Generally there has been increasing interest in the use of body ownership
illusions in the treatment of pain. For example, recently Hänsel et al.
(2011) and Longo & Betti (2009) both show that pain perception is di-
minished in the context of the experimental setups to such illusions and
our findings are in line with this.
7
TRAMA : A COGNIT IVE STORY MODEL
Esa trama de tiempos que se aproximan, se
bifurcan, se cortan o que secularmente se ig-
noran, abarca todas las posibilidades.– Borges
(1942)1
7.1 introduction
In this chapter we introduce a formal model of a story that can be used
by a software agent. The main motivation to introduce this model is
to implement a method that transforms a set of events intuitively per-
ceived as a story into an abstract representation that can be used as a
coordination plan when embedded within a set of situated agents. Using
this model one can implement the principles of interaction introduced
in chapter 5 within any story, as long as they can be stated in a form
similar to a movie script.
The basic intuition behind the formalism introduced is that to represent a
story plot we can use the formalism of lattice theory. This model is named
Trama because in catalan both plot and lattice are translated as trama.
To do so, we introduce a certain algebra which we name Llogic2. This
formalism is used to relate the events forming a story within an abstract
representation that can then be embedded within a set of situated agents
performing real-time decisions in an immersive virtual environment.
The method is based on considering a story as a set of causally-related
and goal-motivated events (Stein, 1982). To model any particular story,
we consider a story S to be a non-stationary process made of causally-
related and goal-motivated events. To be able to satisfy this definition
in a formal model, we introduce a novel definition of causal relation.
Section 2 introduces the main mathematical definitions involved in the
story model. Section 3 shows how such the events forming the story can
be integrated within a set of situated agents. Section 4 shows how such
model can be used to declare a plan in a way very similar to a movie
script.
1 The usual translation in english translates trama as network : This network of times
which approached one another, forked, broke oﬀ, or were unaware of one another
for centuries, embraces all possibilities of time. However, the word network doesn’t
capture the directional aspect of a story. Here, we would rather like to translate the
previous as This Trama (...) covers all possibilities
2 we name this algebra Llogic -First sillab like Yogui, second like Logic- as a short-
hand for Language Logic, as they pretend to describe logic relations among language
propositions. Also, in catalan this word is a dialectal variation of the word Logic.
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7.2 a logic for causally-related stochastic events
7.2.1 Introduction
As said, we consider a story S to be a non-stationary process made of
causally related and goal motivated events. Because it is not stationary,
the probability p that an event ‘e’ occurs changes across time.
To characterize the problem it is important to notice that the probability
of occurrence of an event may change for factors that are independent
among them. For example, the probability of occurrence of an event ‘e’
can increase or decrease if performing such event is expected to help
achieving a particular goal, or prevent from achieving another one. The
probability of occurrence of e can also increase because of the occurrence
of a preceding event. In this last case, one would consider the preceding
event to be the cause of e. It is therefore important that diﬀerent preced-
ing events and separate goals can aﬀect such probability of occurrence
in a distributed fashion.
In addition, given the principle of Substitution previously introduced, it
should be possible that one agent replaces another one, despite each of the
agents should be able to make decisions independently. Therefore, each of
the diﬀerent agents participating in the story should have an independent
copy of the story. Finally, agents also need to be able to estimate in real
time the likeliness that an event was performed by another agent or a
human participant. To be able to address these diﬀerent requirements,
we define an event and a logic to relate the occurrence of diﬀerent events
as follows.
7.2.2 Events
Each event is associated with a label, which can be a’,‘b’, ‘c’, etc, or a
proposition such as ‘Mike starts running’. In addition, all events have
a context. For an event ‘e’, the context ‘e⇤’ is a condition over preceding
events that makes the event can occur. This does not mean it must occur,
but only that it is possible it occurs. For example, in order to smoke
a cigarette one needs, besides a cigarrette, to have a lighter. However,
having the lighter nearby is not the cause of smoking a cigarette. It only
makes it possible.
We also need to distinguish between external and internal events. An
internal event i is an event whose cause i⇤⇤ is a previous event in the story.
If there are several possible causes, they are all previous events in the
story. External events do not have a cause as part of the events forming
the story. In order to manage the causal relations between internal events,
we consider all internal events have a triggering moment and a duration.
For each pair cause-consequence, these intervals will be used by a time-
depending function to determine the speed at which the eﬀect of a cause
spreads to its consequence.
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Table 7.1: The data structure associated to each of the events forming a story
has several elements.
An event forming a story is constituted of:
name A string containing the proposition associated with it
pos A fuzzy value storing the possibility value
nec A fuzzy value storing the necessity value
context It corresponds to e⇤. A logical condition over an array of
pointers to the events forming its context
cause It corresponds to e⇤⇤. A logical condition over an array of
pointers to the events that could be the cause
pEstimator (A pointer to) an estimation method to check whether
some other agent actually performed the action
isInternal A boolean value to store if the event is external or internal
TTime The triggering time, this is, the moment when the event is
triggered, (or considered to be so by the agent doing the
estimation)
pSpreading (A pointer to) a method determining whether enough time
passed after the cause occurred. This will be used to decide
whether the event can occur
In addition, because each situated agent will have to coordinate with the
agents doing diﬀerent actions forming part of the story, an internal event
‘i’ can also have an estimator ‘iˆ’ associated. Contrary to an internal event,
an external event ‘e’ can only be estimated, and therefore it must have
an estimator ‘eˆ’ associated. Finally, to relate the occurrence of events
we consider each event has 2 fuzzy values associated, a possibility and a
necessity. One can therefore define an event with the table 7.1.
7.2.3 Llogic operators
To relate the occurrence of the diﬀerent events forming the story some
kind of logic is needed. And here, we face a dilemma. Lattice theory
defines logics over partially ordered sets and seems ideal to control how
the causation spreads among diﬀerent events. However, considering events
as discrete things that are partially ordered would imply their occurrence
is deterministic.
In this application scenario diﬀerent agents –some of them human partici-
pants– will perform diﬀerent parts of the story. Therefore, some of the
events will have to be estimated, and the likeliness of an event having
occurred should aﬀect the likeliness of occurrence of its consequence. This
suggests that Possibility Theory (Zadeh, 1978) could be a good candidate.
However, there is no natural way to define an implication operator in
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Possibility Theory, where the temporal order of events is not generally
considered.
To address these needs we define a logic that combines these 3 elements.
In order to conceal the diﬀerent properties they have, we consider a story
to be defined in 3 steps: a declaration, a quantification and an instanti-
ation. Each step determines one aspect of the relation between events: the
declaration determines the partially ordered temporal relations between
the events. This means that when we state the events forming a story
we are implicitly saying which events start before or at the same time
than others. The quantification step determines how the likeliness of oc-
currence of an estimated event spreads to subsequent events. The instan-
tiation determines the temporal dynamics of how this spreading occurs.
The Llogic operators that are used throughout these 3 steps are defined
as follows:
• AND(^) is defined on the necessity domain:
nec(a ^ b) , min(nec(a), nec(b))
• OR (_) is defined on the possibility domain:
pos(a _ b) , max(pos(a), pos(b))
• IF x THEN y ()) : Implication transfers values from the pos-
sibility domain to the necessity domain, and it assumes that the
given consequence is possible. Therefore, assuming [pos(y) = 1],
the implication is defined such as
x ) y , nec(y) := pos(x)
In the previous definition the sign ‘:=’ means ‘assign value on the right
to variable on the left’, like in any standard programming language. The
time at which this assignment will occur will depend on the dynamics
of the spreading of possibility and necessity values through the chains of
causal relations when the story is embedded within the situated agents.
It should be noticed that these logical operations are not commutative.
Intuitively, the 2 propositions ‘He gets angry AND she cries’ do
not imply the same as ‘She cries AND he gets angry’. The causal
relations suggested by these sentences are not the same, and they do not
suggest the same meaning. Therefore, quantifying the likeliness of one
of these sequences occurred does not say anything about the occurrence
of the other. Intuitively, the meaning of a formula like ‘a ^ b’ is better
captured if instead of reading as ‘a and b’ one reads it as ‘a and then
b’. The same goes for _. On the other side, these ‘^’ and ‘_’ operators
do satisfy the usual associative and distributive properties. For example,
‘(a ^ b) ^ c’ is equivalent to ‘a ^ (b ^ c)’, and ‘(a _ b) ) c’ is equivalent
to ‘(a) c) _ (b) c)’.
Other operations can also be defined. For example, it is useful to consider
a NOT operator such as:
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• NOTP (¬) The negation operator has the particularity of being
multi-valued.
pos(¬(a, b, c)) , 1 max(pos(a), pos(b), pos(c))
The reader might have noticed that the definitions of AND and OR
are equivalent to usual possibility theory (Zadeh, 1978) . However, the
definition of negation is not. In possibility theory, the transfer between
the possibility and necessity domains is done considering the negation
over the complementary set: Given COMP(a) is the complement of a,
nec(a) = 1   pos(COMP(a)). Here complementary sets are not con-
sidered, but rather partially ordered sets of events.
7.2.4 Causes and contexts
With the previous logic we can define the context and the cause of an
event and how they determine its possibility and necessity values. For
each internal event ‘i’:
• The context i⇤ is a chain of preceding events such as i1 ^ i2 ^ . . .^ in.
where i1 . . . in are internal events that occur not later than i. This
can be stated simply by saying the triggering times satisfy this
relation: ti⇤  ti. The context fixes the possibility value, with the
formula: pos(i) = nec(i⇤). In addition, it is convenient to consider
that all elements of the context must be internal.
• The cause i⇤⇤ is a chain of preceding events such as in+1 _ in+2 _
. . . _ im. The cause fixes the necessity with the formula: nec(i) :=
pos(i⇤⇤). Note that because ‘_’ is quantified with a ‘max’ operation,
in the spreading mechanism only 1 of the elements listed will be the
actual cause. The actual cause can be an internal or an external
event.
The reason why we define a cause and a context in such a way is that we
can associate a lattice to each internal event ‘i’ where ‘i’ is the top element
and the actual cause in ‘i⇤⇤’ is the pseudo-complement of the context ‘i⇤’.
In this construct, it can be shown that the implication operator ‘)’ cor-
responds to the definition of implication in a Heyting algebra (Rutherford
& Edwin, 1965). This is the central mathematical insight of the logic here
introduced: a generalization of possibility theory replacing the idea of set
complementation with the notion of lattice pseudo-complement. Thus we
obtain sequences of partially ordered events whose occurrence is related
through fuzzy rules.
It should be stressed that the definitions of cause and context do not
apply to external events. The reason is simple: by definition an external
event does not have a known cause. This is why it has to be estimated.
External events do not have a necessity value, and the estimated likeliness
of occurrence will be considered as its possibility value. This is also the
reason why within a plan we consider negations (¬) or disjunctions (_) of
external events. On the other side, internal events do not relate through
disjunctions and negations because by definition they must all occur.
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As we will show in detail in section 4, these operators can be used to
process a story declared as a movie script and embody it in a set of
situated agents. However, we first need to choose what kind of situated
agent will be used and define how a story event is integrated within its
decisional procedure.
7.3 causally-related events within situated agents
7.3.1 Election of the architecture
As said before (see section 2.6), Maes (1989) introduced goals in situated
agents to give them a direction or purpose rather than purely reactive
behaviors. In this view, an activation spreading mechanism would select
which actions were most relevant to achieve a certain number of goals
according to particular perceptions of the state of the world was intro-
duced. This allowed agents to use knowledge based on simple empirically
testable rules with techniques of statistical learning (Maes, 1991).
Taking on these results, Dorer (1999) introduced a particular kind of
behavior network that made decisions over continuous and dynamic en-
vironments. He showed it could be used for a robot playing football with
real time decision-making, as exemplified in the Robocup competition.
He also showed these networks behaved better than Maes’s decision mech-
anism (see also Nebel & Babovich-Lierler (2004)). Dorer (2004) extended
these results by introducing the use of resources needed to perform an
action. With resources, the activation spreading becomes a concurrent
mechanism that can select several actions simultaneously and always
converge towards a decision. Extended Behavior Networks (EBN) were
born.
In summary, an EBN is a distributed decisional process defined by the
declaration of Goals, Competence Modules and Resources. Competence
Modules encapsulate knowledge in the form of preconditions and expec-
ted eﬀects, and they spread perceptions and trigger actions. Resources
can be perceived and be used to perform actions associated with eﬀects.
Each Goal and Competence Module can be declared separately. There-
fore, it allows for the integration of a large set of skills and goals and it is
easy to scale. Moreover, the modules are labeled, and therefore the func-
tion of each module in the whole is still understandable. It has suitable
mathematical properties such as scalability, stability and convergence.
Since their introduction, da Silva Corrêa Pinto & Alvares (2005) have
used this architecture to characterize personality stereotypes that would
aﬀect decisions of virtual characters in videogames. It has also been
shown useful to model psychological aspects of decision-making. Johans-
son & Dell’ Acqua (2009) extended the architecture to show how it could
integrate emotional traits in decision-making. Dorer (2010) showed the
decision mechanism could be adjusted to fit with realistic psychological
biases in the context of risk estimation. This suggests virtual characters
equipped with an EBN could show a certain psychological realism when
interacting with a human participant.
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On the other side this election is not the only one possible. Goetz (1998)
already showed that such action selection mechanisms could be seen as
a particular kind of recurrent behavior network. A behavior network is
a distributed decision mechanism over non-linear time varying domains.
It has properties similar to a recurrent neural network, with the prac-
tical advantage that knowledge is encapsulated in labeled modules whose
function can be interpreted. In this view, we may consider an action is
considered as an attractor within a space of motivations. The strength
of the attractor is defined by the expected eﬀects of the action in re-
lation to the fulfillment of the predefined goals. When the perceptions
about the state of the world are updated, it changes the strength of the
diﬀerent attractors. If we are nearby an attractor, the mechanism of ac-
tivation spreading will ensure we converge towards it. This means that
the diﬀerent goals will define an abstract space of motivations in which
one or another action will behave as an attractor, and it will be selected
according to whether they are expected to satisfy one or other goal.
7.3.2 How to instantiate the events forming a story in a set of EBN
agents
Once the kind of situated agent preferred is chosen, one needs to define
how the events forming the story can be instantiated in a set of EBN
agents without changing its properties. Here we provide an overview of
how it is done. The reader interested in further implementation details
should read appendix A.
The two central elements of an EBN are Goals and Competence Modules.
Competence Modules have preconditions, resources and expected eﬀects.
Taking a closer look at the decision procedure of the EBN, each module
considers the satisfaction of the preconditions as a fuzzy value determ-
ining its executability. This value is weighted with an activation level
resulting from comparing the expected eﬀects of the module with the
diﬀerent goals of the agent and preconditions of other modules. If this
weighted product exceeds a certain threshold, then the algorithm will
check, for each resource res used by the module, whether the amount
expected to be used Tu is bigger than the amount available Tr. These
values are checked at decision time. This means that, given a state of the
world s, what is checked is whether: [Tu(res, s)  Tr(res, s)].
To process the possibility and necessity values relating the events forming
the story, we consider, for each event, its possibility to be a precondition,
and its necessity a resource available (Tr). This implies that in order
the event or action a is executed the elements of its context must have
already occured (or at least have started) and, in addition, the “amount
of the resource ‘cause’ needed” is smaller than “the amount of resource
‘cause’ available”. This also implies that the temporal dynamics of how
the necessity values spread through the chains of causal relations can be
controlled in each module adjusting the Tu(a, s).
If one goes back to the definition of an event, the only element that is
not completely defined is what does the pointer pSpreading point to. In
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Figure 7.1: A schematic view of an agent in Extended Behaviour Networks. It
has several goals and can use resources to perform actions if they
are within the domain of his competence modules.
Figure 7.2: In Extended Behaviour Networks an action will be performed if its
eﬀects are expected to meet the goals of the agent and the needed
resources are available
Figure 7.3: The essential modification introduced to manage stories is that ac-
tion performing generates resources available for other agents, and
that these resources are needed to perform the behaviours involved
in a narrative plot.
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this case, it seems quite natural to point it to Tu. But then, which is the
method that fixes the value of Tu? In the present application scenario,
we consider the person defining the Story will provide a time interval
in which each of the events should occur in order the story to unfold
appropriately. This interval will be determined relative to the occurrence
of some of the preceding events. For example, given an event e, the author
of the story would determine it must be triggered between 3 and 10
seconds after its cause e⇤ occurred.
We therefore assume the story creator will provide, for each event or
action a, a temporal interval [Tmin, Tmax] in which each it should occur. To
grant the event occurs within [Tmin, Tmax], it is enough to use a function
such as:
Tu(a, s) = 1  (t  Tmin)(Tmax   Tmin)
where t is the current time in that interval. However, in principle it could
be any other function. For example, if in a diﬀerent application scenario
one wanted to trigger an event after a chemical reaction finished, one
could exploit information on pressure and temperature to estimate if the
reaction finished and adjust the Tu accordingly. In conclusion, to process
all the events that are part of a story within a set of EBN situated
agents, it is useful to consider each event to be an action but also a
resource (see also figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3).
In addition, to grant there will be a motivation to perform all the events
we also define, given a story or plan ‘S1’, an abstract goal which in-
cites each agent to ‘Advance The Plot S1’ (ATP_S1) whenever he can.
This, together with the Llogic relations, implements the Providence
principle introduced in the previous chapter.
When one instantiates a story S in a set of EBN agents, one might want
particular actions to be assumed by particular agents or kind of agents.
For example, in a story one might want to impose a certain role may only
be assumed by an adult female character, but not by a male or a child.
To impose those restrictions, it is enough to declare roles such asMIKE,
JOHN as specific resources associated to the diﬀerent events a.b.c . . . As
any other resource, each time an agent picks a role, it is blocked and no
other agent can use it anymore. In the same way in videogames diﬀerent
characters have diﬀerent skills, here we can simply limit, for each agent,
which role resources he can adopt. This ensures the control over the
Substitution principle introduced in the previous chapter.
7.3.3 Why does such embodiment work?
Why such way of embodying a story within a set if situated agents sat-
isfies the definition of a story given before? Is a story implemented with
such a method really a non-stationary process made of goal-motivated
and causally related events? Given the decision mechanism of an EBN,
the probability that a given module triggers a behavior will change ac-
cording to three factors:
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• The extent at which the preconditions of the module are satisfied
• The extent at which expected eﬀects of performing the action are
relevant for the goals of the agent
• The extent at which the resources needed to perform the action are
available
For the case of an event ‘a’ forming part of a story, the fact that its
context is part of the preconditions ensures that, while the context is
not satisfied, at least at certain extent, the possibility value associated
with the event is zero. The event cannot occur, and its probability of
occurrence is zero.
Once the preconditions associated with performing the action a are sat-
isfied the probability of occurrence depends on the relation between the
diﬀerent goals of the agent and the expected eﬀect associated to perform-
ing the action. For the events part of the story, there will always be some
motivation to perform the action a because of the fact that there is an
‘Advance The Plot’ goal associated with these. However, the probabil-
ity this action a is selected can depend on other goals of the agent, and
the relevance of these goals will generally depend on the real-time per-
ception of its environment and internal sate. It is therefore not possible
to estimate the probability of occurrence of an event a at a given moment
without taking into account factors that are independent from the story.
In particular, one must consider the diﬀerent goals constituting the mo-
tivation to perform action a, the real-time evaluation of the environment
and of the internal state.
Despite the fact that this probability is not fixed by the definition of the
story, it is possible to control how it evolves in time. In particular given a
resource ‘cause’ available and needed for an action a (these are pos(a⇤⇤)
and Tu), the selection mechanism grants that the probability an action
is selected will increase as the resources available become greater than
the ones needed. Assuming there will always be at least 1 agent who
can assume the particular role associated with the action, the way the
cause is embodied grants that the event will occur within the predefined
temporal interval. This is easy to see in the extreme case: once t = Tmax,
the expected amount of ‘cause’ resource needed is zero. Therefore, for any
nec(a) bigger than 0 the amount of resources needed will be smaller than
the amount or resources available. If the action has not been performed
yet the selection mechanism will select it on the basis that the action is
expected to contribute to the ATP goal (and eventually to others). It is
therefore certain that the action will be selected, and its probability of
occurrence is 1. Finally, once the event has occurred the possibility value
is set to 0 and the necessity value is kept unchanged. At this point one
should consider the probability of occurrence is not defined because it is
an impossible event: the event cannot occur.
The 2 fuzzy values, its possibility and necessity (pos(x), nec(x)) are
stochastic variables associated to each event, but they change through
time according to preceding events. These items are the basic mechanism
to control how causes provoke consequences over time intervals. Intuit-
ively, the possibility value reflects the extent at which a certain event is
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Figure 7.4: For each event, its occurrence in time is bounded by two values, a
possibility and a necessity. These values also allow the definition of
the past, present and future of that event.
possible, meaning by this that it can occur. On the contrary, a necessity
value determines the extent at which an event must occur. These values
also apply to past events: an event might have possibly occurred, or must
have necessarily occured.
Overall, this formalism has a certain parallelism between the possibility
and necessity values as defined in possibility theory. In both cases, given
an event ‘a’ its probability of occurrence p(a) is bounded by these 2
values (nec(a)  p(a)  pos(a)). However, in our case this relation
only holds when the event is about to occur, or it has actually occurred,
something that can be seen as a ‘present region’ of the event, when the
possibility is not zero. Correspondingly, one can define the ‘future region’
of the event when the possibility and the necessity of the event are zero,
and the ‘past region’ when the possibility is zero and the necessity is not.
In this last case, the event cannot occur again but, because its necessity
is not zero, it can aﬀect causal chains and provoke the occurrence of
subsequent events (see also figure 7.4). The probability of the event is
not defined because its occurrence is impossible. One can speak of the
event as a fact with a certainty of nec(a).
In other terms, a future event has a zero possibility and a zero necessity.
As its context is satisfied, or it is estimated to have occurred, its possibil-
ity is updated to a value between 0 and 1 and it becomes a present event.
As the cause of an event spreads, its necessity of occurrence increases.
This increases the probability of occurrence, which can also be aﬀected
by other independent goals and causes. Finally, once a situated agent has
performed the event, its possibility is set to zero, making it a past event
that cannot occur but can aﬀect subsequent events. Assuming the dif-
ferent agents inform each other on what they perform, or that the other
agents can detect such occurrence autonomously, they will all coordinate
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their real-time decisions in order to satisfy the diﬀerent constraints of
the story.
Note in this formalism the probability of occurrence is never defined, only
bounded. This is because the probability of occurrence of an event can
change for reasons that are independent to the story. For example, given
an interactive scenario a virtual character with specific goals or a human
participant very motivated in some particular direction might decide to
perform an action as soon as it is possible. On the other side, a very
lazy character will only perform an action when it is strictly necessary.
Therefore, the actual probability of occurrence of an action at a particular
moment can depend on additional factors independent from the story
itself.
7.4 a story for situated agents
7.4.1 Introduction
To process a story S using the formalism introduced in the previous
section, we proceed in 3 steps.
• The first step states the temporal order of the events forming the
story in a way that looks very similar to a movie script.
• The second step is an automated mechanism that parses the movie
script and quantifies the diﬀerent events in terms of possibility and
necessity relations.
• The third step automatically integrates these relations within a set
of decisional agents.
Each step uses one of the 3 levels of the logic previously introduced. We
name such picture of a story the Trama story model. For example, lets
consider a story occurring within a larger Star Wars scenario. The plot
could involve the following events, stated with the typical conventions of
movie scripts:
MIKE and JOHN are exploring the surface of a planet. AS-
SAULT SPACESHIPS arrive and start bombing. MIKE and
JOHN ask for instructions to MOTHER SHIP, who replies
that they should go to a bridge and cross it, where they will
be picked up. MIKE and JOHN go towards the bridge. MIKE
and JOHN arrive to the bridge and realize it is broken. The
MOTHER SHIP orders to jump. MIKE jumps. MIKE reaches
the other side. JOHN also jumps, but falls. The MOTHER
SHIP asks what happened, but no one replies. The MOTHER
SHIP saves MIKE.
This plot can be considered as a set of propositions a.b.c . . . that a group
of situated agents should perform. In this view, diﬀerent agents will in-
tegrate within their goals the plot, adopt a role in it and contribute to it
whenever relevant. Before entering in the details of how such a script can
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be processed by situated agents, we need to consider human participants
can adopt one of the roles of the story, for example MIKE or JOHN.
7.4.2 How to integrate the participant’s behaviour in the story
Now, consider how a participant into this story, if rendered in the con-
text of an immersive virtual environment (IVE) where the story is being
played out. How can we integrate the participants’ contribution? For
example, to render the previous example in an IVE, if the participant
adopts the role of MIKE, another agent will have to adopt the role
of JOHN. However, if he does not, then we need to grant a virtual
character can adopt his role.
In addition, it is also possible the participant assumes the role of JOHN
but does not jump. In this case, the scriptwriter might consider another
virtual character should replace him, adopt his role and jump. However,
the scriptwriter might consider an alternative way to go through the story
and obtain the same outcome. This can be stated considering events that
could occur in the story, but whose occurrence is not mandatory. For
example:
S:
MIKE and JOHN are exploring the surface of a planet.
ASSAULT SPACESHIPS arrive and start bombing.
MIKE and JOHN ask for instructions to MOTHER
SHIP, who replies that they should go to a bridge
and cross it, where they will be picked up. MIKE
and JOHN go towards the bridge. MIKE and JOHN
arrive to the bridge and realize it is broken. The
MOTHER SHIP orders to jump. MIKE jumps. MIKE
reaches the other side.
IF JOHN jumps THEN JOHN falls.
OTHERWISE bomb reaches JOHN.
JOHN dies and the MOTHER SHIP asks what happened.
The MOTHER SHIP saves MIKE.
In general, in an interactive story there can be elements that will be
triggered or not depending on the behaviour of the participant. In the
previous example, the character assuming the role of JOHN will fall only
if he decides to jump. The OTHERWISE declaration simply states
what should occur if John does not jump. These alternatives are the
natural consequence of adopting the Substitution rule. As discussed in
the previous chapter, virtual characters will not assume a pre-established
role, but rather have to assume one role or another according to what
the participant does. Apart from this, the story will unfold as a classic
story.
Using the same syntax, however, the scriptwriter could introduce forking
paths. For this it would be enough to state additional events after JOHN
falls. Note that using this syntax the story writer can consider forking
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paths but, contrary to other approaches to interactive stories, such al-
ternatives are not necessary. In the general case, the story is processed
as a collaborative game in which each of the agents simply incorporates
the Substitution rule: if the behavior of the participant (or another
agent) suggests he is adopting a particular role in the story, each of the
agents will assume that agent assumed that role and treat him consist-
ently. Otherwise, if no one has adopted a particular role, and the role is
available to a particular agent, then the particular agent will assume it
and help to unfold the story.
7.4.3 A story declared in 3 steps
To define a story using the logic previously introduced one only has
to state the events that must occur, and in what temporal intervals.
Obviously, as for any story rendered in an audiovisual environment one
will also need to generate the animations corresponding to each event,
but here we focus in the decision-making part.
Step 1: Declaration
The first step simply consists in stating the events forming the story. We
call this declaring the story. For example, it can be the events stated
in section 7.4.2 involving MIKE and JOHN. Despite at this stage the
story looks similar to a movie script stated in natural language, there are
particular syntactical conventions respected. Each sentence is followed by
a point ‘.’. The roles actively involved in an event are stated with capitals.
These conventions are typical from movie scripts, but one can also use
them to define which are the events forming the story, which are the
partial order relations between them and which ones are internal and
external.
To introduce the general case, consider a story declared as a plot forming
a sequence of events S. One can declare a plan as a sequence S of events
formed of blocks following this structure:
S:
...
a.b.c.
IF x1 THEN y1.
IF x2 THEN y2.
...
IF NOTP THEN z.
...
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Therefore, each sub-scene has an arbitrary amount of internal events
followed by an arbitrary amount of ‘IF x THEN y.’ statements, with
the last one being of the form ‘IF NOTP THEN z.’. In the previous
example involving MIKE and JOHN, the plot fits exactly this struc-
ture, except the statement IF NOTP THEN has been replaced by
OTHERWISE to improve readability.
In this structre structure, the events are declared as propositions ‘a’,’b’
etc. The operator ‘.’ states a temporal order relation between the two
propositions. Concretely, it considers ‘tx  ty’, where tx and ty the in-
stants in which x and y begin. The events immediately after the IF
are external, the rest are internal. Therefore, a structure such as IF x
THEN y relates the occurrence of an external event x and an internal
event y. Operators in external events such as NOT or AND modify the
relationIF x THEN y. In addition, the operator NOTP stands for a
negation of the external events previously stated. NOTP could be writ-
ten as NOT(x1, x2, ...). Despite not declared explicitly, the diﬀerent IF
x THEN y are related with an implicit OR, just as like a statement
such as ‘a OR b’, which means that either one, either the other, either
both can occur.
It is also important to notice that the events have a duration. Therefore,
b and c can occur concurrently. The only thing stated is that b cannot
start before a starts. The diﬀerent IF x THEN y statements will also be
evaluated concurrently, and are not exclusive. Another important diﬀer-
ence between these statements and usual programming is that these are
not binary conditions but rather fuzzy rules linking estimated possibility
values and the necessity values of their consequences. Technically, these
chains of events form a bounded lattice. If to the previous syntax we add
empty propositions and jumps forward, it can be shown that this syntax
can express any finite sequence of partially ordered events (see also figure
7.5). To refer to this kind of description of a story we will use the term
logical description.
Step 2: Quantification
Step 2 is an automatic process. It parses the previous script considering
each proposition refers to an event. It consists in determining, for each
internal event ‘i’, which elements constitute ‘i⇤’ and ‘i⇤⇤’ using the Llo-
gic operators previously introduced. It is therefore called quantification
because such assignment will determine the quantitative values associ-
ated to the proposition: the possibility and the necessity. To refer to this
kind of characterization we use the term quantified description.
Despite there are several mappings possible, if the agent has no internal
representation of which preceding events should be considered as a cause
of other events, the most conservative rule that grants the temporal order
stated in the logical description of step 1 is to consider:
• For internal events with an internal event immediately preceding
them, the preceding event is the cause, and the second preceding
internal events is the context.
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Figure 7.5: A diagram representing the temporal relations of a story with a
jump forward. Its technical name is a Hasse diagram. It is equi-
valent to a directed graph where reflexivity is assumed, which is
something granted if the elements considered are related through
partially ordered relations. It should be noted, though, a Hasse dia-
gram does not discriminate between internal and external events,
which is why, the relations involving both external and internal ele-
ments are highlighted in gray. The declaration corresponding to the
events here depicted is: ‘a.b.c. IF x1 THEN y1. IF x2 THEN y2.
IF x3 THEN JUMP TO f . IF NOTP THEN z1. d.e. IF x4
THEN y4. IF NOTP THEN z2. f .g.’
• For internal events preceded by external events, such as stated in
an IF x THEN y, the context is the nearest preceding internal
event that is not itself preceded by an external event (in the case
of the previous structure, it would be the event c), and the cause
is x.
To make this assignment systematic, all the internal events must have
a predecessor. Because the first event declared does not have a prede-
cessor, before processing the logical description this step systematically
introduces an event labelled ‘K’ that corresponds to ‘emphbeginning of
the story’ and will stand as a default context.
It should be stressed that this mapping does not undermine the possibil-
ity of combining several stories within a certain environment. If an event
constitutes the meeting of two plots as represented by two lattices, it is
enough to merge their contexts, and consider one of the causes as the
new cause and the other cause as part of the new context.
This can also help clarifying a possible doubt. Intuitively, one would think
that the context of an event is not only the preceding event, but a larger
part of the history of preceding events. This is true, and one would need
to consider this stronger condition if the goal was to use the Trama
model to infer causal relations among events. However, because the im-
plementation here introduced grants all the internal events of the story
occur (unless they depend explicitly on an external one), by observing
only the near predecessors one can already have the certainty that more
distant preceding events have occurred. The same applies to causes. We
consider the immediate predecessor to be the cause because this grants
the partial order defined by the scriptwriter is preserved, even if it is not
psychologically plausible (see, for example, Cheng & Novick (1992)). If
one wanted to use the Trama model to infer causal relations, this map-
ping should be established otherwise (see annex B for a method using
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this definition of causal relation to infer plausible causal relations based
on information-theoretic measures).
Overall these rules, used with the operators previously defined, grants
the possibility and necessity values of the events forming S will spread,
and thus guide the way the story unfolds. The only aspect remaining is
to characterize the dynamics with which these values will spread. This
requires embedding such quantified description in some physical device
(for example, a robot making decisions in real time, or a computational
model of decision-making in a sensorimotor loop), which is done in next
step.
Step 3: Instantiation
The third step involves embedding a quantified description in a concrete
physical mechanism for decision-making. Following the logic of object
oriented programming, we name the result of such step an instantiated
description.
In general, this step will result in a situated agent that, from a phys-
ical perspective is better characterized as a non-linear and time-varying
system. It will take as inputs several perceptions on a continuous or dis-
crete domain, and result in one or several actions selected, eventually
with particular intensities. Here we only consider the particular case of
generating an instantiated description using a set of EBN agents and
integrating the plan seamlessly with their preexisting skills, but diﬀerent
kinds of situated agents could be considered.
To control how a story will unfold within an IVE using EBN agents,
we assume the storyteller will provide, for each event, a temporal inter-
val [Tmin, Tmax] in which the event should occur. This can be done quite
intuitively: for each action one fixes a temporal interval relative to pre-
vious actions, much in the same way one specifies the temporal intervals
between the shots of a movie in a software for video edition. To grant
each of the agents selects the actions defined by the scriptwriter within
[Tmin, Tmax], it is enough to use the mapping defined in section 7.3.2.
Overall using the Trama model and EBN one can process a sequence
of events as defined in a movie script and render it in an IVE with
autonomous virtual characters. The question that is not answered by
the story model is whether participants exposed to content created with
this method will actually understand it as a story. This will be addressed
in the last experimental chapter.
7.5 summary
Summing up the previous steps, it should be clear that the Trama model
and EBN agents can be used to process one or several sequences of events
as defined in a movie script and render them as an interactive story in an
IVE involving autonomous virtual characters. What the model assumes
is that the ocurrence of an event within a story is determined by:
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Figure 7.6: At a certain moment, given the events that have occurred, one can
fix temporal constraints [Tmin, Tmax] which bind the occurrence of
a soon coming event. These temporal constraints will translate into
the possibility and necessity values associated to that event. Once
the event occurs, the same process will repeat for the following
events.
• declaring the event as part of the story
• ensuring that the events forming part of its context and cause have
occurred
• ensuring that the temporal latencies among the event and its con-
text and cause are preserved
It is worth noticing that, even though the story model is obviously de-
signed for IVE, it can also apply to traditional media: a movie is equi-
valent to the previous except that there are no external actions and the
latencies satisfy Tmin = Tmax for all events. A novel can be considered
to be similar, where the action is not acting the proposition, but more
simply the reading of the proposition itself, and the latencies are the time
it takes to read each of the sentences. A theatre play can be considered
similar to a movie with occasional external actions, such as for example
the laughs of the public, which will make the actor wait to continue.
8
A STORY TOLD WITHIN AN IMMERS IVE V IRTUAL
ENVIRONMENT
8.1 introduction
In this chapter we describe an experiment developed to validate the prac-
tical use of the Trama model to implement interactive stories rendered
in Immersive Virtual Environments (IVE).
For this experiment, we adopted a scenario that would be part of the Star
Wars story world. This was done in order to give participants a known
implicit context in which they could adopt a role that seemed appropriate
for the story world. The particular election of the story world was more
prosaic: in this story world virtual characters would wear helmets, which
would avoid the need of having elaborated facial expressions, a capability
that was not available in the laboratory. Concerning the behavioural part
of the experiment -how the story would influence the behaviour of the
participant- we tried to evoke a classical experiment developed to show
how Place Illusion works in IVE. This was the pit scenario (Usoh et al.
, 1999), where it was showed that under certain condition participants
would avoid a virtual pit despite the objective knowledge the pit was not
real, and that not avoiding the pit would make their task easier. In this
line of reasoning, we wanted to assess whether participants exposed to a
virtual pit would behave diﬀerently because of the story in which they
were immersed.
The specific goal of the experiment was twofold. First, implement a
simple story with virtual characters making real time decisions to val-
idate the technical viability of such approach. Second, granting a human
participant could understand such a story and her role in it. In other
terms, assessing whether she would be able to recognize the logical de-
scription in the rendering of the instantiated description.
8.2 materials and methods
8.2.1 Participants and ethical approval
10 participants (S1 to S10 ) participated in the experiment, 6 male and 4
female. Each of the participants was given 5 euros for their participation.
The experiment was approved by the Ethical Commission of the Uni-
versitat de Barcelona in the context of the TRAVERSE project (Number
227985).
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8.2.2 Materials
To render the scene we used the same HMD, graphics card and head
tracker described in section 6.2.
The geometry, clothes and skin texture models of the virtual characters
were acquired from the company AXYZ design1 . A helmet model and
landscape were obtained from Google 3D Warehouse 2 . These elements
were remodeled and textured using 3D Studio Max 3 . Character an-
imations were hand crafted in combination with motion-captured data.
HALCA (Gillies & Spanlang, 2010) was used to blend and loop the mo-
tions of the characters. The synchronization of all the devices and signals
was achieved with a custom implementation that uses the VRPN protocol
(Taylor II et al. , 2001) and the rendering of the virtual environment was
done with XVR (Tecchia et al. , 2010). The software for script parsing
was custom-made. The decisional procedure was adapted from a previous
implementation of EBN (Dorer, 2004).
8.2.3 Procedure
When participants arrived, the purpose of the experiment was explained
to them. They were given an information sheet describing the general
purpose and the procedure, a questionnaire for demographic information,
and an informed consent to sign.
Then, they were equipped with the HMD, and shown how to navigate
in the environment. Participants could move their head and navigate
freely. They would see themselves in a vehicle, and could discover that
by balancing towards the left or the right they could go in one direction
or the other. They were explicitly asked if they felt comfortable and in
control of the navigation. When they answered positively they were told
another character would appear and some events would happen. They
were also told they did not have to do anything in particular. They
were only asked to pay attention to the events occurring around them
because they would be asked about them afterwards. Then an operator
triggered the beginning of the story. From this moment, the operator
did not intervene in the virtual experience. The virtual characters would
autonomously unfold a story while allowing the participant to interact
with the environment and adopt a role within the plot.
8.2.4 The scenario
On entering the virtual reality with the HMD, participants would see a
scenario similar to the surface of a planet. When they looked at them-
selves they would see a virtual body dressed as an astronaut. The story
began with the appearance of another virtual character with the same
1 http://www.axyz-design.com/
2 http://www.google.com/sketchup/3dwh/
3 http://usa.autodesk.com/3ds-max/
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Table 8.1: The elements constituting an EBN can be intuitively interpreted. In
this case, ‘exploring’ and ‘stay near’ are perceptions. ‘approach’
is an action. If the action also needed a resource, in the module de-
claration there would be an additional line such as ‘USING car
1.0’ stating which resource and in what amount it was needed. In
one story, the story stated the first character to jump was Mike. By
default, the other role –named John- was attributed to the other
character. Mike reached the other side. John died –after following
Mike or dying from an explosion. Finally, a spaceship would rescue
Mike. In the alternative story, the character that jumped first would
be identified as John: he would fall and die and Mike would be res-
cued.
GOAL:
IF exploring
THEN stay near 0.7
MODULE:
IF NOT stay near
THEN approach
EFFECT stay near 1.0
dress and with a helmet evoking the aesthetics of the Star Wars series
(see figure 8.1).
The behaviour of the virtual character was controlled in real time with
an EBN. In such EBN, some modules were designed to trigger beha-
viours creating proximity with the participant. For example, when the
virtual character behaved as exploring the surface of the planet, a spe-
cific module would encourage the participant to follow his path and, if he
insisted in not doing so, change the strategy and follow the participant.
Other modules where designed to try to make the participant behave in
a certain way, asking him to wait or to be careful when particular circum-
stances where perceived (see table 8.1). The EBN would also process the
story S as stated in section 7.4.2 (see figure 8.1).
8.2.5 Experimental Design
The experiment was designed as a between-groups experiment. Each sub-
ject was exposed to 1 of 2 possible stories. The 2 stories were designed
to be as similar as possible but logically excluded themselves. The parti-
cipant and a virtual character controlled with an EBN would be urged
to decide between jumping over a broken bridge and not doing so (the
script used is the one declared as S in section 7.4.2). The participant
could decide freely whether to jump or not. As a consequence of such
decision the system would attribute to him one role or another within
the story.
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Figure 8.1: As can be seen on top, the appearance of the virtual characters
suggested a space scenario. At the center, the diﬀerent elements of
the plot: the rescue ship the landscape consistent with a star wars
scenario, including the broken bridge. At the bottom, the explosions
and the broken bridge, as rendered from an opposite angle
8.2.6 Questionnaires
It was hypothesized that participants would be able to recognize which
story the virtual characters processed and feel uncertainty when deciding
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Table 8.2: In the first part of the questionnaire participants had to answer 4
questions with a value between 0 (completely disagree) to 10 (com-
pletely agree)
1. the outcome of the story was fixed a priori and the outcome
did not depend on my actions
2. The character I was in the story was fixed a priori and it
did not depend on my actions
3. I had the impression I was a character as much as the other
character I saw
4. I had the impression the environment reacted to the actions
I carried out
Figure 8.2: Responses to the first part of the questionnaire 1) is concerned with
the outcome being fixed a priori, 2) with the participants’ character
fixed a priori, 3) with the impression of being a character within
the story and 4) with being exposed to an interactive space
what to do. We couldn’t find a predefined questionnaire to assess these
aspects, so we designed a questionnaire in 3 parts. First part assessed
general aspect of the experience, attempting to address the subjective
experience of the compromise between freedom of action and fate (see
table 8.2).
The second part was the main response variable: they had to identify
which story occurred and their role in it. For this, each of the possible 4
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Table 8.3: In the second part of the questionnaire, the participants had to
choose one of the diﬀerent possible outcomes in the story. The dif-
ferent outcomes were chosen in such a way that they would logically
exclude themselves. In addition, there would only be 1 correct an-
swer for each subject, but which answer was the correct one depended
both on the experimental condition and on what they decided to do
within the experiment
1. The outcome is: ‘John Jumps first. John falls. John
Dies. The rescue ship arrives and rescues Mike.’ In
this story, I was John
2. The outcome is: ‘John Jumps first. John falls. John
Dies. The rescue ship arrives and rescues Mike.’ In
this story, I was Mike
3. The outcome is: ‘Mike Jumps first. Mike reaches the
other side. John dies. The rescue ship arrives and
rescues Mike.’ In this story, I was Mike
4. The outcome is: ‘Mike Jumps first. Mike reaches the
other side. John dies. The rescue ship arrives and
rescues Mike.’ In this story, I was John
5. The events that occurred in the virtual reality do not cor-
respond to the ones described previously
combinations of story outcome plus role in it was proposed as a result;
with a fifth option that consisted in stating the events in the virtual
world did not correspond with the story described (see table 8.3). For
each participant, the order of the 4 main answers was randomized, and
the right answer depended both on which script was chosen before they
were exposed to the IVE and on what they decided to do in the IVE.
Finally, to evaluate subjective uncertainty, in the third part participants
were asked what would have been the outcome if they had not chosen
to do what they did, allowing for an open answer. The goal was to as-
sess at what extent they felt the outcome of the story was established
beforehand.
8.3 results
10 people participated in the experiment. In 1 case (S5 ) there was a
technical problem and, despite the EBN triggered the arrival of the
rescue ship, this event was never rendered. Therefore, he was excluded
from the statistical analysis. The answers to the graded questions are
summarized in figure 8.2. Responses suggest participants had a moderate
feeling of being in an interactive environment with an outcome fixed
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a priori, but didn’t have the impression they could change their role
in the story. However, these results should be taken with care because
there is a lot of variability within the answers. It clearly seems question
3 was interpreted or perceived in diﬀerent ways. Question 1 seems in
contradiction with what people answered in part 3 (see below).
In part 2, all subjects (S5 excluded) could identify appropriately the
story in which they took part, and their role in it. Considering the prob-
ability of giving the right answer by chance to be 1/4, the likeliness of
having 9 subjects choosing the right answer by chance is of the order of
0.0000001. Anecdotally, S5 chose the complementary answer: the events
that occurred do not correspond to the story.
Concerning part 3, it seems clear subjects felt uncertainty in their de-
cisions. When asked ‘what would have happened if they had decided dif-
ferently? ’, 3 subjects answered giving 2 alternative options. For example,
S1, who jumped first and fell, answered: either I was dead, either mother
ship would have saved me before. The other 6 participants thought that
behaving diﬀerently the outcome would have changed. For example, S6
didn’t jump, and the other character jumped and fell. When asked what
would have happened if she had decided not to jump, she wrote: I would
have fallen in the water, and would also be dead. S10 even speculated
about a completely diﬀerent outcome. He jumped first, and died, and his
answer was: Maybe if I had waited my partner would have showed me a
way to reach the other side. The only subject who guessed what would
actually have happened was S9, who answered: We would both be dead or
Mike would be dead because of John jumping first. This second option was
in fact the right answer: nothing would have changed, except the roles
would be swapped. When exposed to the decision of jumping or not, 5
out of 9 chose to jump first, 3 not to jump and 1 to jump in the second
place. There is also anecdotal evidence showing this. For example, while
removing the HMD, S2 declared spontaneously: I was very confused. I
didn’t know if I had to jump or not.
Overall, no participant reacted inconsistently with the story. For example,
they all tried to avoid the explosions and in general kept close distance
with the other virtual character. An anecdotal result unexpected a priori
was that some participants spontaneously adopted an active role after the
decision. 4 of 9 participants chose the right option and survived. These 4
participants saw the other character falling. When the rescue ship asked
to inform about what happened, 2 answered consistently. For example,
S6 answered: he has fallen to the sea. On the other side, the 5 participants
whose character died heard a big scream and were progressively moved
to seeing the scene from an elevated position, without their virtual body.
The answers to the questionnaire of table 8.3 shows they understood they
were dead, and none spontaneously answered when mother ship asked for
information.

9
DISCUSS ION
The world is the totality of facts, not of things
–Wittgenstein (1921)
9.1 summary of results
In the theoretial chapters, we have based our approach on 3 main assump-
tions which, at certain extent, have been validated by the experimental
results.
1. The first assumption was that communicative actions, including
verbal and nonverbal actions, are a good basic element from which
to consider human-avatar interaction in IVEs. This has been as-
sessed analyzing interaction between real people and virtual char-
acters in a particular aspect of interpersonal communication: prox-
emics. Proxemics show that interpersonal distances are an import-
ant feature of communicative actions. The results show interper-
sonal distances apply between virtual characters and human parti-
cipants in a virtual environmetn. The behaviour and physiological
responses of participants suggest the same verbal and non-verbal
features that apply to everyday communication would also apply
to immersive virtual environments. This suggests automated agents
adopting such rules could improve human computer interaction.
As interpersonal distances are just one feature of interpersonal com-
munication, it might still be possible to argue that aspects of every-
day communication do not apply for interaction in an IVE. How-
ever, it is known that people in an IVE tend to behave as if they
were exposed to a real social situation. This does not happen with
traditional media, or even with video-games. In addition, interper-
sonal distances are remarkably absent in usual media: in a movie
we do not feel the distance of the camera to the actor in the same
way we experience the distance to another person in real life.
In addition, because distance is a continuous domain, and the study
of proxemics tells us that such a factor interacts with others, we’ve
used a multi-variate statistical model in order to consider several
distances and possible interactions with other factors such as the
aspect of the virtual characters or the amount of characters that
approach. This illustrates the diﬃculty of addressing an interact-
ive story from a standard mathematical or modelling perspective.
If we were to consider all the features of communicative actions and
their interaction factors to address the contribution of the diﬀerent
communicative actions to the story we would need massive model-
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ling to solve the problem. And this would rule out an intuitive and
simple approach as the one we have tried to outline.
2. The second assumption was that people do identify with the appear-
ance their body has in an immersive environment. Does owning a
virtual body change at some extent how they behave, feel or inter-
act with the environment? The assumption that having a particular
virtual appearance will change the way we react and interact within
an environment was an essential aspect of the Zelig metaphor. This
has been shown with quite objective measures. Participants report
feeling embodied in a virtual reality. This means that simply be-
cause a virtual character is placed in the same position and moves
in correlation with the participant, it is likely he will have a feeling
of ownership over this body. Further work should improve methods
to measure such sensation of embodiment, but objective evidence
has been provided.
As a complement of this visual appearance, or as a replacement
on a less immersive system, the Zelig metaphor can be reduced to
only the social reactions of the other characters, or the appearance
of the self in virtual mirrors. Then sensorimotor correlations are
still an important aspect to consider, but the identification with
a virtual character is rather based on the social environment, and
not that much on the visual appearance. Experiments involving
interaction with virtual characters have already shown this occurs
extensively, given characters show plausible behaviour. However,
our results support a strong interpretation of the Zelig metaphor.
3. The third assumption to validate was the practical use of the
Trama story model to implement the principle of Providence.
The assumption that a story can be processed within the EBN
architecture and still be perceived as such by a participant has
been shown with an example.We can safely say it is possible to
render a story script within an immersive and interactive virtual
environment if such script is processed using the Trama model.
Results also suggest participants understood the story and their
role in it. Despite the interaction method was rather poor, par-
ticipants engaged actively and interacted with the scene and the
virtual characters around them. Moreover, the interpretation of the
events a participant does can be predicted by the artificial agent(s)
interacting with the participant(s).
9.2 a new way to tell stories
Murray (1997), in one of the first books that describes how an interactive
story rendered in an IVE could look like, stated (p. 73-74):
The computer can be a compelling medium for storytelling if
we can write rules for it that are recognizable as an interpret-
ation of the world. The challenge of the future is how to make
such rule writing as available to writers as musical notation
is to composers.
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We believe this approach shows that one can implement a story within
an IVE just by scriptwriting a sequence of events, staging them and
editing the temporal latencies among events. This method seems reason-
ably similar to the production of a movie, so it might match Murray’s
challenge.
In addition, in the last experiment participants sometimes spoke spon-
taneously to the virtual environment, but only when it was consistent
with their role. This unexpected result should not be overseen. Such
behaviours show that, if participants understand the context in which
they are and their role in it, they can spontaneously engage in verbal
interaction with automated machines, even if not explicitly requested to
do so. Even in a very rough implementation, such scenarios recruit the
cooperative contribution of human participants. This suggests such an
approach can be exploited to automate an environment in which plaus-
ible interactive behaviour of virtual characters is needed.
If this was confirmed by more complex experiment, this would open the
door not only to applications in the entertainment industry, but also
to the possibility of bringing the development of completely automated
IVEs to a new level. This method provides an alternative to the Wizard-
of-Oz approach, the main method used to design experiments involving
interaction with virtual characters. Using the Tramamodel, virtual char-
acters always evolve within the domain predefined by the scriptwriter,
which grants the consistency of their reactions. The 3 steps method can
process an arbitrary amount of story scripts, and EBN is a distributed
algorithm. Therefore, the method is easily scalable. Moreover, hardware
platforms such as Kinect provide an aﬀordable way to detect movements,
facial expressions and speech, and the display of real-size virtual charac-
ters is nowadays reasonably straightforward with standard commercial
equipment. This suggests that any social or interactive scenario that
can be transcribed or scripted as one or several stories could in prin-
ciple be automated and rendered in an IVE. If the tools to do so were
made available to the cognitive scientist, it would allow for experiments
exploiting interactive scenarios with greater ecological validity in fully
controlled laboratory conditions, and thus provide an accessible way to
develop behavioural studies in a much more controlled fashion than the
usual recruitment of human confederates or studies of group behaviour.
This could also have a positive impact in therapeutic application scen-
arios such as the treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder, or diﬀerent
kinds of phobias.
The idea behind the solution proposed is rather simple: given a game
environment -this is, several agents who can perform actions and want
to achieve goals-, the system alters dynamically the probabilities of oc-
currence of the events according to what is in a narrative script. Once
we have a mechanism to ensure this, then we can process any narrative
in an interactive environment. To do this in practical terms we must:
• First, write and stage one or more sequences of actions with ex-
plicitly defined temporal intervals as constraints. This process can
be quite similar to how shooting or animating are usually done
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in movie industry, as well as how movies are edited with common
edition software.
• Second, design agents that can appropriately choose actions to be
performed on the domain chosen for the script. For example, if
the story occurs within a football game, ensure they have all the
competence modules to appear to be playing football. If the story
is a western give agents them some “cowboy goals" and competence
modules that make them behave in similar ways as how would be
expected from a cowboy. In this second stage, again, animations
should be given so characters can believably perform. This step
would be quite similar to designing a video-game, and it can be
implemented before, simultaneously or after the first one.
• Third, after the two previous steps, develop methods to detect when
the human participant is doing some of the actions involved in the
previous two steps. This will be used to apply the Substitution
principle.
However, what has not been developed is tools adapted to specifically
develop this kind of content. If it were integrated in a development suite
including tools for the easy transfer of behaviours and objects from real to
virtual environments it could facilitate enormously the time and human
eﬀort involved in developing an interactive and plausible virtual environ-
ment, or a social robotic agent. Moreover, the non-interactive version of
the story, as well as the non-story interaction (this is, similar to a typical
video-game or conversational agent) would be “downgraded” outputs of
the same production process, in a similar way that a flat-screen visualiz-
ation is a “downgraded” version of an immersive environment or a script
is a “downgraded” version of a movie. With such tools, the authoring
time and the skill set necessary to produce an interactive story rendered
within an IVE would be similar to the time spent in producing a movie
or the audiovisual content of a video-game.
Compared to other existing approaches to Interactive Storytelling, the
main diﬀerence seems to be the use of situated agents that can pro-
cess coordinated plans. Because these agents process storeis according to
the Trama model, we call these agents Tramabots. These agents do
not generate anything: they are only executing combinations of prerecor-
ded animations. This makes their behaviour predictable, and allows the
authoring process to consist in writing a script, staging it to have the
animation of all the behaviours and then edit it in a way very similar to
how movies are produced. Moreover, despite in Interactive Storytelling
it is generally considered that adding narration limits interactivity and
viceversa, the approach here developed doesn’t assume such conflict as a
necessary compromise.
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9.3 the trama model from a computational perspect-
ive
9.3.1 Introduction
Using the Trama model one or several sequences of causally related
events can be used to support automated decision making within dy-
namic and time varying environments. The method is intended to give
the best of the 2 main approaches in AI: agents with real time reactivity
skills as in behaviour-based AI combined with skills to satisfy plans as
in classical AI.
Under the Trama model, stories are processed as a shared plan used to
coordinate the actions of one or several agents. The practical advantage
is that using such representation an agent can process plans and integ-
rate them with specific skills, motivations, resource management and/or
perceptions updated in real time within a dynamic and changing envir-
onment. Therefore the representation improves the decision and coordin-
ation skills of situated agents. Such situated agent can make decisions
using a EBN architecture. However, the election of an EBN architecture
is not mandatory, it could be another one.
The use for coordination purposes is not limited to artificial agents: such
representation can be used to define and drive cooperative interaction
between artificial agents and humans, between agents and other living
systems such as plants or animals and in general between any system
that can perform decisions over a complex environment. Moreover, such
decisional processes can be embedded within a distributed architecture,
which grants the scalability and stability of the system. We now outline
in further detail these properties.
9.3.2 Computational properties
Can the decisional algorithm get stuck? At what extent it can be ensured
the story will always be satisfied? What is the limit in the amount of
stories that can be put together? These are the aspects addressed in this
section.
Scalability
Agents with skills to make decisions within complex games with one with
the addition of having multiple stories can become relatively complex. Is
it hard to scale the diﬀerent parts an agent must have?
The approach proposed to develop interactive stories is based on EBN.
In it, each particular cognitive skill -be it perception or action based- can
be implemented separately in a Competence Module, and then precondi-
tions and eﬀects organize in dynamic networks to evaluate what action
to perform. This implies that the development of each of these cognitive
skills can be done separately and encapsulated as a Competence Module.
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Any new module should simply have an arbitrary number of precondi-
tions and of resources being used, and expect to provoke some eﬀects and
eventually trigger some action. There is no restriction of whether each of
these inputs or outputs has to be a discrete signal, or satisfy temporal
constraints.
In addition, it would give an objective way to evaluate the utility of these
new modules. The apropriateness of this new module could be evaluated
simply by looking if the behaviour of the agent improves, in terms that it
is better adapted, achieves the goals more easily or some other measure
of performance. This would also be useful in a scenario where modules
are tuned adaptatively.
Completeness
The second property becomes apparent when we consider that, within
the Trama model, a story can be considered a coordinated plan, and it
is declared as a finite chain of characters of the form a.b.c.d, which are
then parsed as sequences of behaviours. This kind of structure is simple
enough to be brought to computation theory: it looks like an arbitrary
chain of characters. This is named an unrestricted grammar and it can
express any language that can be recognized by a Turing machine.
A diﬀerent question is whether the story will always occur. Nebel &
Babovich-Lierler (2004) shows that in a static situation, if the goals of a
behaviour network are achievable, they will be achieved. The only thing
that changes when adding stories, is that the actions involved in achieving
the goals are embedded within a partial order. Therefore, if care is taken
to ensure that there will always be a character to adopt one of the roles
needed for the story, the story will always occur. In other terms, if the
goal “advance the plot” is achievable, it will always be. This applies not
only to one, but to an arbitrary amount of stories within an environment.
Stability
If the previous is true, in general the halting problem holds: there is no
way to know if an arbitrary sequence of characters processed in a Turing
machine will provide a halting algorithm or it will continue endlessly.
However, Dorer (1999) has already shown for Behaviour Networks that
under reasonable assumptions the decisional procedure always converges:
given there is a null action, the decision method will always chose a beha-
viour. Therefore, given the possibility to choose a neutral action such as
“do nothing” or “say I do not know”, the resulting algorithm will always
stop. Under these conditions, processing any (finite) chain of characters
within the Trama model will result in a halting algorithm. Even without
enough domain-specific knowledge: in such case it will choose a neutral
action. And this despite processing chains of characters as behaviours
that determine non-linear attractors in a complex distributed architec-
ture, which is a rather unusual approach. This implies such an approach
is powerful enough to express anything that can be processed in a halting
Turing machine.
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Generality
One might wonder: how general is the proposed approach? In the Trama
model the logical description can involve any finite chain of characters.
Moreover, we know that, if we use an EBN to instantiate the description,
the decision mechanism will always converge. Therefore, as far as each
proposition is associated with an event, the algorithm will always stop.
Contrary to a Turing machine, this model does not allow infinite chains of
events. However, for any finite chain of events it supports the processing
of events in parallel threads.
The approach has other advantages: the perception, decision and action
modules are executed in a completely distributed manner. The only ele-
ment that needs to be asumed is that they share a similar local time. If
each module had its own clock, the data flow could be minimized. The
size of the decisional mechanism is much smaller than any high quality
picture, video or motion file, and its algorithmic workload is much smal-
ler than what is needed, for example, for illumination rendering. This
suggests that this representation of causal relations and the interaction
metaphor here adopted might easily be adapted to other uses.
In summary, if a story is declared as a set of partially ordered events
which are related with the Llogic operators and whose dynamics are ad-
justed with temporal intervals, processing it with agents based on EBN
ensures that an arbitrary amount of stories will be executed as a distrib-
uted process in algorithms that will always stop. Moreover, the stories
will always occur if they are achievable within the world they are instan-
tiated.
9.3.3 A new way to combine logic and uncertainty
Overall, the Trama model is based on associating to each event a pos-
sibility, a necessity and a mechanism to spread these values through
causality chains. As already seen, this structure allows the integration of
plans in situated agents, aﬀecting the decisional mechanisms in order to
grant the artificial agent will contribute to the plan whenever is possible
within his own space of perceptions and motivations. We now turn to ad-
dress what are the characteristic diﬀerences of this approach compared
to more common logics and measures of uncertainty such as probability
or possibility theories.
Stories as a way to organize information
It is often said that stories are the oldest way of organizing information.
However, it is known that in propositional logic logical truths do not
carry information (Bremer, 2003): assuming a proposition x is a logical
truth associated with a probability of 1 (p(x) = 1), and assuming also
the classical definition of information (H(x) = p(x) ⇤ log(p(x))), it is
clear that I(x) = 0. The same reasoning applies if x is a logically false
proposition with p(x) = 0. Therefore, if we consider the propositions
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forming a story as logical truths, the answer is no, stories do not carry
information. This suggests that propositional logic is not good at captur-
ing the kind of information found in stories. Does Llogic, the logic in
the Trama model, do better?
In information theory, given particular event x within a set of all possible
events X, the entropy or expected value of the information is: H(x) =
E(I(x)) =  Âx2X p(x)log(p(x)). However, in the Trama model events
are not stationary, so the expected value of the information associated
to an event is time dependent. In particular, for the previously defined
time regions of an event:
• f uture(x) ⌘ [nec(x) = 0 ^ 0  pos(x)  1]. The probability of
occurrence is zero. It can be showed that the information of an
event with zero probability is zero.
• present(x) ⌘ [pos(x) = 1 ^ 0  nec(x)  1]. The probability of
occurrence is a value bounded by the possibility and necessity val-
ues, and therefore the information of the event is a positive value.
The concrete value depends on the actual probability of occurrence,
which depends of such things as the internal goals of the commu-
nicator and the specific context in which the action is performed.
• past(x) ⌘ [pos(x) = 0 ^ 0  nec(x)  1] . Note in this case prob-
ability is undefined, and so is information. However, one might be
tempted to consider the proposition associated to the event as true,
and give to it a probability of 1. In mathematics, this distinction is
described as the diﬀerence between an “almost sure" and a “sure"
event. But even doing this, the information associated to this event
would also be zero.
Therefore, according to the Trama model, triggering an action relevant
to the plot of a story is actually providing some information. In this
view, an event only provides information when it starts occurring, this
is, when an agent decides to perform it. However, it depends on the
receptor to receive this information. From this, the larger result is clear:
in perspective of the Trama model, a story is a way to organize and
transmit information among two or more agents.
A mechanism to represent causal relations
Contrary to what is usual in logic, the Llogic operators do not obviate
the temporal aspect of the performance of the events. This is why the
declaration of such events is associated with a partial order, and why the
logical relations among them are not commutative: because they have
implicit temporal relations.
In any story, apart from the order of the events, the rhythm in which
the events successively occur is important. The notion of Fate previously
discussed reflects the importance of rythm, but it also occurs more in
general: the hero of a story always appears at the right moment, what
could be an unpredictable event occurs magically at the right moment,
and everything that would be random occurs in a precise timing, a tim-
ing that increases the communicative eﬀect of the story. Even in modern
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cinema, or in literature, where the narrative order -this is, the one in
which the events are shown or told- is altered from the chronological or-
der, there is a precise timing on the narrative order, to preserve these
dramatic eﬀects. As the causal relations among events and the meaning-
ful coincidences of unrelated events are an important feature in any story
being told or acted, we need to preserve them in order to conserve this
illusion that the events are purpose-based. The story script is the plan
of occurrence of the events. To conserve the illusion virtual characters
understand it, the simplest is that for each event there is an interval
[Tmin, Tmax] fixed a priori in which the event will occur. For internal
events this delay will be relative to the occurrence of its cause. For ex-
ternal events, as the temporal occurrence of the cause is not known, the
delay will be relative to the last event involved in its context.
In general, the temporal evolution of signals with uncertainty is character-
ized as a stochastic process. Information theory considers the probability
of events does not change through time, which results in a stationary
process. This also goes associated with the occurrence of events at a con-
stant rate. This is why in signal processing the first thing generally fixed
is the sampling rate: the rate at which the events will occur. However, it
seems quite intuitive that in the case of interactive stories these periods
among events are not constant.
Llogic compared to possibility theory
It might be useful to clarify what is exactly the diﬀerence between Llo-
gic and possibility theory (Zadeh, 1978). Possibility Theory is a fuzzy-
value based version of deontic logics where the operators can be seen as
meaning permission/obligation, possibility/necessity or belief/certainty.
In Possibility Theory, the possibilities and necessities are determined in
opposition to a universe of discourse. For example, if someone throws a
dice and tells me the number that came out is not an even number, it is
possible at some extent that it is the number 3. However, it is not pos-
sible it is the number 2. This kind of reasoning works as far as one can
define complementary events. For example, the complementary event of
obtaining number 6 in a dice throw is obtaining a number between 1 and
5.
Llogic generalizes possibility theory to apply not on the notion of com-
plement, but on pseudo-complements, as defined in partial order theory
(see appendix B for a more detailed development of this aspect). The
result is in sharp diﬀerence with possibility theory. The AND and OR
are similar. However, NOT is diﬀerent. This is because in this case the
universe of discourse is essentially open and events do not have a com-
plementary set defined. Moreover, the lack of complementation allows to
define an implication operator ()), something that doesn’t seem possible
in usual possibility theory.
On the other side, one can show quite easily that possibility theory
is a particular case of Llogic. In Llogic it is assumed [8a, (nec(a) =
0) _ (pos(a) = 1) _ (pos(a) = 0)], where each of the previous 3 options
corresponds to a temporal region. On the contrary, in possibility theory
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(Zadeh, 1978), the axiom assumed is [8a, (pos(a) = 1) _ (nec(a) = 0)].
This axiom rules out 1 of the 3 options, which prevents from establish-
ing a relation between the event and its cause. However, this is already
more general than probability theory, which does not even allow for a
relation of the event with a context (one can reduce possibility theory
to probability theory by imposing 8a, pos(a) = nec(a)). In this view,
the price to pay for having a natural definition of implication is loosing
commutativity for Llogic operators. If we impose all events to have a
complement, we gain commutativity but, because complementation does
not have a temporal constraint, possibility and necessity values do not
define temporal regions, and intuitive meanings of future and present are
lost. This would be the case, for example, when dealing with the fuzzy
rules relating the quantification of external events.
They also share some similarities. For example, they both seem non-
monotonic logics: as you add new premises the amount of possible con-
clusions reduces, instead of increasing, as it is the case with propositional
logic. The permission/obligation relations of modal logic hold for the
possibility and the necessity values of an event. This is true for Possibil-
ity Theory but also for Llogic operators. Therefore, if these values are
forced to be 0 or 1, the Llogic operations become modal logic operat-
ors. If commutativity is imposed on the Llogic operators, implication
does not make sense anymore, the temporal aspect disappears and the
formalism seems identical to possibility theory.
A larger statistical framework?
As already said, the Llogic operators do not use one probability value
but rather 2 values, a possibility and a necessity. Therefore, it seems
reasonable to consider the relations among possibility and necessity val-
ues as a method of statistical inference (Dubois, 2006). The particularity
of the Trama model separates radically the notion of belief from the
notion of frequency of occurrence, two notions confounded in Bayesian
decision theory. This rules out the need for acumulating evidence as de-
scribed in Bayesian inference, but requires the mechanism to update the
possibility and necessity values to be appropriate. In this case, contrary
to usual possibility theory (Zadeh, 1978), this is done through a mech-
anism of activation spreading. This is absolutely necessary for a story
model: in a story the most important events generally occur only once,
and they have to satisfy particular constraints related with the notion of
“necessary consequence", as opposed to the notion of random coincidence.
Under a framework such as probability theory, stories would happen only
by chance, and they would be really rare. Under possibility theory, there
would be no natural way of defining causality.
A way to see how this approach relates to Bayesian inference is to con-
sider that defining the probability of an event in certain context needs
a relative frequence of occurrence. However, if some mechanism aﬀects
the likeliness of occurrence before a reasonable amount of repetitions has
been measured, we cannot associate a probability with it. In the case of
stories, this occurs because the context changes at the occurrence of each
new event, and also because several goals interact aﬀecting the likeliness
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of triggering an event.This implies a Bayesian approach will not work.
In this view, the typical a posteriori probability distributions associated
with a belief of a certain proposition as found in Bayesian theory would
only make sense for the particular case of often repeating events in rel-
atively static contexts.
Contrary to a Bayesian approach, in Llogic, the belief in a proposition
is not related with an a posteriori probability but rather with a necessity
value. When an eveant repats and its context is invariant a probability
in a Bayesian sense can be defined, and therefore the necessity value
matches the definition of an a posteriori probability. However, this is
only a particular case in Llogic. This makes such statistical framework
a system somehow larger than a Bayesian one.
9.4 stories within cognitive sciences
9.4.1 Introduction
At a larger scale, we might ask whether the model introduced is realistic.
Does the Trama model really capture the essential features of stories
as they are “in the world”? Stories are ubiquitous in the cognitive de-
velopment of kids (Boyd, 2009, pages 128-208). They allow to represent
sequences of complex events, and they seem a way to store and share
information inherently well adapted to humans. Despite the importance
of stories in our cognitive development is generally admitted, at the best
of our knowledge there is no explanation of such importance in terms of
embodied cognition. There are several reasons for this:
• Stories are often seen as a deterministic set of actions. This is incom-
patible with information theory, inherently based on probabilistic
processes.
• Stories -as natural communication in general- are based on events
that are goal-based and understood as relevant, but classical in-
formation theory does not discriminate in terms of goals nor has
measures of importance of relevance of information.
• Finally, and maybe the most challenging both from a philosophical
and technical perspective is finding a definition of causation. The
events forming a story must be causally related, and at present
there is no consensual definition of causation for complex systems.
There is no quantitative theory or method to find causes in complex
environments that can be related with how humans or animals
develop such skills.
This has provoked that, despite it is largely accepted that stories play a
fundamental role in cognitive development, there are, apart from some
historical attempts (Schank & Abelson, 1977), scarce or no computa-
tional models available with which to compare. According to the Trama
model, a story is a non-stationary process made of non-independent
events. A model of something is a good model if it gives a simple de-
scription of apparently complicated phenomena. It seems an even better
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model if it can predict some unexpected result. If Trama is a good model
of a story, it should explain some features of stories and causal inference
that have not otherwise been explained satisfactorily.
Previous work has already shown that EBN can indeed model a fair
part of realism in decision-making, integrating goal motivated behaviour
with factors such as emotions and biases in risk estimation. This might
show that our election of the decision architecture was appropriate, but
not tell us much about the model introduced. However, there are other
aspects of the model that can be contrasted within contemporary cognit-
ive science. The following sections consider the Trama model in context
of embodied cognition. In cognitive sciences, embodied cognition is the
view that perceptions, decision-making and mental representations arise
from the interaction of the body with its environment. Contrary to clas-
sical cognitive sciences, the brain is not seen as an information-processing
device detached of its environment, but rather as a complex system: non-
linear and time-varying. It is the interaction of the brain with the body
and the environment –also non-linear time-varying systems– which pro-
vokes the cognitive activity that we feel and describe as perceptions,
decisions or mental representations. Such general approach integrates
apparently disconnected research such as detailed descriptions of neuro-
biological activity, language phenomena arising from interaction among
large populations of people or decision-making in robots playing football.
From the perspective of embodied cognition, any story model should be
able to describe the properties shared by all stories in terms of the activ-
ity of the human brain, body and environment. In this section we will
argue that the importance of stories for our cognitive development can
be explained in the view proposed by embodied cognition. The diﬀerent
steps of such explanation are benchmarked with empirical predictions
that can be tested experimentally.
If traditionally cognitive sciences used the computer and information
processing as a metaphor of the mind, here we consider morphogenesis
as an analog of the kind of distributed but coordinated decision process
we have tried to characterize. Given a certain biochemical environment,
during morphogenesis each cell decides individually if it has to reproduce
or not, how to diﬀerentiate, etc. However, the overall result is a tissue
with a coherent structure. The tissue, as the story, is the result of very
imbricated causal relations that trigger sequences of events throughout
the whole cell metabolism. Despite the modeling of these phenomena goes
back at least to Turing (1952), to our knowledge such processes have not
been considered as a metaphor for cognitive sciences. Maybe the reason
has been because it involves nonlinear and dynamic interacting systems,
for which mature modeling tools are just now starting to be available.
9.4.2 Causality
In psychology there is abundant literature stating psychological charac-
teristics of the process of cause attribution (see, for example, Cheng &
Novick (1990, 1991); Cheng (1993); Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird (2001);
Griﬃths & Tenenbaum (2007); Goodman et al. (2011) but also Rosch
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(1994)). Most of them consider probability theory as a “normative” theory
with which to compare, be it in favor or against of.
Why did not we adopt one of these many existing probabilistic models
of causation? If we represent a plan with probabilistic relations between
events, the likeliness the plan will actually be satisfied will never be higher
than the actual probability values. It is preferable, and we developed, an
alternative way of representing causal relations that binds the probab-
ility of occurrence of a particular event based to the occurrence of its
cause and its context. The relation is inverted: causal relations determ-
ine the probabilities of occurrence, but probabilities of occurrence do not
determine causal relations. In our experiment participants could identify
the logical description of the story only from the instantiated description
rendered, which suggests they understood the causal relations among the
events. This is true despite most of the events occurred only once, and
were not comparable with an everyday situation, which suggests there
was not enough data to build a reliable probabilistic characterization of
such events. One could claim this particular story was not a good example
of an experiment designed to assess the inference of causal relations, and
he would be right. On the other side, the method proposed is indeed a
way of representing causal relations that might eventually fit better than
common probabilistic models the psychological characteristics reported
in the literature.
The study of causal inference seems particularly appropriate to put at
proof the realism of the present model. For example, it could be compared
with Bayesian models of causality (such as, for example, Kemp et al.
(2007)), which inherently assume a probabilistic definition of causality
and have been exploited systematically to study the cognitive process of
causal attribution (Holyoak & Lu, 2011).
Contrary to a probabilistic model, in the Trama model to infer a causal
relation would involve, first, to build a logical description with a large
set of possible causes which, when instantiated, can be evaluated against
a statistical fit to select the actual cause. The option chosen would be
the smallest pseudo-complemented lattice that, given the context and
the cause, minimizes the surprise associated with the consequence. This
means that the cause and context would be selected building a direc-
ted graph with, in one branch, the elements of the context, and at the
other, the cause. At the top, the partially ordered graph would have the
event predicted. The surprise would be estimated from the quantified
description of such graph. Because within the Trama model this implies
transforming an external event into an internal one in order to learn a
specific skill, we can name such process internalization. The reader inter-
ested in the mathematical details can find a more detailed mathematical
development in appendix B.
It should be stressed that the method does not address which are the
possible events that would fit as cause candidates. The Trama model
has no semantics. It rather sees causality as an attempt to find a good
predictor for a consequence, and do this on a nonlinear domain. Therefore,
what it says is which of the cause candidates does fit better as an actual
cause. There are indirect measures pointing to this view of causality in
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the psychological literature. For example, Trabasso et al. (1984) showed
stories are remembered better and longer if the events forming it have a
larger amount of interrelated causal relations, a result that could fit with
the view of cause as minimal statistical predictor.
Finally, we would like to argue why studying causality in virtual reality
seems particularly appropriate. Despite under certain conditions it can
provoke a sensation of it feels like real ; in an IVE judgments about causal
consequences of events do not make any objective sense because in an
IVE there is no physical causality. For example, there is no reason for
which a stone should fall when someone drops it. Therefore, what appears
as purely physical causal relations can be controlled, so it constitutes a
perfect environment to control whether causality judgments are indeed
better described by a causation model such as the one proposed here, or
better characterized with more common probabilistic methods. Moreover,
other paradoxes of causal attribution have been reported in the context of
social psychology. For example, Nisbett & Wilson (1977) report how bad
we are at determining the cause of some judgement. This kind of social
biases of causal reasoning could also be tested systematically within a
completely controlled environment.
9.4.3 Decisions under uncertainty
Because probabilities deal with uncertainty, the core diﬀerence between
the model developed here and usual probabilistic views of causality and
decision-making is the understanding of uncertainty. In our case, uncer-
tainty appears because we do not know beforehand what a person in an
immersive virtual environment will decide to do.
From a psychological perspective, the model introduced seems to predict
paradoxes reported on the domain of subjective judgments. For example,
the conjunction fallacy has been put forward as a paradox in how we
deal with uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Considering the
evidence, a statement such as Uma Thurman is a pretty, blonde and
smart American actress is generally considered to be more likely than a
statement such as Uma Thurman is a smart American actress. However,
the joint probability of 2 independents events is always smaller than each
separated. Assuming being smart and being blonde are separated events,
these kinds of judgment suggest we do not treat uncertainty in terms of
probabilities. In slightly more formal terms: an explanation involving 2
independent events is considered more likely than with only 1 of these
events, violating clearly the composition operation in probability theory,
where independence means p(A
T
B) = p(a) ⇤ p(b), which is obviously
smaller than any of both events. A possibility put forward is to explain
it with an underlying causal mechanism (Ahn & Bailenson, 1996). But
this sends us back to the previous point. 1
1 (Ahn & Bailenson, 1996) also introduce the discounting principle, which states that
if a cause has been found explaining in a satisfactory way an event, we will tend
to discount any other cause. In the perspective of the Trama model this would be
provoked by the mechanism of causal inference as explained in detail in appendix B
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Raufaste et al. (2003) has shown that classical possibility theory (Za-
deh, 1978) predicts better than probability theory the confidence people
attribute to judgments under uncertainty. It is possible that a definition
of causation based on possibility theory also explains better subjective
judgments on causal relations. In this view, a conjunction fallacy such
as the previous case will be considered a logical description to which,
in principle, would be associated a physical instance –in this case, Uma
Thurman. Therefore, the longer statement would be preferred because
it seems a better fit of the diﬀerent features of the physical entity. In
this view, the tendency to choose the longer statement as more likely
would relate to a better description of the evidence, and not to the joint
probability of the independent events depicted.
This approach involves a view of uncertainty that is somehow diﬀerent
to the common and widespread treatment issued from information the-
ory. In usual information theory, one considers that symbols are encoded
and decoded at a constant rate, and that given enough time any symbol
will occur (Shannon, 1948). This implies that uncertainty originates in a
random process that is stationary, with events having a constant probab-
ility through time. The uncertainty is mainly due to the need to estimate
which event occurred. One of the implications of such view of uncertainty
is that Bayesian inference does a good job in inferring the occurrence of
an event. Bayesian inference works under the principle that we infer a
probability of a fact by accumulating evidence. Then, this probability is
interpreted as the belief in such fact.
Contrary to this view, in the Trama model events do not necessarily
repeat, and there is no constant rate at which the events occur. Rather,
events are considered as belonging to a non-stationary processes made of
non-independent events whose probability of occurrence changes through
time. Consistently, the uncertainty is not only in how to estimate which
event occurred, but also in how to estimate whether any event occurred
at a certain time moment. Uncertainty can appear because we do not
know a certain fact, or because we know that fact is the result of a
random process. If it is the result of a random process, we certainly
need a fair amount of evidence to estimate a belief level, and a statistical
learning technique such as Bayesian inference is appropriate. For example,
to estimate a color in presence of stationary spectral noise, we need
to accumulate evidence before doing an inference. However, if we do
not assume a priori that a certain fact has noise related to a stationary
random process, we can simply consider that as far as an event is possible
in a certain context, the evidence available implies it is necessary at some
degree. This is the view developed within the Trama model. In this
view, a story is understood as a non-stationary process occurring in a
nonlinear and dynamic environment, something quite diﬀerent from the
view of uncertainty provoked by a random process.
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9.4.4 Learning to control movement
Introduction
The modelisation of human behaviour in complex environments is nowa-
days fairly limited. Wolpert (2007) argues human behaviour can be well
estimated from a Bayesian statistical model when the action to perform
is motivated by a unique goal. For example, in the case of walking, a bio-
realistic statistical predictor can be found with an optimization criterion
such as minimizing the energy spent. In his terms:
Given a particular task, such as reaching from one location
to another or serving at tennis, the brain can specify which
statistics of the task are important. For example, in a reaching
movement it may be that we wish to minimize the mean
squared error at the end of the movement. The problem of
planning is then to choose a sequence of motor commands
which optimizes these statistics.
However, when there are several goals involved, modeling the behaviour
doesn’t give the same quality of results. For example, minimizing energy
cannot give account of saccades in the eye movement of people. As these
movements are known to correlate with neural mechanisms of attentional
shift, it seems that there is a need to model it with diﬀerent goals which
can change the motivation of a particular behaviour in real time. In the
conclusions of Wolpert (2007) , it is explained:
Although for simple systems we can simulate the optimal solu-
tions, when it comes to nonlinear systems such as the human
body we cannot yet solve optimal control problems which
our brains seem to have solved. Understanding the computa-
tional mechanism that the brain uses in determining optimal
control will be a major challenge.
Two models of action selection
The problem at stake is on what criterion would we choose a set of
behaviours in a changing non-linear environment, where these behaviours
are motivated by several goals, can be part of plans and be modulated
by real time updated perceptions.
In perspective of the Trama model, this may be conceived as the need to
consider a plan made of causal relations among goal motivated actions to
model human behaviour as a large set of sensorimotor loops. The reader
might have already noticed that this method instantiates a sequence of
events in a physical mechanism without imposing restrictions such as
making decisions over linear or discrete domains. Moreover, the possibil-
ity and necessity allow for a physical interpretation that is simpler than
probability. From a purely physical perspective, a probability can only be
related with a frequency, something that is measured many times. From
this, one can estimate a probability distribution and work out the diﬀer-
ent parameters involved in a probabilistic model. On the contrary, in the
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Trama model the possibility of an event is closer to what in physics is
considered a boundary problem. In a boundary problem, one generally
states the conditions under which an event can occur. For example, if
we want to turn on a light bulb, we need 2 cables with a certain voltage
between them. This makes the event possible, but not necessary. The
necessity is closer to the other kind of problems in physics: dynamic
problems. In the previous example, to turn on the light we would need
to close the circuit in order for the current to flow. In the general case,
a dynamic problem characterizes an exchange of energy. Given the fact
that an event was possible, closing the circuit would necessarily provoke
it. The main diﬀerence between this example and our case is that cur-
rents and intensities are typically linear, while an IVE interacting with
a participant is not.
In mathematical terms, the instantiated description is an action selection
mechanism, a method by which a situated agent selects one or several
actions because these actions are attractors in an abstract space of mo-
tivations to act, calculated on the basis of perceptions and behaviour
rules (Goetz, 1998). When the perceptions about the state of the world
are updated, the activation spreading mechanism will ensure we converge
towards an attractor. In this picture, what the plan does is change dynam-
ically the relative weight of the attractors present in this abstract space
of motivations. Note this description defies more common mathematical
modeling techniques such as the use of diﬀerential equations. Already
Maes (1991) noted the activation spreading mechanism could be stated
with diﬀerential equations, but that these equations could not be solved
analytically. In addition, the use of the Trama model changes dynamic-
ally the weight of the attractors according to the occurrence of preceding
events, which complicates even more an attempt in this direction.
Overall, it would seem that the present method oﬀers an alternative to
situated agents based on probabilistic modeling, and that adopting it
could provide a better understanding of the coordination skills needed to
integrate action and perception loops to generate coordinated and pur-
posefull behaviour (The reader interested in the mathematical details is
referred to appendix B, in particular section B.4). This suggests there
might be a deeper connection between how brains make decisions that
result in motor control and how decisions are done within the Trama
model. In the following sections we will try to show Llogic can be seen
as a mathematical version of Empirical Range Theory, an alternative to
Bayesian inference about how the brain deals with statistics, and intro-
duce some empirical predictions that would validate such view.
Bayesian inference versus Empirical Range Theory
Bayesian inference is nowadays a popular statistical perspective to model
cognitive mechanisms such as vision or motor reactions. However, the ac-
tual assumptions on which these models are based are often ambiguously
stated. Moreover, despite such approach works well for simple cases, it
does not generalize easily to complex scenarios, nor it can be related eas-
ily with what is known about the brains’ anatomy and physiology (Jones
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& Love, 2011). On the other side, there is no other framework of statist-
ical inference that seems appropriate to describe cognitive processes and
brain activity. Or is there? Dale Purves proposes empirical range theory
as an alternative to Bayesian decision theory. One of his main arguments
is cited below (Purves, 2010, page 228):
Bayes’s theorem correctly (and usefully) spells out the logical
relationship among the factors that underlie any empirical
approach to vision. Nonetheless, the way it has been used
in vision science has tended to obscure instead of clarify the
way brains seem to work. For most people using Bayesian de-
cision theory, the visual system is taken to compute statistical
inferences about possible physical states of the world based
on prior knowledge acquired through experience with image
features. The evidence (...), however, argues that the accumu-
lated knowledge stored in brain circuitry is based on feedback
from behavioural success, not image features. (...) These per-
ceptions successfully guide behaviour not because they rep-
resent likely states of the world but because of the trial-and-
error manner in which the relevant perceptual spaces and the
inerlying neural circuitry have been generated.
The essential idea in empirical range theory is that the brain does not try
to find the real state of the world from new stimuli and the evidence ac-
cumulated through time, but rather that it puts a certain stimuli within
the range of the possible ones, as determined by all previously experi-
enced stimuli. In this theory, the focus of the perceptual system is not to
estimate at best the real state, but rather to use this information to guide
successfully behaviour. Then, the perception is not the aproximation of a
real state of the world, but rather this indexated information. Following
this line, the reason why we have greater discrimination of certain range
of colours or sounds is because these are the ones that dominate in our
natural environment, and discriminating them well guides behaviour bet-
ter, and therefore gives competitive advantage. In this view, the brain
would adapt through evolutionary and developmental time to do so. This
aproach has successfully reached to explain some perceptual illusions in
geometry and colour perception that could not be explained otherwise
(see, for example Howe & Purves (2005a,b)).
In the Trama model, methods of statistical learning would characterize
how causation spreads within the instantiated description. If the plan is
instantiated in an EBN, the simplest is to use it to estimate the probab-
ilistic expected eﬀect of an action from some adaptive function taking as
input some perceptions of the world. The method is compatible with any
kind of technique of statistical learning. The statistical learning could be
based on an adaptive filter, a Bayesian algorithm, or a Reinforcement
Learning policy. Again, we can compare such a strategy with Bayesian
models. It has recently been claimed that the widespread and popular
use of Bayesian modeling in cognitive sciences (see, for example, at a
neural level, Beck et al. (2008) or, at a perception/action level, Körd-
ing & Wolpert (2004)) suﬀers from a lack of rigor in distinguishing, on
one side, the assumptions drawn from theoretical hypothesis and exper-
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imental results and, on the other side, the mathematical assumptions
that are necessary to work out the Bayesian method of inference (Jones
& Love, 2011).
In the Trama model the relations between the logical statement, probab-
ilistic quantification and physical instantiation has to be stated explicitly
–concretely, in the mappings between logical, quantified and instantiated
descriptions–, which suggests the relation between a scientific descrip-
tion, its computational implementation and the statistical fit of such
description with a physical reality could be clearly outlined. Because the
likelihood of an event is probabilistic, Bayesian methods also have diﬃ-
culties in characterizing dynamic systems or rare events. But precisely
rare events are the ones crucial for stories. The approach developed in the
Trama model seems closer to Empirical Range Theory because, contrary
to Bayesian modelling, it assumes that perception skills do not accumu-
late evidence to maximize the likelihood of a good stimulus estimation,
but rather to maximize the likelihood of a successful behaviour. It also
seems closer to a certain trend within computational neuroscience that
considers information not only looking at the mean firing rates of neur-
ons, but also the temporal patterns among them (see, for example, Gütig
& Sompolinsky (2006)), something which goes towards making compat-
ible the timings of motor actions based on sensorimotor loops with how
computational neuroscience models perception.
The learning brain
The concern for the validity of the Trama model can be pushed further
in the context of learning. There is no constraint on the physical system
used in the instantiated description, which -as an EBN- can be non-linear
and recursive. Therefore, the EBN architecture could be replaced with
biologically plausible simulations of sensorimotor loops. For example, we
could try to characterize how the brain changes in order to learn a new
task. To characterize how the brain does the internalization of a causal
relation, we could map a quantified description to a biologically plausible
simulation of brain activity. This would be done by relating the possibil-
ity and necessity values of the quantified description to an instantiated
description involving inhibitory and excitatory inputs of brain modules.
In a first approximation, these would correspond to the spiking rates of
interneurons and pyramidal neurons, respectively (Buzsáki, 2006).
In this line, we could follow Beck et al. (2008) and approximate neural
spiking as Poisson distributions, and map the possibility and necessity
input values to the lambda parameter that characterizes such kind of
distribution. However, unlike Beck et al. (2008), instead of develop-
ing a Bayesian model we can instantiate our quantified description in
a physically realistic simulation of brain cells. In this approach the lo-
gical description would impose a series of constraints in the connectivity
of diﬀerent brain modules. We believe the result would provide similar
predictions as Beck et al. (2008), given we replaced statements about
posterior probability distributions over variables of interest, by facts as-
sociated to a certain necessity distribution. But such kind of mapping
could explain data that a priori is diﬃcult to reconcile with Bayesian
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methods. For example, consider again skill acquisition as “causal infer-
ence plus statistical learning”. As said before, to consider a large set of
possible causes supposes building a pseudo-complemented lattice associ-
ated to each possible cause. However, once the actual cause is found, only
1 lattice is needed (the reader will find in appendix B for a more detailed
explanation). If we consider the previous mapping (possibilities and ne-
cessities correspond to inhibitory and excitatory activity), building the
connectivity to represent all the possible causes would require a consid-
erable increase in cortical volume, but once the actual cause found, the
actual size needed would be similar to the original. This picture seems
compatible with empirical data: Reed et al. (2011) have shown that the
process by which we learn to perform a task involves cortical growth, but
that once this cortical growth is acquired, the growth resorbs despite the
skill is maintained, even lifelong.
The previous analogy can be pushed further. It is sometimes described
that a neural equivalent of Reinforcement Learning (RL) is Long Term
Potentiation and Long Term Depression (LTP/LTD), which are also
adaptative methods but within neural circuitry. Such mechanisms are
widespread in the brain, and they reinforce or attenuate the connec-
tion between 2 neural systems and the statistical distribution of their
spikes. Adaptative methods implemented within each of the modules of
the EBN would correlate with the neural mechanisms of Long Term Po-
tentiation and/or Long Term Depression. Be this analogy validated, such
Llogic rules would describe the statistical properties of neural activity in
a much simpler model, and also provide a functional interpretation of the
role of the inhibitory, excitatory and adaptive mechanisms of the nervous
system. Such an analogy could in principle be validated experimentally
by comparing a Tramabot with a simple living system, both showing
similar behaviour. Triggering some change in the environment that rec-
quires adaptive learning, the RL and LTP/LTD mechanisms should pro-
voke similar changes in the statistical distribution of firing rates of EBN
modules.
9.4.5 Summary
In this section we have tried to show how the Trama model might be
useful to characterize cognitive systems, and particularly to study the
role of stories and causal inference in cognitive development and motor
coordination. However, the diﬀerent directions outlined are a speculative
development based on the mathematics of the model, but such predic-
tions are not supported by specifically designed experiments. If experi-
ments were to confirm that a computer model of causality can predict a
measurable change in brain connectivity, as predicted here, it might ex-
ploited in the tendency to converge between computational neuroscience,
nowadays rather focused on simulations of the physical dynamics of the
brain, with cognitive neuroscience, closer to behavioural studies.
Overall, the Trama model characterizes a story as a non-stationary pro-
cess made of non-independent events. When characterizing systems that
are stationary or near to stationary and involve repeated events, prob-
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abilities of events do not change through time and therefore the views
of probability as a frequency estimation and as an inferred belief con-
verge. This is similar to an information-processing device processing tele-
graphic signals, and in such cases, Bayesian methods are appropriate.
However, for cases such as stories where we must consider rare events
under uncertainty, probabilities make sense in terms of frequency of oc-
currence but not in terms of belief of a proposition. In this view, this is
because these processes are non-stationary and are constituted of non-
independent events. Therefore, to model how such events relate among
each other, we have to consider in greater detail how we instantiate the
mechanisms by which beliefs and decisions are inferred. This mechanism
is specified in the instantiated description, and it can either be an arti-
ficial situated agent, a real person or a biologically plausible simulation
of a brain.
9.5 ethical aspects
Finally, apart from possible academic developments, it seems such a
method could be used in an industrial context. Because using this tech-
nique it is possible to predict the global outcome of several agents mak-
ing independent decisions, situated agents could be used in fields such
as industrial robotics. This method would allow moving away from the
typical linear production pipeline, allowing for massively concurrent pro-
cesses respecting the minimal order restrictions to not interfere one with
each other.
It could also be exploited to develop interactive stories in common vir-
tual environments and commercial entertainment systems. Note in this
story model there are no semantics. The only thing stated in the lo-
gical part is a partial order between events. It is assumed implicitly that
the scriptwriter will declare events that appear to be causally related.
The only thing required is that these events can actually be instantiated
within a virtual environment. Therefore, in the approach proposed the
design of the story can be done independently of the implementation of
the virtual world, and even of the implementation of other decisional
skills in the situated agent. This suggests such method could be integ-
rated within the production pipelines of video-games, most often based
on a strict separation of tasks.
The work developed in this document has been mainly concerned with the
technical part of such a challenge –how can this be done?. However, the
possibility that such a medium can be adopted in society raises another
kind of questions –what impact will this have?.
The importance of stories for cognitive development can hardly be under-
estimated, and new forms of narrative have had an undeniable impact on
shaping society. The arrival of cinema and television are good examples
of how a new media can shape society in a new way. Nowadays the ad-
vertisement industry based on corporate television largely creates and
deforms public opinion in favor of private interests. Despite subliminal
advertising and the mix of content with ads is forbidden, such mix is
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commonly found through all TVs, public and private. This is because
the main source of income for television channels is advertisement in-
dustry, and such economic pressure pushes always in the same direction.
For video-games, there is a telling quote:
Computer games do not aﬀect kids, I mean if Pac-Man af-
fected us as kids, we’d all be running around in darkened
rooms, munching pills and listening to repetitive music.
Such sentence is often attributed to Kristian Wilson, a Nintendo execut-
ive by 1989. Despite the quote is probably misattributed (It might be a
joke from Marcus Brickstoke, a stand-up comedian), it is telling about
the social and cultural impact video-games have had. It has already been
shown that certain video-games can improve general perception and at-
tention skills (Green & Bavelier, 2003, 2007; Green et al. , 2010). It
has also been shown to produce changes in the brain (see for example
Mathiak & Weber (2006)). IVE have also been shown to allow for the
manipulation of learning (Okita et al. , 2008) or to introduce sublim-
inal biases in decision-making with real-world consequences, such as an
election vote (Bailenson et al. , 2008). Such experiments also show the
boundary between subliminal and liminal stimuli is hard to distinguish
in an interactive medium. Moreover, because in an IVE everything is
fake but it has a feeling of reality that makes people respond as if it was
real, one can use it to reproduce scenarios that favor immoral behaviour
(see experiments such as, for example, Slater et al. (2006); Rovira et al.
(2009)). Given the result is a completely automated interactive envir-
onment processed as a game formalism, the methodology of fields such
as behavioural economics (Kahneman & Smith, 2009), or neuroscientific
theories about how we deal with decision-making (Sanfey, 2007) could
easily be integrated within such media and applied to industries such as
financial economy or marketing, whose goal is to change the behaviour
of people to favor particular interests.
At a larger scale, if we look back 50 or 60 years, it becomes clear that
TV advertising has had a massive impact in shaping the population’s
preferences and decisions according to private interests. It is not hard
to see a link between the financial consequences of such decisions and
the current situation of economic instability. If interactive stories be-
come as pervasive as today’s advertisement industry, they will be able
to adapt the content in real time and individually to the reactions of
each of the members of an audience. If we assume that IVE can purpose-
fully bias cognitive aspects of decision-making, and eventually integrate
advancements in behavioural and cognitive decision models, it seems a
massive adoption in society of interactive stories rendered in IVE could
be exploited to shape the preferences and beliefs of a society in an even
stronger fashion than current advertising technologies. This suggests the
potential consequences of widespread adoption of this technology within
society should be addressed with care.
To imagine a media that can not only provide meaningful experiences as
movies, TV or theatre but does also provide real time detailed feedback
of the reaction of the participant exposed to such media opens the door to
a completely diﬀerent dimension of shaping opinion. Nowadays interna-
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tional stores such as Zara can change all their products to adapt it to the
client’s preferences in 2 weeks. Such an interactive media could adapt to
the audience’s preferences within a single exposure. For example, the ap-
pearance of a candidate to an election could be systematically adapted to
the person exposed (Bailenson et al. , 2008). This would make the notion
of a political program obsolete: the program could adapt to the prefer-
ences of the audience. The notion of "show business society" as depicted
in The Society of Spectacle (Debord et al. , 1992) falls short to portray
the kind of dystopia that the XXIst century society could become. Such
a media adopted by a totalitarian regime could shape public opinion in
ways hardly imaginable before. Even a dystopia such as George Orwell’s
1984, where control was exerted with cameras connected to television,
falls short compared to what such system could actually do.
On a larger perspective, it is currently matter of public debate whether
the acces to internet should be considered a fundamental right. It is
argued such right should grant open access as a consumer and as a pro-
ducer of content. Maybe when the movie we participate in aﬀects our
behaviour and thoughts in ways we cannot even be aware of it is time to
consider the time people spend being the audience and interacting with
computers to be a public good such as public health or education. Oth-
erwise, it would become very diﬃcult to prevent some of the potentially
harming eﬀect such media could have if implemented largely into society
(if it ever is).
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CONCLUS IONS
I was born at a bad time for Spain, but a
really good one for cinema – Pedro Almo-
dóvar
The significant and rapid developments in interactive and rendering tech-
nology oﬀer the opportunity for the exploitation immersive virtual envir-
onments (IVEs) as a new medium in which to tell a story. Throughout
this thesis, we have developed a method that can be used to tell a story
within an IVE. The method exploits the unique features of IVEs, con-
cretely, that people tend to feel embodied within such environment and
to react in ways surprisingly similar to how they react in everyday non-
mediated situations. The method developed supports the interaction of
the participant with characters in the story while it also conserves the
plausibility of dynamic virtual characters: each agent can contribute as a
character, but a human participant can replace any of the agents at any
moment, and eventually change the outcome of the story. This method al-
lows the combination of game-like interaction with story-like sequences of
events in an arbitrarily complex environment. Moreover, we have demon-
strated how this works in a concrete example. Results show that this
approach can be used to implement a story in an IVE, and suggest parti-
cipants experiencing such IVE adopt a role within the story and interact
with virtual characters within the unfolding plot. Results also suggest par-
ticipants can recognize the relation between the experience and a logical
description of the story, and that this understanding has an influence in
how they decide to act within the IVE.
The method is based on a cognitive model of a story, the Trama model.
In this model stories are understood as a causally related sequence of
goal-motivated actions that together form a plan. To ensure the story
is achieved, the plot is processed as a context-dependent goal performed
by several coordinated agents, which can be humans, artificial agents or
a mix of both. According to the model, a story can be embodied in a
set of situated agents, and it can be related to information measures,
consistently with the classic intuition that stories are a way of sharing in-
formation. The essential contribution of the model is to describe causal re-
lations under conditions of uncertainty typical of complex environments,
this is, where the probability distributions of the events are time-varying
and the relations among them are non-linear.
Everyday environments are also time varying and non-linear. In addition,
causal relations are ubiquitous within our reasoning skills. This suggests
such model can be used as an alternative to how causal relations are
generally considered within cognitive science, rather based on probabil-
istic definitions. The mathematical definitions of ‘story’ and of ‘causation’
introduced are based on the notion of non-stationary processes, and it
142 conclusions
seems to predict some experimental results previously reported in psy-
chology and cognitive neuroscience. They also seem to present several
advantages compared with the more popular and widespread probabil-
istic modeling, without excluding its use in particular scenarios. Further
work should clarify whether these predictions are confirmed in specific ex-
periments addressing aspects of cognitive development such as subjective
judgments, decisions involving sensorimotor integration, and inference of
causal relations. Used in the lab, the method here proposed could in
turn be used to develop a new set of tools that would enable the cre-
ation of automated virtual environments, thus enabling researchers with
the possibility of providing fully controlled stimuli with more ecological
validity.
Beyond research, it is likely such method can be used in industry to
develop a media interactive as a video-game and narrative as a movie.
In addition, the adoption of this or similar technologies within the mass
media industry could have a huge impact in the way we make decisions
and learn. This suggests the ethical and industrial implications of im-
plementing such new kind of content within society at large should be
addressed with care.
A
APPENDIX A . THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
TRAMABOTS
- Because a zombie has no will of his own.
You see them sometimes walking around blindly
with dead eyes, following orders, not knowing
what they do, not caring.
-You mean like Democrats?
Marshall et al. (1940)1
a.1 introduction
The integration of a story within an Extended Behaviour Network (EBN)
consists in, first, defining each of the events constituting the story. Second,
defining the Substitution and ATP principles in the terms of an EBN.
We now introduce a detailed review of the Tramabot, an agent pro-
cessing a story using a software implementation of the Trama model
and making decisions with EBN.
As we will show in further detail, the EBN will remain essentially un-
changed: an action can be performed when its preconditions are satisfied
and the resources that are needed to run it are available. The motivation
to choose an action will increase if the expected eﬀect of performing it
satisfies some of the goals that are relevant at that particular moment.
This motivation will also increase if the expected eﬀect is a precondition
of some other action that itself is expected to satisfy a goal, or decrease
if there are conflictor modules. The only minor change to the EBN ar-
chitecture is that some resources can be not spendable. This does not
make sense for concrete resources such as tools or parts of the body, but
it does for abstract resources such as causes and contexts.
a.2 data structure to process the events of the story
In the Trama model, the possibility of occurrence of a given event x
is determined from its context x⇤. Its necessity is determined from its
cause x⇤⇤. In EBN, for an event to occur, its preconditions must have
been satisfied. In addition to this, the amount of resources estimated to
be needed must be higher than the amount of resources estimated to
be used. In both cases, these conditions are independent of the goals or
motivations of the characters. They are rather constraints within which
these goals can be expressed.
1 as can be found in youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4XtENXHdU7M
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Therefore, given the module that can trigger x, we can establish a map-
ing between the two formalisms: the context x⇤ can be a precondition
of that module, and the cause x⇤⇤ a resource. The expected amount of
resources needed and available will vary through time following the dy-
namical change of qp. To do so, all the actions involved in a story should
be seen from the perspective of the EBN as behaviours, but also as
resources (to spread necessity values through chains of causal relations)
and preconditions (for context determination). Consider a story declared
such as:
S1 :
2 a . b . c .
IF x1 THEN y1
4 IFx2 THEN y2
IF NOTP THEN z
6 d . e . f .
From the veiwpoint of a behaviour network, the context a⇤ of an event a is
a precondition, the cause a⇤⇤ is a needed resource. The new class created
is named an ActionResource. We summarize the elements needed in table
A.1. As we have already stated before, parsing an action a that is part
of this story will generate a module such as:
2 MODULE:
IF a // t h i s w i l l check the p o s s i b i l i t y c a l c u l a t e d
from i t s con t e x t a⇤
4 AND . . . // o ther cond i t i on s
THEN a // t h i s w i l l run the ac t i on
6 EFFECT . . .
USING a Tu // t h i s w i l l check the n e c e s s i t y from i t s
cause a⇤⇤
8 AND . . . // o ther re source s
Note in the previous use of resources these are not spendable: a cause is
an abstract resource that can be available or not. However, if one module
uses it, it doesn’t limit the use by other modules. In opposition to this,
spendable resources can only be used for 1 task. For example, a hand can
only be used to grasp a pencil or to open a can, but not both successively.
How does this relate with the context and the cause as defined previously?
To perform an action a software agent will first need to check if its context
and cause have occurred. This is done, first, assuming the partial orders
established in the declaration step. Then, the relations among events as
expressed with the Llogic operators determine how the values spread
among these events. These values already define regions for the events,
and therefore having events in a future region, in a present region, and in
a past region. The temporal constraints introduce a third step, namely
the dynamics, the speed at which the possibility and necessity values
spread through the events forming a story.
The previous is still compatible with the interaction principles: given
an action, within this interval an agent (or a human participant) can
decide to trigger it responding to its own goals and motivations, which
is important for the Substitution principle. However, if the goals of
the participant or the agent do not motivate this action, the abstract
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Table A.1: The data structure used to process the relations among the events
forming a story. A story is a set of events which within EBN have
the properties of actions and of resources. The corresponding object,
named ActionResource has the attributes here listed.
An event forming a story is constituted of:
name A string containing the proposition associated with it
pos A fuzzy value storing the possibility value
nec A fuzzy value storing the necessity value
TTime The triggering time, this is, the moment when it is
triggered, or considered to be by another agent
Tmin The minimum delay to wait after his action
Tmax The maximum delay to wait
context It corresponds to e⇤. (An array of pointers to) the Action-
Resources forming its context
cause It corresponds to e⇤⇤. (An array of pointers to) the Action-
Resources that could be its cause
causeNeg A boolean to know if the cause is negated (this will be
true when processing NOTP operators)
isInternalA boolean value to store if it is an external or internal
event
To relate with the elements of a behaviour network
it has:
pAction (A pointer to) the concrete behaviour associated with the
action
pResource(A pointer to) the resource associated with the action
(when it is seen as part of the cause of some other be-
haviour)
pState (A pointer to) the precondition associated with the action
(when it is seen as part of the context of some other beha-
viour)
pEstimator(A pointer to) an estimation method to check if some other
agent actually performed the action
146 appendix a. the implementation of tramabots
goal “Advance the Plot” will progressively take over in the agent as a
motivation in itself, which will ensure some character performs the action
and the story does not get stuck.
a.3 how to implement the atp principle
Here we review the interaction principles of the Zelig metaphor to express
them in such a way that an artificial agent can process them. Consider
the same story as declared before.
The ATP principle, this is, having an underlying goal of Advancing The
Plot is simple to formalize. Given a story labeled ‘S1’, it is enough to
create a condition named ‘ATP_S1’ and another one named ‘K_S1’. The
first stands for the abstract condition, and the second one for the default
context common to all the actions involved in the story. Then, when
parsing the story it is enough to add a new goal which is achieved when
this condition occurs. In EBN it is declared like:
GOAL:
2 IF K1 //The re l e vance cond i t i on
THEN ATPS1 1 .0 //The goa l cond i t i on
To start the story it is enough to assume the default context ‘KS1’ is
assumed to be true, which makes the goal being taken into account.
To ensure all the actions involved in the plot will have the apropriate
motivation it should be added that they all have the condition included
in their expected eﬀects. For exampe, in the EBN module corresponding
to the action ‘d’ we would add an eﬀect ‘ATPS1’:
1 MODULE:
IF a // p o s s i b i l i t y determined from a⇤
3 AND . . . // o ther cond i t i on s
THEN a // execu te the ac t i on
5 EFFECT ATPS1 1 .0 // t h i s w i l l c on t r i b u t e to the goa l
ATP_S1
AND . . . // o ther e f f e c t s
7 USING a Tu // n e c e s s i t y o f a determined from a⇤⇤
AND . . . // o ther re source s
Despite the expected probability stated in the module, the condition
‘ATPS1’ will only be achieved when the last action of the story is finished.
a.4 how to implement the substitution principle
To clarify how the Substitution principle applies in this context, con-
sider the script from the perspective of an agent embodied in a virtual
character: just like an actor in a theatre play, it knows which are the
actions forming the plot, and which ones it can perform. It doesn’t know
exactly what will the other agents do, but expects them to do some of
the actions scripted, and it has specific skills to detect those.
If the action to be performed by the participant is external, such as in
IF x THEN y, where x is done by the participant and y by an agent, it
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is enough the agent estimates x occurred, so he performs y. Within the
Llogic rules it can be stated as: xˆ ^ (xˆ ) y ). This reads as: estimate x
and then if x occurred trigger y. On the contrary, if the event is internal
event, it must necessarily occur within the plot. In such case, there are
two options. Either it is an action the agent can perform, either it is not.
If it is not, he does as in the previous case.
Otherwise, if it is: consider an event e forming part of a story a.b.c.d.e. f .
The Substitution principle says that the event e will be triggered either
by the participant, this is, the Zelig character Z, either by some other
character controlled by an agent A. Assuming eA means event e occurs
triggered by agent A, the substitution principle can be stated within the
Llogic operators as eZ _ eA. Assuming agent A has some way to estimate
eZ the Substitution principle can be written as eZ _ eA. In words it gives:
either Zelig does e either I do.
The elements in the expression eZ _ eA refer to the same action, and
therefore the option chosen should simply be the most likely of the two.
To process it, at the moment of triggering the action it will simply be
checked which possibility it is more likely: the estimated one or the de-
cided internally by the agent after processing the context, causes and
delays. This reminds the words found in (Goetz, 1998, chapter 8): “Ac-
tion selection is also pattern recognition: the task is to categorize the
situation at hand by the response appropriate to it”. The agent evaluates
the context of the action to determine its possibility and then evaluates
the likeliness that it already occurred to decide if he actually has to
performing it or it already occurred.
Contrary to this simultaneity, the expression x ^ (x ) y ) implies a
certain temporal dimension, which is the latency between the occurrences
of x and y. If the action is external, the processing is already defined.
However, if the action is internal but the agent cannot perform it -
something that would look like internal to the story but external to
the character- the agent needs to know if it can or cannot perform it.
This is central to the Substitution principle: the roles are not assigned
unequivocally to each of the virtual characters, but rather it is the actions
they perform which define which role the character becomes.
Therefore, the agent needs to know which are the roles within the story
that it can adopt and which are the roles it cannot. Going back to the
example in a theatre, in a classical play each actor has one role associated
to it, but it is quite common in monologues and other kinds of plays that
a character adopts several roles, switching from one to the other. This is
exactly what virtual characters need to do to satisfy the Substitution
principle. But they must do so taking into account which are the roles
adopted by the other characters.
To represent this knowledge the agent will have a set of resources which
will represent the diﬀerent roles involved in the story. Then, when a char-
acter performs an action that defines him as a certain role he will bind
the use of that resource. This implies the module performing that action
will now take a form such as:
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2 MODULE:
IF . . . .
4 THEN a //The ac t i on to perform
EFFECT . . .
6 USING . . .
AND ra 1 //a r o l e t ha t needs to be a v a i l a b l e
8 AND . . .
Once such an action has been performed by some agent or human par-
ticipant and it is detected by another agent, this agent will reduce the
amount available, assuming literally that the role has been taken by some
other character, much as if it was a ball in a football game or a particular
weapon in a war scenario.
A final practical consideration to ensure the story occurs is about re-
dundancy of agents. If one character can only assume 1 role, given a
story with r roles, n characters of which z are human participants, to
ensure there are always enough characters for all the roles and that the
human participants can do whatever they want, the conditions 2 ⇤ z  r,
r  n and 2 ⇤ z  n should be satisfied. For example, with 1 human
participant, there should at least be 2 roles and 2 virtual characters. If
some characters can adopt several roles at the same time, or there is
some way to coerce the behaviour of the human participant(s), some of
these conditions can be relaxed.
a.5 initialization
To define an EBN agent, functions for the estimation of all the percep-
tions and availability of resources have to be implemented, as well as
for the performance of the behaviours the character can do. Then, the
diﬀerent perceptions, resources and actions have to be added to the net-
work, and by parsing the rules using the syntax previously defined these
diﬀerent elements are related with goals and competence modules.
For the case of Tramabots, the main diﬀerence is that the behaviours
forming the network have temporal relations binding their occurrence.
This will provoke that, instead of having a network of situation-dependent
goals, as usual in extended behaviour networks, they will be context-
dependent goals. In practical terms, this implies that the perceptions
and resources are declared exactly in the same way, but the declaration
of the actions oﬀers more options:
• an action that can simply be executed. This will be exactly like in
EBN
• an action can also be perceived as being performed by another
agent. In such case a function to evaluate this case should also be
provided.
• an action can not only be perceived, but also has a specific role
associated with it. In such case, such role should be specified.
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Once this is done, the rules to be parsed will be the ones of the EBN
and additionally the ones declaring the stories, which will be transformed
in EBN modules and goals with the principles previously described. An
additional step will require to provide the latencies among the events
forming the story or stories.
a.6 run time
At a certain point in the progress of the story, to decide if an action
has occurred or has to be performed, an agent will have to consider if
the actions of its context and cause are available as resources, if the
latencies related to those have been satisfied, if the action is internal or
external, and eventually if the role requested is not currently taken by
someone else. Moreover, as the action can be part of a normal EBN
module, additional preconditions and resources can be needed, and its
motivation can be altered by other goals unrelated with the story.
The main practical advantage of this approach is that it is inherently
distributed: it still allows to have diﬀerent competence modules dealing
with diﬀerent skills, action decision being done in parallel, as well as
goals for a interaction more similar to a typical game, or to add other
independent stories, secondary plots within a story, or parameters such as
emotional factors aﬀecting the decisional process, in the line of Johansson
& Dell’ Acqua (2009). The calculations at run time will be 2 parallel
processes: the spreading of the possibility and necessity values through
the causal relations and the decisional procedure.
A first process will update the possibility and necessity values of the
events forming part of the story. To do so, it will use the data structure
previously defined and the formulas defining the activation among the
possibility and necessity values of the diﬀerent actions. This spreading
can be done sequentially, randomly or, if each of the actions can access to
a time measure, in parallel. The only information that has to be shared
is determined by the pointers to the elements of the context and the
cause of each action. In any case, such process can run concurrently to
the decisional procedure of EBN.
The decisional procedure of EBN remains essentially the same, with
only minor variations. It assumes the perceptions quantifying the precon-
ditions and the availability of resources will be updated asynchronously.
Then, the modules can be updated sequentially or randomly or even con-
currently. To clarify the processing of the actions forming part of the plot,
we review the decisional procedure for a module k involving a behaviour
bk that is part of one or more stories. We underline the principal novelties
in bold:2
2 In both processes we am assuming that the calculation of the values is much faster
than the temporal delays involved in the plot. For example, if the frame rate of the
system rendering the characters is 100, the minimum temporal delay that can be
showed is of 10ms. Then, if one iteration of such calculation is done in less than 1 ms
it can be guaranteed the decisional procedure does not distort the shown latencies.
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1. calculate the activation a and the executability e of the module. The
executability is e = tP(Pre, s). The executability takes into ac-
count the possibility value of an event as defined in the
Trama model. If the behaviour bk is only involved in the
story, it stands that tP ⌘ pos(bk).
In practical terms, such value is controlled externally: in EBN this
is determined when updating the situation of the world s. Now it
also takes into account the context of bk.
The activation a considers all the goals, their importance, the con-
flictor and successor modules and computes the maximal expected
relevance associated to the action. If the ATP goal is involved,
the eﬀect added to the module which states that it is ex-
pected that performing the action will satisfy such ATP
condition will be taken into account in this calculation.
2. calculate the execution-value h(a, e).
3. for each resource res used by module k starting with the previous
unavailable resource:
i. check if the execution value exceeds the activation threshold of
the resource res, this is h(a, e)   qres. If the resource res is an
action belonging to the cause b⇤⇤k , qres ⌘ qp. Therefore this
step is verifying the condition pos(bk) := [nec(bk⇤)   qp]
ii. check if the amount of resource units still available are enough:
[tU  tR(res, s)]. If the resource is part of b⇤⇤k , the amount
available is tR = nec(b⇤⇤k ), and the amount needed tU(res, s) =
1  t TminTmax Tmin .
If the resource is a role, it will simply check if the as-
sumption of this role is available
If so, bind the resources, i.e., increase the number of used units by
the expected number of units the behaviour will use. Linguistic
resources are not spendable, and therefore the expected
amount of units tu is not updated: the resources are not
bound and can be used to perform another action.
4. 4) If both tests succeeded,
i. Execute the corresponding behaviour The Substitution prin-
ciple applies here, in the case defined as eZ _ eA . Before
executing, the option with the maximal value will be the
one chosen. If it is more likely that some other agent per-
formed the action, the algorithm considers the action has
been performed by another agent: the value of the neces-
sity is the estimated one, and the availability of the roles
associated with such an action are decreased. Otherwise,
execute the corresponding behaviour and, as it is certain
the action occurs, nec(bk) = 1. In both cases, once executed,
the action is not possible anymore.
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ii. Reset the activation threshold of all the resources used, i. e.,
reduce the amount of bound resource
5. Start again.

B
APPENDIX B : A NEW MODEL OF CAUSAL
INFERENCE
God has not yet created the world; he is just
imagining it, like in slumber. That’s why the
world is perfect, but confused. Monterroso
(1972)
b.1 introduction
The Tramamodel considers stories made of sequences of causally related
goal-motivated actions. To define a story like this, we have introduced
a logical definition of causation that is embodied in a physical system
through the quantification of 2 fuzzy values: its possibility and its neces-
sity.
Because causal inference under conditions of uncertainty is relevant to
several fields such as cognitive science, statistics, economy, evolutionary
biology and social sciences, there exist several approaches to cause infer-
ence. However, they are all based on the notion of probability. As (Purves,
2010, page 1) says in the context of cognitive neuroscience:
Any theory of causality [...] must therefore be cast in a lan-
guage that distinguishes various shades of likelihood –namely,
the language of probabilities (...). Probability theory, aided by
methods of statistical analysis, provides both the principles
and the means of coping with -and drawing inferences from-
such observations.
Probably the most exhaustive review of causality inference under un-
certainty can be found in Pearl (2009). Over more than 300 pages, it
explains diﬀerent methods to estimate a causal relation from probabil-
istic relations. However, the author admits that “statistical associations
do not logically imply causation” (p. 42).
The puzzling nature of causation, an intuitive and universal notion that
in contemporary science is placed somewhere between logic and statist-
ics, has puzzled philosophers for centuries. Probabilistic approaches to
causal inference have become popular because, contrary to formal logic,
they can include uncertainty. This implies a radical separation between
statistical inference and logical implication. However, such approaches
assume the probability of an event does not change through time. An es-
timated or “subjective” probability might change, but they all, implicitly
or explicitly, assume the actual probability value is constant. This is not
the case within the Trama model.
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The notion of “probability” can be used with two diﬀerent meanings.
The first meaning relates it with a frequency, and it dates at least since
the axiomatic theory of probability developed by Kolmogorov. It can be
derived from experience by repeated exposure to independent events. For
example, the probability of getting a 4 when throwing a balanced dice is
1/6, and this measure can be found experimentally. A condition to find
this result is that the experiment “throwing the dice” is not aﬀected by
previous experiments.
The second approach to probability is the often called Bayesian. Prob-
ably its first systematic development was done by Laplace. This approach
associates the probability with a belief. One of the consequences of this
is that Bayesian inference uses systematically a posteriori probability
distributions to represent the belief of something being true after it has
occurred. For example, beforehand our belief of throwing a dice and ob-
taining a 4 is 1/6. However, if we know the dice has been in the possession
of a person specially good at gambling, we might increase or decrease my
belief in the likelihood of this event. Bayesian inference is also used to
state the likeliness of more abstract beliefs. For example, given a dice
that was never thrown it is not possible to speak of the probability of it
being fair in the frequency approach, but in the Bayesian one it is. If we
consider independent events occurring many times, such as the events
in a stationary process typically found in classical information theory,
both definitions are equivalent: the belief is likely to correspond to the
frequency approach.
Contrary to the Bayesian approach, in Llogic probabilities are not asso-
ciated with beliefs; events in the past region do not have a probability
because a past event cannot occur. Therefore, considering the probability
of their occurrence simply does not make sense. The notion most similar
to a Bayesian a posteriori distribution is the necessity value when the
event is in the past region. Within Llogic, probabilities only represent
a certain frequency measurement: if we run this experiment n times the
probability of getting this event is the number of times we estimate it
occurred divided by n.
However, in a story events do not occur many times, which rules out the
possibility of estimating causes from statistical measures. The implicit
assumption of the Trama model is that Bayesian inference should only
be applied to processes in which events occur repeatedly. For example, if
a story had to occur many times, the occurrence of one particular event
in such story could be determined in terms of frequency of occurrence.
In such case one could define a Bayesian belief, and a definition of causal
relation based on probabilities. Such kind of definitions and the one pro-
posed in the Trama model would converge on repeated and independent
instances of the same story, but within 1 instance of a story definitions of
causality based on probability cannot apply simply because probability
cannot be defined.
Contrary to the Bayesian approach, in the Trama model an event can
have an undetermined probability associated with it. For example, an
event with possibility 1 and necessity 0 can occur, but the probability of
its occurrence can have any value between these 2. In addition, contrary
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Figure B.1: a Hasse diagram expressing the divisible relation within the factors
of 12
to what is often considered when estimating probabilities, in a story -and
in the everyday world- events are not independent.The way we proposed
the Trama model and the Llogic relations among events diﬀers from
probabilistic approaches in a fundamental aspect: in how uncertainty is
understood. Just as possibility theory was opposed to probability theory
as an alternative method to represent uncertainty (Zadeh, 1978), Llogic
is an alternative to probabilities for representing causal relations.
As a result of this, a causal relation is understood as a logical property
which, because of how we understand uncertainty, can be implemented
in a physical model. It is the fit with a physical model that allows for
the introduction of statistical measures. Therefore, from diﬀerent causes
that would be logically possible, we can determine which, according to
statistics, is the most likely. Under such approach, logical and statistical
definitions of “causal inference” are not exclusive, but suddenly become
complementary.
b.2 elements of lattice theory
In the Trama model we have shown the relations among the events with
Hasse diagrams, which are a compact form of representing directed acyc-
lic graphs. In this section we introduce some notions of lattice theory that
are useful to describe relations among elements of acyclic directed graphs.
In following sections we will use these results to show how Llogic can
be used to determine causal relations among events in a non-stationary
process.
Consider a set of elements and a partial order relation ‘’. A typical
case is the factors of a natural number, ordered by their division re-
lation. For example, consider the universe W to be the factors of 12:
W ⌘ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12}. Such elements have ordered relations. For ex-
ample, 12 is divisible by 6, and by 4, but 6 is not divisible by 4. This
can be depicted as a directed graph among the numbers 12, 6, 4, 3, 2, 1,
but a simpler representation can be given with a Hasse diagram, such as
in figure B.1. Contrary to directed graphs, such representation assumes
reflexivity (8a, a  a) and associativity (a  b and b  c implies a  c),
which are always true for the kind of relations considered here.
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A partial order is a lattice if there is a least upper bound and a greatest
lower bound for any two elements. These are called the join and the meet,
and are generally denoted with the signs ‘_’ and ‘^’. However, to avoid
confusion with how such signs are used in Llogic, to use them in the
context of partial order theory we will write ‘ _
p.o.
’ and ‘
p^.o.
’. For example,
in relation to the factors of 12, these are true statements:
‘6^ 4 ⌘ 2
p.o.
’ , ‘6_ 4 ⌘ 12
p.o.
’, ‘3_ 2 ⌘ 6
p.o.
’
Intuitively, we can think the meaning of ‘
p^.o.
’ is diﬀerent from the mean-
ing of‘^’ as used in Llogic. ‘
p^.o.
’ denotes the element common to both
factors, and ‘_
p.o.
’ the element containing both. Also, both operators have
diﬀerent properties. For example, in lattices meets and joins are always
commutative, while in Llogic ‘_’ and ‘^’ are not.
Partial order theory tells that if the number of elements is finite, it is
a lattice. If there is a unique upper and lower bound, it is a bounded
lattice. In the previous example, the upper and lower bounds would be
the elements 12 and 1, respectively. They are often denoted as I and
O, or top and bottom. By taking a bounded lattice and inverting the
bottom and top element as well as all the order relations one gets the
complementary lattice, in which all the joins become meets and viceversa.
The complement of an element ‘a’ is ‘b’ if it satisfies a _ b ⌘ I
p.o.
and
a ^ b ⌘ O
p.o.
. This complement does not need to be unique. For example,
in figure B.2 the element ‘d’ has 2 complements. A complemented lattice
is a bounded lattice where all elements are complemented, such as in
figure B.2. The pseudo-complement of ‘a’ is ‘b’ if ‘b’ satisfies a ^ b ⌘ O
p.o.
and is the unique greatest element with this property. This is not a
proper complement because a _ b ⌘ I
p.o.
does not in general hold. Another
diﬀerence with the complement is that the pseudo-complement has to be
unique. The sign for pseudo-complement of ‘a’ is generally ‘¬a’ but, as
we are already using this sign with a diﬀerent meaning, we will use ¬
p.o.
.
A surprising property of this operator is that the principle of the third
excluded does not always hold. This means ¬¬a
p.o.
is not the same as a
(for example, see figure B.3). However, ¬¬¬a ⌘ ¬a
p.o.
is in general true. A
pseudo-complemented lattice is one for which any element has a pseudo-
complement. This is not satisfied for all bounded lattices. For example,
B.3 is pseudo-complemented, but B.4 is not, despite it is complemen-
ted. If a pseudo-complemented lattice satisfies the principle of the third
excluded for all its elements, then it is also a complemented lattice.
Finally, using the meet, join and pseudo-complement as operators, the
intuitionistic implication ‘)
p.o.
’ is generally defined as (Rutherford & Ed-
win, 1965):
[a) b] , [a ^ ¬a  b]
p.o.
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Figure B.2: a Hasse diagram showing a complemented bounded lattice. In par-
ticular, the element d has two complements: c and h. As there is
no knowledge about whether c is greater than h or viceversa, the
complement is not unique.
Figure B.3: a Hasse diagram corresponding to the knowledge of: b  c  f ; b 
d  e  f . The pseudo-complement of d is c. However, the pseudo-
complement of c is not d, it is e.
.
The important point here is that if the pseudo-complement exists, then
this implication operator can be defined. In figure B.3 you could say, for
example, d) f
p.o.
, because d ^ ¬d
p.o.
 f .
b.3 inferring causes across 3 levels of description
b.3.1 Causes in a logical description are pseudo-complemented lattices
Consider sequences of events in a logical description, where sequences are
only declared, but not quantified with possibility and necessity values.
At this level of description we are not taking into account uncertainty
and estimation, only temporal orders. For example, consider 3 sequences
declared as:
S1:a.b.c. f .
S2:b.d.e.h.
S3: b.d.
IF e THEN f
IF NOT(e) THEN g.
h.
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Figure B.4: the Hasse diagram of a lattice that is not pseudo-complemented.
In particular, the element d has as pseudo-complement candidates
the elements c or h. As there is no knowledge about whether c is
greater than h or viceversa, there is no unique pseudo-complement
candidate, and therefore the lattice is not pseudo-complemented.
Intuitively, it can be considered these events are facts, this is, past events,
and the 3 sequences to have occurred simultaneously. It can also be con-
sidered that the 3 sequences correspond to diﬀerent exposures to en-
vironments in which similar events occurred, it does not really make a
diﬀerence. Such 3 sequences can be represented either as separate Hasse
diagrams, either as a combined Hasse diagram expressing all the order
relations, such as can be seen in figure B.5.
In the Trama model, any event ‘x’ has a context ‘x⇤’ -at least the default
implicit one, K. When we addressed a preestablished story, the cause
‘x⇤⇤’ of an event was established systematically. External events did not
have a known cause, and therefore their occurrence had to be estimated.
For internal ones, the cause was the immediately preceding event in the
logical description. This was considered systematically, regardless of its
psychological realism.
However, if instead of assuming a cause with a systematic rule we want
to infer it, the Llogic operators can be used to establish the most likely
cause given several sequences of events. To be able to predict the oc-
currence of an event ‘x’, an agent exposed to its occurrence needs to,
first, determine in which context it can occur. Then, it should try to
determine a unique element which, if found, would imply the event must
occur. This will be considered the cause. For example, we expect pressing
a light button will cause the light to turn on, but we assume implicitly
some contextual elements, such as that there is electricity in the building.
The inference of the cause can be done systematically by building dif-
ferent partial orders from the experienced sequences of events. Because
all events have a context and only some have a cause, given an event ‘x’
to find its context ‘x⇤’ and its cause ‘x⇤⇤’ it is enough to identify the
elements common to all sequences of events where the event occurs. For
example, consider the element h in figure B.5 . It occurs in S2 and S3,
but not in S1. Therefore, the cause of h has to be some element present
in S2 and S3, but not in S1. Therefore b, d and e are candidates to form
h⇤ and h⇤⇤.
The cause and the context must occur previously to the actual event,
but do not need necessarily to share particular temporal relations among
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Figure B.5: At the left the Hassse diagrams of 3 separated sequences of events.
At the right, a diagram of the 3 partial orders merged. Note the
Hasse diagram corresponding to S2 is already implicit in S3. Con-
trary to this, the Hasse diagram of S1 is not, so the combined
diagram is diﬀerent from the one representing only the partial or-
ders involved in S3. Note also in a combined diagram the distinc-
tion between internal and external events is not conserved, because
such distinction is defined in the quantified description relative to
a particular sequence, and in the combined diagram we’ve created
a new logical description combining the 3 diﬀerent sequences.
them. In a logical description this is equivalent to find a pseudo-comple-
mented lattice with the element x as top (I), the default context K as
bottom (O), and 2 branches: 1 with all the elements of the context x⇤,
and 1 with the cause x⇤⇤. This lattice should be implicit in all the lattices
involving x, in the same way S2 is implicit in S3. In such construction,
the cause is the pseudo-complement of all and each of the elements of
the context. This can be expressed as:
¬
p.o.
x⇤ ⌘ x⇤⇤
The previous implies the intuitionistic implication relates the event with
its cause. Because the context and the cause of an event will never occur
after the event, it is true by construction that:
x⇤
p^.o.
¬x⇤⇤
p.o.
x
From the definition of intuitionistic implication, it follows that the cause
will allways imply the event. In other terms, it is always true that:
x⇤⇤)
p.o.
x
Overall, what these mathematical statements are saying is that, given
several occurrences of an event, if one can establish unequivocally a
pseudo-complemented lattice of previous events that predicts the occur-
rence of the event, this means that the event has a cause which is unique.
Moreover, the cause and the the context will involve disjoint sets of ele-
ments, and the cause will pseudo-complement the elements of the context.
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Figure B.6: From the sequences of events depicted in B.5, there are only two
lattices that can be built as candidates to explain the occurrence
of h.
It might also be relevant to note that not having a cause for an event is
equivalent to only have a context: in this particular sense, the context is
the (intuitionistic) negation of the cause (¬
p.o.
x⇤ ⌘ x⇤⇤).
In the previous example, given the 3 sequences of events as depicted in
figure B.5, to define the cause h⇤⇤ and the context h⇤ the only 2 possible
lattices with such properties are the ones in figure B.6. To determine
which is the most likely cause and context between these lattice candid-
ates, we must look into how well they can be used as predictors. This
can only be done in a quantified description
b.3.2 Causes in a quantified description minimize surprise
If we consider relations among events not only from their order con-
straints, but also with their possibility and necessity values, we are doing
a quantified description. At this level of description, a general criterion to
determine the pseudo-complemented lattice that better predicts the oc-
currece of an event is to find out which candidate minimizes the surprise,
this is, the self-information or “unexpected occurrence" of an event. The
self-information of an event e is defined as: I(e) = p(e) ⇤ log(1/p(e)).
Consider an event ‘x’ with a context ‘x⇤’ and a cause ‘x⇤⇤’. Their possib-
ility and necessity values will be related by their definitions:
• In a logical description, the context x⇤ is a chain such as x⇤ ⌘
K ^ x1 ^ x2 ^ ... ^ xn, with tx⇤  tx relative to a time measure. In
a quantified description we know pos(x) := nec(K ^ x1 ^ x2 ^ x3 ^
...^ xn).
• Reciprocally, in a logical description the cause x⇤⇤ is an event
among a set of possible events: x⇤⇤ ⌘ xn+1 _ xn+2 _ ... _ xm, and
it also satisfies tx⇤⇤  tx. In a quantified description, we know
nec(x) := pos(xn+1 _ ..._ xm).
In the previous definition, the cause will be a unique element if there
is a single pseudo-complemented lattice that minimizes the surprise of
the event x. To interpret it intuitively, consider a dynamic environment.
While the elements involved in the context of x do not occur, pos(x) = 0,
which implies the probability of x is null: p(x) = 0. This implies the
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surprise is null. Once the elements in the context of x occur, then the
occurrence of the cause will tend to maximize the necessity of x, which in
turn will agan minimize surprise. In this model surprise will be maximal
when the estimation of the likeliness the cause occurred is 0.5.
In summary: in a quantified description, if we can characterize the context
and the cause of an event, we will be able to predict the occurrence of the
event with minimal surprise. Therefore, the best way to characterize the
cause in a quantified description is to find which pseudo-complemented
lattice is associated with a minimal surprise.
b.3.3 Causes in an instantiated description match statistical estimation
An instantiated description matches the previous logical relations with a
physical system. It therefore relates all the previous variables and para-
meters with physical mechanisms. It is through this physical embodiment
that the dynamics of change of the possibility and necessity values are
determined. For example, in the case of stories embodied in an EBN, the
physical embodiment consists in creating a set of competence modules
for the diﬀerent actions involved, to also consider the actions as physical
resources to be used in the context of cooperation among agents, and to
control the spreading of the possibility and necessity values through the
activation spreading mechanisms of the agent. In the story model, the
way the instantiated description was defined was based on the equation:
nec(x⇤⇤)   1  t  Tmin
Tmax   Tmin
This was defined in this way in order to control the occurrence of each
event by fixing 2 arbitrary temporal boundaries (Tmin, Tmax), and there-
fore give a simple and intuitive method to control the pace at which
the interactive story unfolded. However, this function can be extracted
from any physical value. For example, if we wanted to characterize the
dynamics of a causal relation provoked by a chemical reaction, the pos-
sibility and necessity values would be updated from the characterization
of the dynamics of the chemical reaction. In other terms: the statistical
properties of the causal relation would be the same than the statistical
properties of the chemical reaction.
Overall, the argument of Goetz (1998), stating that decision-making in
behaviour networks is equivalent to pattern recognition can be compared
with what we have tried to show in this section: EBNs using the Trama
model to make decisions can also be exploited to infer the causes and the
context of an event. The agent would learn to achieve its goals taking
into account such causal relations to minimize surprise: it would use its
prediction on how the environment would react to its actions to decide
what to do. The result would be an agent that would learn in which
particular contexts certain events should be expected and how to trigger
them. It would be to internalize a series of causal schemas and use such
patterns to improve its eﬃciency within its context, much as we adapt
the impedance of an electrical or mechanical device to connect well its
environment.
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b.4 situated agents that learn how to coordinate
their behaviour
A particularly interesting application scenario of the previous is when a
situated agent uses these 3 steps of causal inference to learn to perform
a task. In this application scenario, the physical embodiment to consider
is a sensorimotor loop matching the perception of the cause and the
consequence in the behaviour of the agent. In such a loop, it is always
possible to adjust the dynamics of the possibility and necessity values
with techniques based on statistical learning. Usually, machine learning
involves the adjustment of one or more statistical parameters to optimize
a behaviour according to some success measure. For example, an agent
moving a robotic arm can adjust the temporal dynamics of the arm
movement to hit a ball and maximize the likelihood the ball is going in
a particular direction. In this view, the physical embodiment of a causal
relation determined in a quantified description could be adjusted so the
practical eﬀectivity of this perception/action relation is maximized.
Situated agents were introduced in Artificial Intelligence (AI) because
agents based on formal plans were not practical. Any small possible
runtime change had to be stated beforehand in the plan. This made
the programming an overwhelming challenge. This might be the reason
why EBN do not deal with plans: because not using plans was the initial
motivation to introduce situated agents. On the other side, the way plans
and stories have been introduced here is diﬀerent to how they were used
in classic AI. In everyday life, when working with real actors, writers do
not have to specify each detail of the actions performed by the actors.
Rather, they state the essential events that must occur in order each actor
can impersonate his character as he feels it, and collectively maintain the
coherence of the overall plot. Consistently, we consider a story as a plan
that several agents intend to achieve in coordination. The achievement of
the plan relies on the skills of the situated agents to improvise solutions
as they go and their ability to coordinate them. The approach developed
here does a similar job, but integrating real people and artificial situated
agents.
On a larger spectrum, video-game industry uses situated agents to deal
with the uncertainty introduced by the participants’ behaviour. In such
cases, there is a necessary compromise between the observed realism of
the motion and the detailed control over it (for a review, see Welbergen
et al. (2009)). It seems the present method could be used as a guide
to plan the actions to be rendered and therefore help reaching a better
appearance of realism while conserving the real time control over the
animation rendered. Situated agents are also largely used in academic
research to show macroscopic phenomena can be explained as the result
of large-scale interaction from simple rules defined at the individual level.
This tendency ranges from neuroscience (for example, Purves & Boots
(2006)) to ethology (for example, Beltran et al. (2006)).
However, in situated agents local behaviour is rarely shaped by global
constraints, such as a coordinated plan (we do not know of any case).
Because situated agents are constantly adapting their behaviour to their
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environment, it is generally diﬃcult to predict the long-term outcome of
their behaviour, even less expect they can achieve a complicated plan
such as a story as stated in a movie script. This limitation has already
been pointed in the cognitive science community, and in particular when
attempting to characterize the mechanisms by which we integrate sensory
and motor information. We know how perception-action loops achieve
optimal decision-making in relatively simple and local domains (Körding
& Wolpert, 2004; Kober & Peters, 2009). However, it is acknowledged
the performance of complicated tasks involving coordinated actions is
a challenge that seems hard to solve with current probabilistic models
(Wolpert, 2007). In section 9.4.4 we have argued the Trama model can
be used to improve how motor coordination and decision-making based
on sensorimotor loops is modelled. We now try to show how these skills
can be learnt. We describe this as a process of cause inference within
an instantiated description such as an EBN.
It would seem that using the 3 steps outlined previously one can discover
particular sequences of actions that optimize the likelihood of achieving
a goal involving complicated sequences of actions. This could be used to
improve the state of the art in current machine learning techniques.
In this view, an artificial agent using such method could learn what action
to do and with what intensity in order to obtain a particular eﬀect. This
could be used to extend results of motor coordination in robots (Kober
& Peters, 2009) or to give a better account of how sensorimotor control
is achieved in humans (Körding & Wolpert, 2004). Be it implemented
in a situated agent with skills to sense and to act, such method might
give an artificial agent with the ability to learn new skills by inferring
causal relations between actions triggered and consequences it wants to
achieve on the basis of a trial and error method. We previously said we
coined such process of causal inference internalization. If it turned out
that we can combine this process with statistical learning in order to use
it in a situated agent at a behavioural level, then the meaning of this
term would turn out to be quite similar with the meaning Vygotsky gave
to internalization, referring to the process of skill acquisition (Vygotsky,
1964; Vygotsky et al. , 1978). As an example, we review the use of this
causal inference model in the context of a particular machine learning
technique: Reinforcement Learning (RL). However, this is just an ex-
ample, in principle the method could also work with other techniques of
statistical learning.
RL has been shown as an alternative to Bayesian Learning particularly
useful for robots learning to behave. Kober & Peters (2009) have shown
that giving only one example of behaviour and applying RL methods, a
robotic arm can learn behaviours which ask for advanced coordination
skills. In this context, RL methods consist in some policy to optimize
the output of a reward function within a sensorimotor loop. A policy
is to choose between some actions according to some reward measure.
A spectacular example of the capacity of such a system is to learn to
do correctly the “Ball-in-a-cup” game, in which the player has a cup
attached to a rope which has, at the other end, a ball in the end. The
player has to put the ball in the cup by simply moving the cup. Here,
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the action space is a continuous space made of the rotations of the seven
articulations of the robotic arm, and to be able to solve the problem a
specially eﬃcient method to explore this space and find optimal solutions
needs to be implemented.
The Trama model seems specially suited for this purpose. Already Dorer
(2004) indicated that extended behaviour networks (EBN) could be ad-
apted to work with statistical learning techniques such as RL. This would
work by having an adaptative parameter within one or more of the com-
petence modules forming a EBN. In the jargon of EBN, a competence
module is a way to encapsulate a skill: it is what triggers a certain beha-
viour, and it has some “expected eﬀects”, this is, fuzzy-value probabilities
associated with a certain action. It is this expected eﬀect that combines
with the diﬀerent conditions of the goals and the preconditions of the
competence modules to decide what behaviour should be chosen. In ad-
dition, the Trama model adds planning skills to EBN. These plans are
declared as sets of causally related events, but they are processed within
the architecture of EBN as any other event. Therefore, the integration
would be quite simple: it would simply consist in optimizing each of the
policies within a competence module, and then these competence mod-
ules would integrate naturally within the Trama model to do a complex
sequence of actions. However, these expected eﬀects can be learnt at real
time, and within the Tramamodel, a particular action space, such as the
one from the ball-in-a-cup example, would be a particular action within
a sequence of complex actions.
Translating this in the RL terminology, what is being done is splitting
the reward function and the motivation to perform an action. In RL the
policy is chosen so as the action performed maximizes a reward. Using
RL within EBN, the reward function would only be used to estimate
the probability of the expected eﬀect. This expected eﬀect would be
considered within all the goals and all the actions the agent has available.
Therefore, in each competence module an RL device could be set, but the
decision to which action perform would be done weighting all competence
modules, as usual in EBN. More concretely, consider a EBN module
defined like:
MODULE:
2 IF Percept ion1 AND Percept ion2
THEN doAction1
4 EFFECT Percept ion3 p //p i s the expec ted p r o b a b i l i t y o f
g e t t i n g Percept ion3
In such module, the RL would find out exactly how to do Action1. In
the previous example, Action1 would be put the ball in the cup. The ball
being in the cup would be Perception3, and the probability p would be the
long term reward. The Trama model extends EBN and introduces the
possibility of considering complicated sequences of actions. Within one
or several modules the RL would find the probability of an eﬀect after
performing an action, combining several modules as in the Trama model
would allow integrating naturally complex actions. The only assumption
done is that the sequence of actions is known. In EBN terminology, the
Preconditions and Resources of a module are established and fixed a
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priori. But the steps defined in the previous sections provide precisely
this: a method to find a sequence of events that can be embedded in a
physical device such as a robot using EBN and RL.
b.5 towards a different mathematical theory of com-
munication
b.5.1 Introduction
One of the main result of this work is the introduction of artificial agents
that are able to process stories in complex environments, which are pro-
cessed like coordination plans among diﬀerent agents. The events that
form stories have context-dependent causal relations in a world with un-
certainty where agents have several goals and skills. However, in this
appendix, we have shown that causes can also be inferred, much like in
everyday communication we find what people want from how they be-
have, or from what they say. It has already been shown that this kind of
feature can be achieved with usual machine learning techniques on spe-
cific domains. For example, one can build a computer program that can
infer a complex mental state from the dynamics of facial expressions, or
from body motion (El Kaliouby & Robinson, 2004; Bernhardt & Robin-
son, 2007). However, it would seem that using the mechanism of causal
inference previously outlined within a communicative situation, a ma-
chine could be able to determine a goal that would be associated with an
action. This could maybe aproximate the everyday and automatic mech-
anism by which we find out what people want from what they say, or how
they behave. This is, the process of inferring implicatures. In this section
we will outline how the formalism of cause inference developed so far
would do this in an everyday scenario involving natural communication.
b.5.2 Review of the formalism
To summarize the formalism used we go back to Grice’s example in-
troduced in chapter 3 to see how it could be processed as part of an
interactive story within such an architecture. Consider again:
A is standing by an obviously immovilized car.
B aproaches him.
A says “I am out of petrol”.
B says “There is a garage around the corner”.
The previous sequence has 5 actions, that we call a.b.c.d.e. Consider 2
agents, each of them able to perform the actions of one of the two roles,
and a human participant embodied in a Zelig character which can either
choose one of the roles, either remain passive.
An agent assuming the role of B will consider A assumed by another
artificial agent or a human participant. When parsing the story, it will
create a goal having as a relevance condition K and as goal condition
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ATP. It will also add to the actions involved in the plot their contexts as
preconditions and their causes as resources needed. As expected eﬀects, it
will have ATP, despite only the execution of the last action will actually
satisfy this ATP condition.
Then, on the decisional procedure, when it will be considering if it has
to perform the last action e, apart from preconditions and resources due
to the particularities of the action, the agent will consider the cause of e
to be e⇤⇤ ⌘ d, and the context the cultural background K plus the other
previous event in the plot its context: K ^ a ^ b ^ c. To decide if he has
to perform e, when he reaches the module that can trigger it, he will do
the following:
• It will calculate the executability, which consists in consider at what
extent the preconditions are satisfied: tp(Pre, s). As one of the pre-
conditions is its context, this step involves checking if the actions of
its context have been triggered. This will determine pos(e) relative
to its context, and only allow to go further once d has occurred, this
is, has a high necessity value according to what can be estimated
from the behaviour of another agent or a human participant.
• It will take into account the relevance of performing such an action.
In the case of an action involved in a story, performing an action
has to contribute to the satisfaction of a goal with goal condition
ATP. As the expected satisfaction of this condition will be of 1,
and the relevance condition of the goal will be K, the activation of
the module to perform such an action -what in EBN is equivalent
to motivation- will be high.
• It will check if he has the resources needed. This implies considering
if its cause has occurred. In other terms, it will check nec(e), which
by the definition of a cause is: nec(e) := pos(e⇤⇤) ⌘ pos(d). In
virtue of the substitution principle pos(d) ⌘ pos(dZ _ dA) and
therefore nec(e) = max(dZ, dA), which reads: estimate if the Zelig
character did action d or the agent assuming role A and take the
more likely.
• Finally, again because of the Zelig metaphor it will check if the
Zelig character performed e. If so, it will assume the action has
occurred with a necessity of the likeliness estimated. Otherwise it
will actually perform it taking into account who is more likely to
have performed the previous action.
• It will move to consider its next competence module, this is, an-
other of its behaviours, which might be triggered simultaneously or
succesively.
This shows a practical way in which an artificial agent can make appropri-
ate decisions about what action it should do, by characterizing contexts
and context within environments where the probability of occurrence of
events changes through time. An agent equipped with skills to estimate
the actions done by other agents and human participants could in fact
appear to understand the causal relations among events in an interactive
situation.
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As we said at the beginning of this section, in the perspective of classical
information theory the action e was independent from its predecessors,
and therefore its occurrence could not be related with it. Moreover, as
having a gas station nearby would be a true statement in this context,
and as it is known that logical truths of propositional logic do not carry in-
formation (Bremer, 2003), it would seem such an event does not carry in-
formation! The solution adopted in theTramamodel involves causes and
contexts that change the probability of occurrence of the events through
time. Therefore, the information is associated with the performance of
the action itself, independently of the truth of the sentence conveyed by
the action. This has the advantage that such a system is insensitive to
the fact of being used in a virtual or a real environment.
In addition, it seems to formalize quite well the inferential model of
communication, which appeared as a criticism of classical information
theory, and from which the previous is a classical example. This suggests
that the formalism outlined throughout this work might capture some
of the aspects of the inferential model of communication as outlined in
chapter 3. In next section we discuss some of these aspects
b.5.3 Inferring Implicatures
In everyday communication, the establishment of causal relations such
as implicatures systematically imply the existence of hidden variables:
goals and intentions are never accessible to the specific experience. The
estimation of the likeliness of a persons’ goal is not only based on what
he most frequently wants when he performs a particular action. The
estimation process is also aﬀected by the context at hand: what was said
just before, the social context, and so on.
If the Trama model formalizes the inferential communication model, an
agent should be able to establish such implicatures taking into account
the most likely goals of the other agents at the light of their actions.
Consider again the example outlined in previous section. The last reply
by B “There is a garage around the corner ” is clearly relevant and shows
the willing to cooperate. But consider the two sentences that A and
B say. It is clear that the events they describe are independent: the
likeliness of running out of gas does not depend with the distance we are
from a garage. Therefore, in usual information theory there is no way to
relate their occurrence. Moreover, the fact of running out of gas does not
change the probability of having a gas station near or far. This is what
is normally called stationarity: the probability p(x) of having a certain
event x does not vary through time: p(x, t) ⌘ p(x). Even more, it is
known (Bremer, 2003) that true propositions such as There is a garage
around the corner do not carry information! And still, the information
B provides seems to be related with what A said, and relevant to the
context depicted.
Moreover, it is likely that if B was asked why he did say the gas station
was round the corner he would answer something like because A told me
he had run out of has. So, in some way what A said provoked the ac-
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tion performed by B. This kind of causal relation is normally called an
implicature in language theory. It depends on having a general, shared
and mutually understood context, such as A is standing by an obviously
immobilized car. The first property of a story is that the elements con-
stituting it have to be causally-related, but the kind of causal relation is
often of this kind. Therefore, causal inference under the Trama model
should also cover this case. Is it the case? It is if we place ourselves in a
quantified description, and assume actions are goal based. Then, a situ-
ated agent can infer how likely is one or another goal in order to satisfy
such quantification.
In the Trama model, finding the cause of an event implies to -first- de-
termine the context e⇤ and -second- determine the cause e⇤⇤. Once the
context and the cause of an event are established, the occurrence of the
event itself can have a high relevance associated to it, but its occurrence
probability will also be close to 1, which implies a very low information
value. We have shown in section B.3 that this was equivalent to find a
pseudo-complemented lattice that minizes surprise. The diﬀerence here
is that in a conversation the cause might not be an event, but rather a
goal internal to the participant. Therefore, to formalize such principle an
agent needs to be able to estimate the relevance of performing an action
from the perspective of the other participant. But this is exactly what
happens when we apply the Substitution principle: an agent assumes the
role of someone else. Maybe the same mechanism can be adapted for
this new purpose. In this purpose, instead of assuming a certain role if it
seems relevant given the context, what the listener would do is assume
the action performed by the speaker is relevant, and from this estimate
its goals and their relative importance that would explain better its ac-
tions. Therefore, a Generalized Substitution principle can formalize
the second principle of relevance theory.
In virtue of the application of a principle of Generalized Substitution,
agent B could have estimated that, if he had been in the role of A, the
most likely cause for A to express a lack of petrol is to actually want
more. In addition to this, if a sequence such as "Go to the gas station.
Put petrol. Have a full reservoir." was known to him in the form of a
small story as part of a set of causal relations, then the relevant action
to choose would be precisely the one in the story: inform about the
proximity of a gas station. In this way agent B can find out what agent
A wants from what agent A says, in a process that looks similar to what
is generally described as mind-reading. Such Tramabot would not only
be able of finding out how to achieve its goals from the inference of causal
relations: it would also be able to find out the goals of other people.
In this outline, an agent can only determine the goals of other agents if he
is already familiar with it, this is, if those goals are already within an in-
ternal list of possible goals. Correspondingly, if we want artificial agents
that learn from example to recognize what a person wants, we would
most probably need artificial agents with goals similar to our internal
motivations, and the ability to perform actions that can be identified as
similar to ours. Note this also happens in natural communication: we
find out much better what people mean or what they want if we are with
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people we know well or have interests similar to ours. The study of nat-
ural communication in pragmatics litterature names this "mind-reading"
skills. The expression in folk psychology is also telling: understanding
"the others viewpoint". Machines imitating such skills could significantly
improve human machine interaction. Note this scenario where A and B
are artificial agents might seem a science-fiction scenario if we imagine
them as robots moving and acting, but quite near to reality if we imagine
B as a typical GPS based electronic map guide commonly known as Tom
Tom. With such principles of communication, an agent such as the Tom
Tom would decide to display the information of the gas station without
request, only by finding out giving this information is relevant in this
context.
Summarizing: under some assumptions, by applying the Generalized
Substitution principle , an agent could find out what is the most likely
goal a person might have to act as she did in the context the agent per-
ceives she was. Overall, it seems the Trama model formalizes appropri-
ately some aspects of the inferential communication model. Implemented
in a Tramabot, such agent could estimate the cause and the goals that
seem to motivate a particular action using information and relevance
measures to give quantitative validity to such inferences.
b.5.4 Acquiring Communicative Competence
If such formalism can be used to infer implicatures, it might also be pos-
sible to internalize such implicatures, much in the same way physical
causes can be internalized. The acquisition of Communicative Compet-
ence is the process of learning how to perform in order to communicate.
Stories have shown of crucial importance for competence acquistion on
linguistic domains. They are a way of ordering information, they reflect
goals and plans and help establishing causal relations within the cog-
nitive development of children, which then have consequences in their
behaviour. As a child acquires Communicatve Competence, he will pro-
gressively shift from imitative actions as saying “water!”, “food!”, etc. to
more complex constructions, ending eventually with constructions as “Ex-
cuse me, I would like a glass of water, please”, or other complicated gram-
matical constructions that respond to the same central goal but integrate
secondary goals (for example, conforming to social principles).
Although theorizing about the process of acquiring grammatical com-
mand in natural language has been dominated by generative linguistics,
in the last years it has repeatedly been said that this approach is not
consistent with empirical data. In recent years, alternative approaches
has received considerable interest, and there is work showing that it is
possible to articulate a theory of competence acquisition based on imita-
tion combined with the development of mental schemas (see, for example,
Tomasello (2003)). The idea is that language grammar would come pro-
gressively by learning how to relate the performance of diﬀerent chunks
of language with real-world contexts and consequences, and progressivel
use these chunks of language and their combinations. There is starting
to be experimental evidence this describes accurately how kids acquire
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grammatical knowledge (Bannard et al. , 2009). This seems to corres-
pond quite clearly with the old notion of internalization as a means to
acquire communicative competence (Vygotsky, 1964). For example, one
learns how to ride a bycicle by seeing it and trying it, independently of
an understanding of how it works: you internalize what to do to get a
certain eﬀect. Similarly, one learns to use a word by determining in what
context and with what purpose someone else used it, and then shifts to
use it in order to get a certain eﬀect.
It might turn out that the acquisition of gramatical knowledge is done
in a way similar to how we discover plans with non-linear causal rela-
tions. In this view, the causal relation between a kid saying “water” in
certain context and him receiving a glass of water could be seen as an
example of “non-linear relation”. In this view, a sophisticated sentence
such as “Excuse me, I would like a glass of water, please” would be inter-
preted as a certain sequence of verbal actions that maximize the likeli-
ness of obtaining a desired eﬀect. Such sentence would be established by,
first, finding the right context and motivation in the form of a pseudo-
complemented lattice that minimizes surprise and, second, determining
the relative weights of the diﬀerent competence modules involved to max-
imize the expected eﬀect of performing the action. The more elaborate
construction would be favored, for example, with the goal of complying
with social rules.
As already said in the discussion, Empirical Range Theory considers that
perception evolves as an adaptative process: we perceive what we perceive
not because it matches an objective reality, but rather because it is well
adapted to our context. On simple examples, this evolutionary tendency
has been shown compatible with simulation with artificial agents (Purves
& Boots, 2006). But what happens when we are exposed to dynamic
and non-linear environments? The best way to adapt behaviourally to a
complex environment might be to have a complex representation of it. In
other terms, an agent can be seen as an entity with perception and action
skills surrounded by a non-linear environment that changes through time.
Therefore, a way to study the acquisition of communicative competence
is to consider a cognitive system as a non-linear time-varying system that
adapts to the environment in order to achieve better its goals.
b.5.5 Validation and limits of inferring implicatures in the Trama
model
Overall, it would seem the Trama model and the Llogic operators give a
formal account of the inferential communication model, and can account
some of the phenomena that occur in the acquisition of communicat-
ive competence. Mathematically, the Llogic operators can express the
relations among stationary processes and independent events as well as
among non-stationary processes and non-independent ones, and they can
relate the occurrence of such events with goals and decisions within com-
plex systems. It seems the formalism introduced can be used to describe
causal relations in interactive environments, how such causal relations
can shape behaviour within complex domains. The importance of stor-
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ies for the cognitive development would be explained with quantitative
predictions.
The best way to validate such communication mechanisms is to create
an artificial agent with goals for which he must interact with its envir-
onment. If the environment at which the agent is exposed involves other
agents interacting with him, this would allow the automatic construction
of cognitive grammars. For example, if a robot can learn that by smil-
ing when humans look at him it is more likely the humans will smile,
whenever one of his goals involves make humans smile it will facilitate
such behaviour whenever it detect the context “humans are looking at
me”. The same principle applies to goals such as “get a glass of water”.
This means a Tramabot with skills to would learn how to use a partic-
ular verbal action in a particular situation, and doing so only by giving
some examples, this is, performing those actions a small amount of times.
It would be much like the way you show a kid to use a new word by giving
some examples. Such a learning process would result in artificial agents
learning spontaneously to react to particular verbal actions in particular
ways, but only in particular contexts and in accordance to their goals.
Does this mean building machines with understanding? It would seem
with such causal inference mechanism a situated agent can learn in what
context it must do a certain action to obtain a certain eﬀect. Such asser-
tion has to be validated empirically: the easiest way to prove an artificial
agent can find the good context, the good temporal delays among actions
and reactions and the good intensity of performing an action is to build
an artificial agent that does so. If this theory is right, the question is
not a philosophic or scientific one: it is a technical problem. What is at
stake is not only a new entertainment form such as interactive stories:
such agents could improve largely how machines interact with humans
in particular and with natural environments in general. Imagine a ro-
bot can learn spontaneously from few examples the diﬀerence between a
dangerous zone and a safe one and act according so. Such a behaviour
would show some level of understanding. Even more if those zones were
not physical spaces, but rather topics within a conversation. Such line of
research could also help understanding what makes an immersive virtual
environment a plausible one, something for which, when addressing inter-
action with virtual characters, there is a dramatic lack of an explanatory
theory.
On the other side, there is an important aspect of stories that the model
does not address: their meaning. It is known that classical information
theory is neutral regarding the semantics or significance of the symbols
transmitted. The Trama model also is. In cognitive sciences consider-
ations about representations are widespread in the literature, despite a
precise definition of such a notion remains elusive. If the formalization
of internalization outlined before turns out to fit with experimental res-
ults, it might also be possible to describe in a mathematical form how
“representations” are formed in the process of skill acquisition, and thus
characterize the “meaningful interpretation” that seems to go together
with being able to behave in a certain way or understand a certain story.
Despite the notions of natural category (Rosch, 1973; Rosch & Mervis,
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1975; Rosch, 1999) or conceptual metaphor (Lakoﬀ & Johnson, 1980)
allow for a reasonable account of semantics and its pragmatical use in
everyday speech, the lack of a formal definition of Natural Category is a
limiting factor when attempting to validate quantitatively the theory.
For example, Bannard et al. (2009) shows that taking as initial data a
large corps of language iterations one can build a Bayesian model that
predicts the grammatical knowledge of a 2 year old kid. Once it goes
further, the model is less good, but it greatly improves its quality if we
introduce the category noun and verb. This suggests kids after 2 have
internalized such natural categories, and they use them in their gram-
matical constructions. However, how such categories would be acquired
is not explained. The understanding of category formation in psychology
is nowadays relatively limited to general principles (Rosch, 1978). De-
tailed information on the formation of some particular categories might
be found in neuroscience. For example, to study how color discrimina-
tion is built we might find enough information in studies about how the
receptive fields of color discrimination are formed, and this can help in-
forming how we learn to recognize and associate this sensation with a
particular word or task. But for more abstract categories, we have no
clue.
For example, the definition of ‘story’ we’ve used is a particular natural
category (Stein, 1982): there can be better or worse examples of a story,
and we learn to recognize what a story is by being exposed to several
of them (Stein & Policastro, 1984). However, if we wanted to design an
algorithm able to discriminate stories from random sequences of events,
we would not really know where to start with.
On the other side, one can have indirect measures of the existence of
such natural categories. For the case of stories, if we can use Llogic to
determine the causal relations within a sequence of events, and represent
them through Hasse diagrams with a method such as the one depicted in
section B.3, measures on these graphs should predict the extent at which
people remember a story. If we consider the causal relations within a
sequence of events, we can introduce quantitative measures associated
with notions such as consistency and coherence of a story. Trabasso et al.
(1984) has shown that applying these measures to simple stories directly
correlates with the extent to which people remember the events and the
order in which they occurred within the story.
Therefore, we can only rely on an operational definition of natural cat-
egory, something like ‘a black box that takes any kind of input and gives an
output that corresponds to a label and a fuzzy value’. However, how these
categories are formed and if they can be built from the process of causal
inference described throughout this appendix is a question not answered
by the Trama model. To answer this question one would need to com-
pare the model with a mathematical theory of predication, something
characterizing how one generalizes abstract knowledge from concrete ex-
amples, or the process by which one can build internal representations
from everyday experience. But to my knowledge theories of knowledge
acquisition seem to be too descriptive of the data or too vague to allow
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for a quantitative comparison with a mathematical formalism such as
the one introduced in this work.

C
APPENDIX C : MATHEMATICAL SUMMARY
Logic s. The art of thinking and reasoning
in strict accordance with the limitations and
incapacities of the human misunderstanding
– Bierce (1996)
The reader may find below a summary of the notation and the main
mathematical notions discussed through the text, with pointers to the
relevant sections.
c.1 notation
The basic elements forming a story S are events. We denote them with:
• ‘e’, but also ‘a, b, c, ...’ or ‘x, y, z, ...’ or even ‘e1, e2, ...ei, ...’ These
variables are used to denote events, which are assumed to have
a finite time duration. Often, these events will be communicative
actions, and will be stated as propositions.
• ‘e⇤’ and ‘e⇤⇤’ should read as the context of ‘e’ and the cause of ‘e’.
• ‘te’ means the time in which e starts occurring.
• Occasionally, we need to make explicit the occurrence of an event
e is estimated with some evaluation function. In such case, we will
express it as eˆ, and consider such estimation a fuzzy value.
• Occasionally, we need to make explicit which agent triggers an
event. This is generally written eA or eB for an action performed by
agent A or B, or eZ for an action performed by the Zelig character,
this is, the human participant.
To express logical relations between events, we use:
• ‘.’ This sign is used to indicate a temporal relation between two
events. It indicates precedence but not in a strict sense: it can also
admit simultaneity, such as when one compares two values with
the operator “less or equal", this is, ‘’. Considering te1 and te2 as
the time in which the events e1 and e2 start occurring, [e1.e2] is
equivalent to state [te1  te2 ].
• ‘^’ This sign reads as ‘and’.
• ‘_’ This sign reads as ‘or’.
• ‘¬’. This sign reads as ‘not’
• ‘)’ This sign reads as ‘implies’.
Statements about logical relations between elements are named formulas.
To show relations between formulas, we use:
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• ‘⌘’ This sign is used to indicate a logical equivalence between two
formulas.
• ‘,’ This sign is used to indicate a definition. Read ‘equivalent by
definition
• ‘=’ This sign is used to indicate quantitative equality. Equivalence
applies between propositions, while equality applies to quantities.
• ‘:=’ This sign is used to indicate equality by assignment, just as
equality is used in any computer program. a := b is used as ‘we
assign the value of b to variable a’
• ‘[ ]’ This sign expresses a boolean condition. For example, in:
a := [tb  tc]
the term a can either be 1 or 0.
To associate stochastic variables with particular events, we also use par-
ticular functions:
• ‘p(a)’ or ‘prob(a)’ read as the probability of a.
• ‘pos(a)’ and ‘nec(a)’ should read as possibility and necessity of a.
In addition appendix B is intended to show that a situated agent can use
this formalism to infer causal relations from sensorimotor loops. For this
purpose we use lattice theory to show one can infer a causal relation if
it is represented a pseudo-complemented lattice that minimizes surprise.
To diﬀerentiate the logic relations among partial ordered elements char-
acteristic of lattice theory from the Llogic operators, we use a diﬀerent
notation when dealing with logical relations within partial orders. This
kind of notation is only used in appendix B. For example, when referring
to a conjunction of a and b within a partial order instead of ‘a ^ b’ we
write ‘a ^ b
p.o.
’.
c.2 llogic operators
Llogic has the particularity of being a logic defined in 3 steps. The state-
ment or declaration of a sequence is then quantified into an abstract rep-
resentation which in turns is embodied within a set of situated agents.
We now outline where these steps are specified.
c.2.1 Declaration of sequences
For two events e1, e2, stating them in a formula such as ‘e1.e2’ or such
as ‘IF e1 THEN e2’ assumes the starting times te1 , te2 satisfy te1  te2 .
Despite it is not much used throughout the text, it also applies to state-
ments such as e1 OR e2 (see section 7.2.3). In application scenarios where
there is learning, such declaration can be done in order to infer a causal
relation (see section 9.4 and appendix B). This level of specification of
relation among events, where there are only order constraints, is named
a logical description (see section 7.4.3).
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c.2.2 Quantification of logic relations
Once the sequence of events declared is parsed, we use Llogic operators
to relate the events among them (see section 7.4.3):
• AND (^): nec(a ^ b) , min(nec(a), nec(b)). Intuitively it can be
understood as meaning “and then”
• OR (_): pos(a _ b) , max(pos(a), pos(b)). Intuitively it can be
understood as meaning “or then”.
• IF _ THEN _ ()) : x ) y , nec(y) := pos(x). Such explicit
way of stating implication is only used when x is an external ele-
ment. Intuitively, it reads as “If x has possibly occurred, then y will
necessarily happen”.
• NOTP (¬): pos(¬(a, b, c)) , 1  max(pos(a), pos(b), pos(c)). In
particular, with the implication operator:
(¬(a, b, c)) d) ⌘ (nec(d) := 1  pos(a _ b _ c))
Contrary to more common logics, the negation applies over multiple
elements. Intuitively this operator can be understood as none of
these or, if referring to previous statements, none of the previous. In
logical terms, it works like a binding statement for a set of external
events: it imposes the set over which it applies is complemented
and therefore ensures that at least one of the consequences stated
in a block of IF x THEN y statements will occur.
Note that, because such quantification applies on sequences previously
declared, they do not behave exactly as usual logic operators. In partic-
ular:
• Associativity holds: for AND: (a ^ b) ^ c ⌘ a ^ (b ^ c), as well as
for OR.
• Commutativity does not hold: consider tp1 represents the triggering
time of p1. Then a statement like p1.p2 implies tp1  tp2 . Therefore,
the quantification of a formula such as a^ b does not tell anything
about a formula such as b ^ a.
When we want to consider specifically the abstract representation re-
lating the events with hte Llogic operators we speak of a quantified
description.
c.2.3 Dynamics
To establish the temporal dynamics between events we do an instanti-
ated description which “embodies’ a story representation in a physical
device, such as a robot or a virtual character controlled, for example,
by a decisional architecture named EBN (see sections 7.3.2 and 7.4.3).
This allows controling the dynamics of how possibility and necessity val-
ues spread through events related with the previous logic relations. To
determine this spreading, temporal intervals are considered, such as:
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• Tmin is the minimum delay that has to separate the occurrence of
an event from the occurrence of its cause.
• Tmax is the maximum delay that has to separate the occurrence of
an event from the occurrence of its cause.
Note, however, that the dynamics of a stochastic process can be specified
in many alternative ways. For example, in section 9.4.4 it is proposed a
story can be embodied within a computational simulation of a neural
system.
c.3 formal definitions
c.3.1 Events
The Trama model considers an event is described with a proposition and
is quantified in a possibility space. It has 2 fuzzy values associated, its
possibility pos(e) and its necessity nec(e) (Section 7.2.2). These values do
not have exactly the same meaning than in Possibility Theory. Section
9.3.3 contains a comparison of both with further mathematical detail.
The events forming a process can be related with the Llogic operators
(see section C.2). To do this, we must consider events also have a cause
and a context associated to them, and they can be internal or external,
as explained below.
c.3.2 Causes and Contexts
By definition, causes and contexts determine possibility and necessity
values (see sections 7.2.4 and 7.4.3). In addition, an event is considered
to be internal or external to a story S depending on whether its cause is
part or not of S. In particular, considering K the first event of a story:
• The context p⇤ of p is defined as:
p⇤ , K ^ p1 ^ p2 ^ ...^ pn
where
pos(p) := nec(K ^ p1 ^ p2 ^ p3 ^ ...^ pn)
and tp⇤  tp.
• Reciprocally, the cause p⇤⇤ is defined as:
p⇤⇤ , p1 _ p2 _ ..._ pn
where
nec(p) := pos(p1 _ ..._ pn)
and tp⇤⇤  tp.
Note in the previous definition a cause occurs before its consequence, but
there are no temporal dynamics specified, which have to be introduced
separately. How the dynamics are specified will depend on the kind of
process that the events are part of.
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c.3.3 Stories and Stochastic Processes
The Trama model defines a story S as a non-stationary stochastic pro-
cess constituted of causally related and goal-motivated events. This is
diﬀerent to to usual information theory, mainly focussed on stationary
processes.The diﬀerence can be stated formally with the definitions pre-
viously introduced. In particular, given a process P and an event e 2 P,
consider K the first event of a process. Then:
• e is internal if e⇤⇤ 2 P. e is external otherwise.
• P is stationary if 8e 2 P, e⇤ ⌘ K and e is external.
• P is non-stationary if it is not stationary.
• a story is a non-stationary process with internal events. An inter-
active story is one in which there are also external events.
Note that if P is a stationary process, for all events it holds pos(e) = 1
and nec(e) does not change through time (as neither the probability
does). In this case, to establish the temporal dynamics of an event we
only need an additional value: the sample rate. Non-stationary processes
can behave in many diﬀerent ways. One possible way is characterized
by processing the events within an EBN architecture using 2 values
Tmin, Tmax. Section 2.6.4 defines precisely the diﬀerent elements of an
EBN, and appendix A details exactly how the events of a non-stationary
process S are maped into an EBN.
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